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One of the most prominent characteristics of the public capital market is 
information asymmetry. During the process of going public, the asymmetric information 
exists between insiders (e.g., issuers) and outsiders (e.g., investors) because there is very 
limited public information about issuers when they operated as private firms. This will 
result in the uncertainty of firm values and consequently lead to IPO underpricing, which 
is a market anomaly when the share is priced under its intrinsic value. In this case, newly 
listed firms experience losses, as they are potentially able to raise more capital (e.g., with 
higher offer price sold). Apart from the short-run performance around the offering, over 
30% of IPO firms cannot survive longer than five years after going public. There are 
either acquired by other firms or delisted due to any negative factors (e.g., bankruptcy). 
Nevertheless, investors can take advantage of specific firm characteristics at the time of 
the offering to gain further valuation in order to anticipate the issuer’s future performance. 
Moreover, IPO is deemed as the most attractive way for venture capitalists (VCs) to exit 
their portfolio firms, as the return is substantially higher than M&As. As a special private 
fundraising entity, VCs’ reputation and expertise are important for IPO’s short-run and 
long-run performance.  
 
Therefore, in this thesis, I examine the potential factors that affect an IPO’s 
performance in different time horizon (e.g., short- and long- run). Specifically, I first 
question how political corruption affect firms’ initial public offerings. Then, I investigate 
the relationship between a firm’s geographically dispersed business interests at the time 
of going public and its post-IPO survivability. Lastly, I explore the impact of VCs’ 
monitoring failures of previously backed IPOs on the performance of future supported 
newly listed firms.       
 
First, I investigate the association between corruption and IPO underpricing. I find 
evidence that a politically corrupt environment increases underpricing and thereby 
imposes costs on firms that wish to access the initial public offering (IPO) market. The 
evidence indicates that the corruption effect applies only for small-sized issuers; 
moreover, the effect increases as the percentage of a firm's operations concentrated 
around its headquarter locations becomes greater. Further, I demonstrate that underwriters 
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play a vital role in promoting IPOs in a corrupt environment by increasing offer price 
revisions and reducing underpricing. Additionally, political corruption does not diminish 
the likelihood of pre-IPO shareholders' achieving wealth gains, but does reduce post-IPO 
financial performance. Overall, empirical evidence supports the notion that political 





Second, I explore the impact of geographic dispersion on IPO’s survivability. 
Using a text-based measure as proxy for a firm’s geographically dispersed business 
interests, I document that geographic dispersion increases the probability of failure risk 
for newly listed firms. I find that the effect is more pronounced in a soft information 
environment where information is not easily transferrable or verifiable over long 
distances, and in small communities where managerial social concerns dominate in 
decision-making. Moreover, I find that firms with spatially distributed business interests 
are negatively associated with post-IPO operating performance. Overall, the results are 
consistent with the argument that geographically dispersed firms are subject to internal 
information asymmetry and divert managerial focus away from shareholder value, which 
negatively affects corporate performance and eventually results in corporate failure. Our 
study suggests to the corporate world, stay concentrated to survive. 
 
Finally, I investigate how discredited VCs affect IPO performance. I define 
discredited VC as those who failed to monitor their backed IPOs and result in post-
offering litigations. I find discredited VC-backed IPOs experience higher underpricing 
and left more “money on the table”. Underwriters take advantage of offer price revisions 
to extract information from investors due to high information disparity. Further, IPO firms 
with discredited VCs exhibit declined post-IPO performance, as measured by operating 
return on assets and BHARs. Those IPOs are also associated with high failure risks. Lastly, 
I reveal it discredited VC-backed IPO with higher underpricing are less likely to face 
lawsuits, suggesting an insurance channel for the underpricing.  
 
This thesis provides innovative evidence not only broadening up our scope to 
different areas of IPO related studies, but also contributing to a wide range of literature, 
including political corruption, firm’s geographic dispersion, and venture capital financing.  
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Importantly, studies included in this thesis may provide practical implications for 





Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Background and motivation 
 
A private firm conducts an initial public offering (IPO) in order to trade in the 
public capital market, which also represents a transfer of ownership from the private to 
the public. During this process, the newly listed firms experience different challenges. 
One of the most prominent threat is the uncertainty of new issues deriving from the high 
information asymmetry problem, which result in greater IPO underpricing. When 
information asymmetry is high in the market, a majority of investors are lack of accurate 
information about IPO firms, known as uninformed investors; on the contrary, a small 
number of investors possess enough information about new issues which enable them to 
bid attractive shares, known as informed investors. Earlier studies suggest that investment 
banks have to underprice new issues in order to compensate uninformed investors and 
encourage them to participate in the market (e.g., Kevin Rock (1986); Beatty and Ritter 
(1986)). 
 
Nevertheless, this would make issuer suffer losses, as the new shares could be 
potentially priced higher and close to the intrinsic value. Previous studies have presented 
the evidence of various factors related to uncertainty (information asymmetry) and IPO 
underpricing, including firm specific characteristics (e.g., age, size) (e.g., Ritter (1984); 
Alexander Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003)), venture capital (Megginson and Weiss, 
1991), reputable underwriter and auditor (e.g., Carter, Dark and Singh (1998); Corwin 
and Schultz (2005); Weber and Willenborg (2003)), governance reform (Ekkayokkaya 
and Pengniti, 2012), firm location (Nielsson and Wójcik, 2016), the use of language in S-
1 fillings (Loughran and McDonald, 2013), and media sentiment and coverage (Bajo and 
Raimondo, 2017). However, the relationship between political corruption and IPO 
underpricing remains an unexplored area.  
 
Political corruption refers to an illegal activity when one party offers bribes to a 
public official in exchange for favors. In this regard, only a small number of firms can 
benefit from using bribes in the business because of the confidentiality of corrupt 
transactions and public officials would only accept bribes from their familiar partners.   
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Thus, political corruption significantly hampers economic growth as public officials 
become inefficient and the unfair competition between firms tends to be prevalent in the 
market. Consequently, firms operating in a politically corrupt environment are more 
likely to use more opaque disclosure to protect themselves from being exploited by 
corrupt officials (e.g., Stulz (2005); Durnev and Fauver (2011); Jared D Smith (2016)). 
This will make firms less transparent to outsiders, which increase information asymmetry 
and uncertainty. Due to the significant impact of political corruption on firms and 
financial market, we are motivated to investigate how corruption affects the firm’s initial 
public offering. We also aim to reveal underwriter’s role in a corrupt environment when 
bringing a firm to the public capital market. The second chapter presents an in-depth 
discussion between political corruption and IPO underpricing.  
 
Apart from underpricing which represents the short-run performance around the 
offering, another important issue in newly listed firms is post-IPO survival which 
indicates an IPO’s long-run performance. Firms have to deal with various challenges 
when their corporate structures have undergone significant changes from the private to 
the public, such as more intensive monitoring from investors and regulatory authorities. 
Evidence suggests that over 30% of IPOs were either failed or acquired within the first 
five years after listing due to poor performance (e.g., Loughran and Ritter (2002); Demers 
and Joos (2007)). Further, Bertrand and Schoar (2003) suggest that managers’ ability to 
make the decision is critical for the firm’s performance. Therefore, managerial decisions 
are vital for newly listed firms’ post-IPO survival.  
 
One of the most important firm’s characteristics is geographically distributed 
business operations. Since distance affects information flow (Petersen, 2004), previous 
literature suggests that firm’s geographic dispersion causes high information asymmetry 
between insiders and outsiders (Platikanova and Mattei (2016); Addoum, Kumar and Law 
(2017)); and between managers and shareholder which deteriorates agency conflicts, 
thereby affecting managerial decisions (Landier, Nair and Wulf, 2009).  Being inspired 
by the impact of firms’ geographically dispersed business interests on the information 
asymmetry and agency conflicts between managers and shareholders, we particularly 
explore how an IPO firm’s geographic dispersion affects the survivability in the post-
offering periods. We also investigate possible channels through which geographic 
dispersion affects IPO survival; namely, information asymmetry and agency conflicts. 
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The third chapter investigates this research topic and provides innovative evidence of the 
impact of geographic dispersion on corporate failures. 
 
 IPO is important for venture capitalists, as VCs can cash out from portfolio firms 
with high returns by taking them to go public. Further, because VCs are repeated market 
participants which accumulate abundant reputation and professional knowledge in the 
specific industry, they are recognized as value-adding services in the financial market. 
Due to the challenges that firms will experience in a public capital market, VCs tend to 
have in-depth involvements in portfolio firms in order to execute their certification and 
monitor roles. For example, VCs often take board positions in investee’s corporate 
activities. They also hold a large number of shares in post-IPO periods, which act as major 
shareholders. However, recent studies suggest that VC’s are less likely to cash out from 
IPOs because of IPO related litigations, which subsequently destroy their reputation and 
expose the shortage of their managerial abilities (e.g., Tian, Udell and Yu (2016)). 
However, it is unclear how these reputation damaged VCs affects IPO performance. 
Therefore, we examine the performance of newly listed firms with the participation of 
VCs who failed to prevent IPO frauds. Specifically, we focus on the IPO performance in 
the short and long run, including underpricing, post-offering operating performance, 
BHARs, and failure risks. In the fourth chapter, we present an in-depth analysis of the 
impact of reputation damaged VCs on IPO performances.   
 
In the following sections, we summarize the methodology, main findings, and 
contributions of the three research topics discussed above.  
 
1.2 Political corruption and firm access to the initial public offering 
 
In this study, we set up four research questions which associate political 
corruption and IPO: 1) Whether a corrupt environment affects firms’ going public process; 
2) if so, we ask whether the prestigious investment bank acts as an important financial 
intermediary in the IPO market can help; 3) we are curious about whether pre-IPO 
shareholders’ benefits are also affected by the politically corrupt environment; 4) we 
investigate the impact of political corruption on newly listed firms’ post-offering 
performance. To answer these questions, we measure the politically corrupt environment 
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as the number of corruption lawsuits per year divided by the total population during the 
same period in the state where IPO firm headquarter locates.  
 
Consistent with the argument that political corruption causes information 
asymmetry and market uncertainty, we document a positive association between a corrupt 
environment and IPO underpricing. The evidence suggests that IPO firms leave more 
“money on the table” when the local political corruption is severer, implying potential 
losses for them. For the economic cost, on average, IPO firms potentially lose US$1.08 
million for one standard deviation increase in the local political corruption rate. In 
addition, we reveal a vital certification role of prestigious banks when underwriting newly 
listed firms in a corrupt environment. Specifically, we find that investment banks with a 
good reputation can alleviate the corruption-effect on underpricing. Moreover, the 
prestigious banks tend to make efforts to induce private information from the informed 
investors during road shows in a corrupt environment, resulting in a higher number of 
offer price revisions. Finally, we find that corruption does not reduces pre-IPO 
shareholders’ wealth gains, but does negatively affect firms’ financial performance in 
post-offering periods.  
 
In this study, we also consider endogeneity issues. We first use a two-stage least 
square approach to control for the IPO firm’s selection of headquarter locations. We then 
apply a propensity score matching (PSM) analysis to control for the observable 
differences of IPO and firm characteristics between low and high corrupt areas. All of 
these two methodologies confirm our main findings that political corruption increases 
IPO underpricing, thereby leaving “money on the table”. Finally, we use the firm’s 
geographically dispersed business interests to examine the interactive effect with political 
corruption on underpricing. In particular, we find that IPO firms experience higher 
underpricing if they have increased business concentration around their headquarter 
locations. This evidence provides a robust pattern that political corruption increases 
information asymmetry around the IPO, along with the increasing operations in the state 
where firms’ headquarter locates.  
 
This study makes several significant contributions. First, our work extends the 
growing literature which addresses various negative impacts of political corruption on 
firm performance by showing that corruption imposes extra costs for firms to access the 
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public capital market. Moreover, apart from other works which focus on M&As and 
corruption in the host countries (e.g., Delios and Henisz (2000)), our study is the first to 
associate the market uncertainty stemmed from political corruption with an IPO setting 
in the local market. Çolak, Durnev and Qian (2017) identify gubernatorial elections as 
political uncertainty and find that firms are less likely to conduct IPOs during the election 
period. Our study, however, provides appealing evidence that how corruption linked 
political uncertainty lead to direct economic costs in the IPO market, namely greater IPO 
underpricing.  
 
1.3 Stay concentrated to survive 
 
We investigate how IPO firms’ geographically dispersed business interests affect 
their survivability in periods subsequent to the offering. We follow previous studies to 
measure an IPO firm’s geographically distributed operations by counting the number of 
state citations from specific sections which illustrate corporate operations in 10-K Forms 
issued in the offering year (e.g., see, Garcia and Norli (2012); Platikanova and Mattei 
(2016)). We create a normalized Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) to indicate the level 
of IPO firms’ geographically dispersed business interests across the U.S. states. To 
evaluate the impact of geographic dispersion on IPO survival, we rely on the Cox 
proportional hazard model (CPH), an econometric approach which is wildly used to 
predict the timing of an event (e.g., IPO failure) by taking time horizons into account.  
 
In empirical results, we reveal that newly listed firms with more geographically 
dispersed business interests experience higher failure risks in post-offering periods. We 
also classify firms into low and high dispersed groups. We find that firms with less 
dispersed businesses make it 0.756 times less likely to fail than firms with more dispersed 
businesses. Further, we document that firms share more competitions with industry rivals 
in the same state and firms’ dispersed businesses are closely correlated with local 
economic shocks are less likely to fail in post-IPO periods. We argue that this is because 
more comparable information stemmed from competitors enables shareholders to urge 
managers to make efficient decisions, and local shocks that are deeply associated with 




Further, we explore the possible mechanisms which affect geographically 
dispersed newly listed firms’ post-IPO survival. First of all, we find dispersed IPO firms 
are more likely to fail if they operate in a soft information-oriented industry. This is 
consistent with the argument that the soft information is difficult to be transferred and 
verified over long distances, which result in higher information asymmetry (e.g., Petersen 
(2004)). Second, we document that post-IPO failure risk is notably higher for small 
communities (e.g., less population) located dispersed firms in a soft information 
environment. This finding is consistent with Landier, Nair and Wulf (2009) that social 
concerns matter for managerial decision making, which have an impact on corporate 
performance. Thus, the results support our argument that geographic dispersion causes 
information asymmetry within the organization and deteriorates agency conflicts, thereby 
affecting corporate performance and result in IPO failures.  
 
The findings in this study contribute to the vast body of literature which emphasize 
the relationship between geographic dispersion and corporate performance (e.g., Garcia 
and Norli (2012)). However, we are the first to address the ultimate consequence that 
geographic dispersion can cause for firms, which is corporate failures. Thus, this study 
provides both firms and investors with significant insights into managerial and investment 
decision making. Specifically, our works suggest firms need to be careful when 
expanding their businesses to other areas. They may need to consider more about 
managerial aspect when making expansion decisions. For investors, our findings suggest 
that they can anticipate IPO’s future performance through observing the level of the firm’s 
geographic dispersion.  
 
1.4 The costs of monitoring failures: discredited VCs and IPO performance 
 
In this study, we investigate how discredited VCs affect the performance of their 
backed IPOs. We define discredited VCs as those who failed to prevent IPO frauds and 
subsequently caused post-offering litigations. Our promise is that those VCs experience 
reputation damage and expose their reduced managerial ability because of the IPO 
lawsuits that they experienced, and therefore impose negative impacts on their future 
backed IPOs. We employ both short-run and long-run performance measures in this study, 
including IPO underpricing, operating return on assets, BHARs, and post-IPO survival. 
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We also explore why discredited VCs can tolerate high underpricing at the time of going 
public.  
 
First of all, consistent with the argument that discredited VCs increase information 
asymmetry between their portfolio IPO firms and investors, we reveal a positive 
relationship between IPO underpricing and reputation damaged VCs. On average, 
discredited VC-backed IPO firms suffer a US $16.3 million hidden losses compared to 
non-discredited VC-backed IPOs. Moreover, we also find relevant evidence that 
underwriters extract private information from investors during roadshows in discredited 
VC-backed firms, as the offer price revision is higher. Second, we conjecture discredited 
VCs do not have sufficient managerial abilities because of the monitoring failures. Based 
on this argument, we document that discredited VC-backed IPOs experience declined 
operating returns on assets after going public, suggesting an inferior ability to generate 
profits based on the existing investments. 
 
Similarly, investors also suffer losses with the shares they hold for discredited 
VC-backed IPOs, as the BHARs significantly lower for those issues. Through 
implementing a Cox hazard proportional model, we reveal that discredited VC-backed 
IPOs are associated with higher failure risks than their counterparts without any 
discredited VCs. Finally, empirical evidence shows that IPOs with discredited VCs are 
more likely to be sued in post-offering periods, confirming the problem of managerial 
ability of those VCs. However, this effect can be alleviated by greater underpricing.  
 
Although previous literature has documented that VCs which are involved in 
litigations are less likely to cash out from IPOs, they do not indicate the economic 
consequences resulted from those VCs. To the best of our knowledge, we provide the first 
study to explore how reputation damaged VCs affect IPO performance. Importantly, our 
findings may suggest a value-reducing effect of discredited VCs, other than the general 
notion that VCs are value-adding financial intermediaries. Thus, investors may take 
advantage of VCs’ monitoring failure experiences to better evaluate their portfolio firms 
and make efficient investment decisions. 
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Corruption is pervasive in the world which negatively affects the whole society 
and economies (e.g., Alesina and Angeletos (2005)). When corruption takes the form of 
rent seeking, it can establish barriers for firms that wish to conduct business (e.g., Dal Bó 
and Rossi (2007); Nguyen and Van Dijk (2012); Athanasouli and Goujard (2015); Paunov 
(2016)). Indeed, the World Economic Forum has pointed out that corruption raises the 
cost of business for firms by 10% on average worldwide (OECD, 2013). However, 
surprisingly little is known about how the rent-seeking behavior affects the Initial Public 
Offering (IPO), as going public is an important source for firms to access the capital 
market. In this study, we address this gap by investigating the relation between IPO 
outcomes and politically corrupt environments in the US.  
                
The US is not a country with an extensive level of corruption. Transparency 
International gave the US a score of 76 out of 100 and ranked it sixteenth in the world in 
terms of corruption severity. Nevertheless, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is 
devoted to eliminating corrupt activities in the US. For instance, William J. Jefferson, a 
Representative of Louisiana’s 2nd Congressional District since 1991, was convicted for 
taking advantage of his political position to offer favorable treatment for several 
American companies. Specifically, during 2000 to 2005, he received bribes of 
US$478,000 and helped his co-conspirators to seek billions of dollars additional income. 
Further, in a sting operation named “Tennessee Waltz” conducted by the FBI from 2002 
onward, several state legislators were arrested after accepting more than US$150,000 in 
bribes to help a firm introduce new legislation that was beneficial to its business; however, 
the law has not been passed. 
 
There are two main research streams that focus on corruption and firm 
performance. The first addresses the issue that corruption diverts a firm’s productivity 
from its regular operations. In this regard, political corruption can reduce investment and 
research and development (R&D) expenses (Ades and Tella, 1997), make firms 
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inefficient (Dal Bó and Rossi, 2007), obstruct firms that wish to attain access to business 
and regulation (Nguyen and Van Dijk, 2012), cause management and productivity to 
deteriorate (Athanasouli and Goujard, 2015), and establish barriers for firms that wish to 
obtain quality certificates (North (1990) and Paunov (2016)). The second research stream 
relates to firms that can benefit from rent-seeking behavior. The corruption mentality can 
help firms to deal with inefficient governments and poor local laws (Leff (1964) and Lui 
(1985)), and thus aid the firms' growth (e.g., Michael T Rock and Bonnett (2004), Vial 
and Hanoteau (2010) and Mironov (2015)). When bribery is used in business, it acts as 
part of the bargaining process between corrupt governments and firms (Paunov, 2016). 
Firms can benefit from such a process by offering bribes and quickly receiving 
governmental services such as municipal contracts. However, just a small number of 
firms can gain any advantage because corrupt officials only accept bribes from certain 
risk-free sources. In contrast, firms that do not have access to illicit business activities 
experience losses compared with their corrupt competitors. The effects of corruption on 
firm performance raise several interesting questions: Does political corruption have an 
impact on firms' access to public capital markets when the firms decide to go public? If 
so, do prestigious investment banks that act as intermediaries in the financial market 
provide help? How does a corrupt environment affect pre-IPO shareholders' benefits? 
Does political corruption affect firm’s post-IPO performance? 
 
Motivated by the empirical evidence on this subject, we address the foregoing 
questions by examining the relationship between political corruption and IPOs' initial 
returns. We use a large, comprehensive sample of US newly listed issues from 1990 to 
2015. We obtain data about corruption convictions from the US Department of Justice 
(DOJ) that relate to US public officials in each state and adopt per capita convictions in 
order to link such officials to the corrupt business environment. This approach is similar 
to that of Butler, Fauver and Mortal (2009) and Jared D Smith (2016)). However, in a 
departure from these studies, we measure corruption from 1976 to the appropriate IPO 
year to account for accumulated political corruption. In this regard, we consider the 
impact of the period before a firm goes public to the initial aftermarket returns.  
 
Generally, the IPO market is characterized by information asymmetry, which 
causes uncertainty about firm value for investors and results in unusual initial returns (e.g., 
a high degree of underpricing) (Kevin Rock (1986); Levis (1990); Amihud, Hauser and 
17 
 
Kirsh (2003); Nielsson and Wójcik (2016)), which is the potential loss that represents 
“money left on the table” increases the cost of accessing the public capital market for IPO 
issuers. In this study, we argue that political corruption raises uncertainty in the local 
business environment for two reasons. First, if firms offer bribes to a corrupt 
governmental official, they are likely to adopt a means to prevent such corrupt behavior 
from being exposed to the public because of the need for secrecy (Murphy, Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1993). For example, such firms use a concentrated decision-making process, 
thereby making their organizational activities less transparent. Second, if firms suffer 
productive or managerial setbacks because of unfair competition caused by competitors' 
illicit business activities, these firms are likely to conceal their inferior situations from 
investors, resulting in increased ex ante uncertainty. In sum, we argue that political 
corruption unquestionably influences market information asymmetry and ex ante 
uncertainty, thereby affecting IPOs' initial returns.  
 
We find evidence of political corruption's important effects on IPOs' initial returns. 
Specifically, we reveal that a corrupt environment is associated with higher IPO first-day 
returns in the US stock market. This effect is economically significant: A one standard 
deviation increase in the political corruption rate (PCR) is linked with a 1.06% increase 
in initial returns, which translates into US$1.08 million of “money left on the table” for a 
mean-sized issuer. The results indicate that political corruption causes a higher incidence 
of underpricing for small-sized but not large-sized firms. We argue that this is because 1) 
large-scale firms possess the capability and resources to secure themselves in the financial 
market and 2) such firms have better connections with politicians and are likely to use 
bribes for business, thereby enabling the firms to benefit from corruption. The overall 
findings are consistent with the resource redistribution model, which suggests that 
resources are re-allocated from one party to another party because of rent-seeking 
activities. Indeed, the finding that a higher incidence of underpricing is caused by 
corruption implies that IPO issuers incur opportunity costs and that investors benefit from 
more returns in the short term.  
 
We consider the endogeneity that arises from the selection of headquarters by IPO 
issuers. A firm can choose to locate its headquarters in various US states, all of which 
have different corruption levels. This selection may affect financial and managerial 
decisions (e.g., Jared D Smith (2016)). Thus, ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates are 
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potentially biased because of such self-selection. In order to address this concern, we 
implement a two-stage instrumental variable approach to reveal a corrupt environment's 
pure effect. Specifically, we select educational level, racial heterogeneity, and the Gini 
ratio at state level, all of which have a causal relationship with political corruption as 
instruments. Our results continue to hold after controlling for the endogeneity problem.  
 
Given the argument that a politician has a greater ability to misappropriate money 
from a firm if the firm’s business is concentrated in the politician’s jurisdictional area 
(Jared D Smith, 2016), we find that political corruption does not affect initial returns and 
revisions when an IPO firm has no business in the vicinity of its headquarters. This 
finding implies that a firm has an incentive to move its business away from its 
headquarters to a state where there is less corruption. Further, the results imply that 
investors are disadvantaged when they evaluate new issues in politically corrupt 
environments. The reason is that information asymmetry and market uncertainty tend to 
be higher if firms concentrate their business on their headquarters' locations when such 
locations have high levels of corruption. This finding is reflected by greater initial returns.  
 
Importantly, when examining the association between corrupt environments and 
underwriters, we reveal that a positive relationship exists between corruption and IPOs 
that offer price revisions. The evidence reflects a significant desire for information 
production in a corrupt environment during bookbuilding. We attribute this to the 
underwriters' promotional efforts, whereby they attempt to induce private information 
from informed investors and price shares close to their intrinsic values. Thus, we also 
document that a prestigious bank can reduce the incidence of underpricing in a politically 
corrupt environment. Further, we reveal that a corrupt business environment does not 
cause pre-IPO shareholders' benefits to deteriorate by demonstrating that corruption 
increases the likelihood of net wealth gains for insiders. This explains why issuers may 
not worry about losses from initial returns in a corrupt environment because pre-IPO 
shareholders still benefit from the shares they retain. The evidence supports prospect 
theory (Loughran and Ritter, 2002) and the wealth-maximizing hypothesis (Ang and Brau, 
2003).  
 
Moreover, when taking post-IPO financial performance into account, we find that 
newly listed firms experience a considerable decline of Tobin’s Q, capital expenditure, 
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and profitability after one year of listing compared with the IPO year. Thus, we conclude 
that firms that go public in environments with higher levels of political corruption are 
associated with negative post-IPO growth. The results support the view that for issuers, 
the market timing of an IPO is important for future development (e.g., Christoffersen, 
Nain and Tang (2010); Shantanu Banerjee, Güçbilmez and Pawlina (2016)).  
 
Finally, we conduct various robustness checks. We first measure a corrupt 
environment from the year of a firm's incorporation to its IPO year and also use raw 
convictions as an alternative measure. We then exclude IPOs from Washington D.C. 
because corruption in this area is relatively higher than in others. Further, we adopt a 
perception-based measure, known as corruption scales, from Boylan and Long (2003). 
Lastly, we extract conviction data from the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse 
(TRAC), an alternative database, which helps to build a full picture of corrupt 
environments. The results from using all these measures are robust in terms of our 
baseline findings and show that political corruption raises costs for firms that go public 
by generating higher first-day returns. In addition, we extract conviction data to create a 
measure for the environment of white-collar crime, which is another type of rent-seeking 
activity. The results suggest that our analysis is not caused by white-collar crime and is 
robust to political corruption. 
 
Our study makes important and significant contributions to the literature on 
political corruption and IPOs. Prior studies theoretically and empirically demonstrate that 
political corruption negatively affects firm performance, but has a limited effect on 
managerial and productivity levels; thus, political corruption potentially causes extra 
costs for firms (e.g. Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1993); Bliss and Tella (1997); Ades 
and Tella (1997); Mo (2001); Fisman and Svensson (2007); Dal Bó and Rossi (2007); 
Bloom and Van Reenen (2010); Athanasouli and Goujard (2015)). To our knowledge, we 
provide the first study to present empirical evidence that political corruption imposes 
additional costs on firms in the IPO context by revealing that newly listed firms raise less 
capital than they are potentially able to raise. Further, some studies point out that 
corruption is related to a high degree of business uncertainty (e.g., Murphy, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1993); Ades and Tella (1997)). They also argue that a relationship exists between 
such uncertainty and mergers and acquisitions (M&A) in host countries (e.g., Delios and 
Beamish (1999); Delios and Henisz (2000); Slangen and Van Tulder (2009)). We 
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examine business environment uncertainty that stems from corruption in the context of 
local financial markets. Specifically, we show that a high degree of market uncertainty 
that results from political corruption obstructs investors from gathering IPO information 
and assessing the corresponding firm's value, a situation that leads to greater underpricing.  
 
Most corruption-related studies focus on the international arena. However, 
concentrating on individual countries is more appropriate because this approach controls 
for institutional and cultural factors (Fisman and Gatti, 2002). The US is usually treated 
as a country with low political corruption (e.g., International Country Risk Guide). Indeed, 
corruption may have a low impact on firm performance in the US because of the 
comprehensive and well-defined legal system. Thus, our study adds new evidence to the 
growing literature of within-country studies about the way in which corruption affects 
firm performance (e.g., Amore and Bennedsen (2013); Jared D Smith (2016)). Further, 
prior research presents various factors that could determine IPO performance, such as a 
firm's credit rating (An and Chan, 2008), international business activity (Mauer et al., 
2015), and location (Nielsson and Wójcik, 2016). However, we address a new 
determinant of IPO short-term returns in the stock market: political corruption. 
 
Our study also relates to research that addresses the relationship between politics 
and IPOs. The literature in this field explores the benefits that issuers can obtain from 
political connections (e.g., Gounopoulos et al. (2017)). We extend such work by 
providing new insights about the use of political corruption and thereby demonstrate that 
newly listed firms suffer losses because of political reasons rather than benefiting from 
them. Çolak, Durnev and Qian (2017) reveal that political uncertainty caused by 
gubernatorial elections has a negative impact on a firm’s decision to go public. We update 
their work by taking corrupt environments into account to show the economic 
consequences for IPOs that result from political uncertainty. 
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the relevant 
literature and section 3 presents the hypotheses' development. Section 4 explains the 
sample that we employed. Section 5 presents our preliminary findings and tests the 





.2.2 Literature review 
 
2.2.1 Theoretical framework 
 
The resource redistribution model, which addresses the relationship between rent 
seeking (corruption), production, and the economy was first modeled in the classic work 
by Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1993). According to their study, if rent seekers from the 
public or private sectors attempt to misappropriate values from society, such actions 
reduce the returns of production because more resources are allocated to rent seekers (e.g., 
corrupt public officials). Alternatively, misappropriation results in a third party losing an 
opportunity to share the resources in a market. 
 
In terms of the foregoing research, suppose that a regional government has 
procurements that are open to bids from any firm. At the same time, a small number of 
firms are determined to bribe public officials to win the bids. Consequently, such corrupt 
business activity disrupts competitive fairness in the market and gives an advantage to 
those firms that offer bribes, enabling such firms to benefit from public resources. The 
corruption-free firms may then realize that they are trapped in an unexpectedly difficult 
situation in which they must compete with corrupt firms in an environment where 
resources have moved from the public to the bribers. Thus, corrupt activities can 
eventually damage the economy and output through the redistribution of resources. 
However, hidden costs will increase for those firms that operate in a corrupt business 
environment. In spirit of their work, we examine consequences of rent seeking in the IPO 
market. 
 
2.2.2 Political corruption and firm performance 
 
The literature has extensively uncovered the relationship between corruption and 
firm performance. Corruption can impede a firm’s growth directly or indirectly. Ades and 
Tella (1997) document that corruption can reduce investment and R&D expenditure by 
affecting an industry's policies. Dal Bó and Rossi (2007) argue that corruption can divert 
firms from their primary economic activities. They focus on electricity firms and find that 
these have to invest in additional input to produce the same amount of output in a corrupt 
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environment. Athanasouli and Goujard (2015) report that corruption weakens a firm’s 
management and aggregate productivity. They find that contract-dependent firms in a 
corrupt region have lower R&D investment and smaller product markets. In addition, the 
authors reveal that such firms are associated with a highly centralized decision-making 
mechanism. Paunov (2016) provides evidence that corruption reduces the probability of 
firms obtaining quality certification and decreases investment in innovation. However, 
the study fails to prove that corruption has a negative impact on the efforts of export-
oriented and publicly traded firms to obtain relevant certifications and patents.   
 
Although retrieving corruption-related information at the micro level is extremely 
difficult because of the need for secrecy about corrupt activities, a few studies have found 
ways to overcome this problem and use firm-level data to assess the sensitivity of business 
performance to corruption. Fisman and Svensson (2007) document that corruption 
hampers a firm’s growth three times more than taxation. Specifically, the authors use 
bribery data from surveys of Ugandan firms and reveal that a one-percentage point 
increase in bribery payments results in a three-percentage points decrease in firm growth. 
Similarly, Nguyen and Van Dijk (2012) use different firm-level surveys that indicate the 
severity of perceived corruption in Vietnam. The authors conclude that corruption 
impedes private firm’s growth but does not harm state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The 
reason may be the special interrelationship of SOEs with governmental officials, which 
benefits SOEs at the cost of private firms in a corrupt environment. The authors argue 
that the adverse effects of corruption on businesses can be mitigated by improving 
governance quality, lowering business entry costs, offering better land access, and 
ensuring better regulations in the private sector.  
 
In contrast to the negative effects of corruption on firm performance, some studies 
consider the circumstance whereby malfeasance can benefit firms to some extent. First, 
from a macro perspective, some research focuses on the entire economy. Leff (1964) and 
Lui (1985) argue that corrupt activities enable firms to dispose of obstacles caused by 
local government, such as inefficient public services or incomplete laws. Michael T Rock 
and Bonnett (2004) reveal that corruption helps new, large industrializing economies 
grow faster in East Asia. They assert that the high level of growth in a highly corrupt 
environment originates from the trade-off whereby bribery is used in exchange for 
quicker and efficient services from governmental officials.  
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Second, few studies document the beneficial aspects of corruption at a micro level. 
Vial and Hanoteau (2010) measure corruption in terms of bribes and indirect tax payments 
to investigate how corruption affects firms in Indonesia. They present a long-term 
positive effect of corruption on plant growth, a finding that supports the “grease the 
wheels” hypothesis. Finally, Mironov (2015) uses a unique database of driving licenses 
from Russia and employs the propensity to corruption (PTC) as an objective measure. He 
documents that firms that use corrupt chief executive officers (CEOs) outperform their 
counterparts in terms of income diversion for their firms. Nevertheless, even if some firms 
can benefit from using bribes to conduct business, other firms that do not engage in illegal 
activities suffer potential losses and eventually leave the market (Bliss and Tella, 1997).  
 
2.3. Hypotheses' development 
Information uncertainty refers to the ambiguous information regarding a firm’s true value 
in the market. Zhang (2006) argues that the uncertainty derives from poor information 
and the volatility of firms’ fundamental financial performance. Similarly, Jiang, Lee and 
Zhang (2005) suggest that information uncertainty relates to the firm’s ambiguous value 
of which professional investors cannot estimate it at a reasonable cost. However, unlike 
information uncertainty, information asymmetry implies that there are some informed 
investors bear more advanced internal information about firms’ intrinsic value over other 
uninformed investors in the market. Thus, there is asymmetric information between the 
informed and uninformed market participants. In this study, we argue that political 
corruption increases information uncertainty in terms of firm value and deteriorates 
information asymmetry problem among investors. 
 
2.3.1 Corrupt environments and IPO performance 
 
Firm performance signals stock price stability and relates to future dividend 
distribution. Better firm characteristics can deliver benefits to investors. IPO investors 
may decide to stay away from risky environments because they are usually willing to pay 
a higher price for issues that have outstanding quality. Chiang, Qian and Sherman (2010) 
document that institutional investors always consider the value of the issue when 
investing in an IPO. Similarly, Neupane, Paudyal and Thapa (2014) reveal that 
institutional investors are sensitive to firm quality when they make investment decisions; 
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moreover, retail investors follow institutional investors if the latter perform well in the 
market. However, a rent-seeking environment can inherently destroy firm performance 
(e.g., Dal Bó and Rossi (2007); Nguyen and Van Dijk (2012); Athanasouli and Goujard 
(2015); Paunov (2016)). 
 
If investors realize that the IPO firms in a corrupt environment do not show 
prospective financial achievement, they may not demonstrate the demand that the issuers 
expect. This situation causes a financial predicament for IPO firms; indeed, in such a 
corrupt environment, firms will have difficulty raising capital against securities in order 
to go public. Further, when operating under notable conditions of political corruption, 
issuers may be motivated to conceal from investors information such as financial or 
managerial deficiencies. For instance, issuers may use ambiguous language for some of 
the content in their IPO prospectuses in order to mislead investors. Consequently, when 
a corrupt environment damages firms' performance, such firms are less transparent when 
they go public.  
 
 Stulz (2005) and Durnev and Fauver (2011) reveal that firms tend to implement 
opaque disclosure policies to protect resources when they are surrounded by risks in rent-
seeking business circumstances. Thus, when operating in a corrupt environment, firms 
are likely to hide financial information in order to avoid demands for bribes made by 
corrupt officials. Further, Jared D Smith (2016) finds that firms tend to decrease liquidity 
and increase debt obligations to limit expropriation when operating in uncertain, 
politically corrupt environments. In addition, investors find it hard to value firms that are 
engaged in corrupt business activities because of the firms' need for secrecy. For instance, 
using bribes for business may lead firms to centralize their decision-making processes to 
prevent information leakage (Athanasouli and Goujard, 2015), a situation that makes such 
firms less transparent. 
 
 Thus, a politically corrupt business environment increases market uncertainty and 
risks (Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1993); Ades and Tella (1997)). Beatty and Ritter 
(1986) argue that IPO underpricing should be resolved along with the ex-ante uncertainty 
of IPO firm value. Investors are more likely to become involved in a call option for 
information production during the IPO process when the strike price is compared with 
the offer price. When uncertainty is aggregated, investors require a lower offer price to 
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increase the value of the call option in exchange for costly information collection. 
Consequently, IPOs that are issued in a corrupt environment and the increased ex ante 
uncertainty associated with them lead to our first hypothesis. 
 
H1: IPOs in an environment with notable political corruption are associated with 
higher first-day returns. 
 
Svensson (2003) argues that the amount of bribes that a firm is keen to offer 
depends on its “ability to pay.” Thus, large firms may become long-term partners with 
corruption-prone governors and in return receive greater benefits from the bribes that they 
pay. As the resource redistribution model states, such rent-seeking activity has largely 
moved resources from the public to firms that resort to bribery, resulting in damage to 
those firms that do not benefit from corruption. Paunov (2016) reveals that corruption 
negatively affects the likelihood that firms obtain quality certificates and particularly has 
an impact on small firms. Thus, large firms do not worry about fighting against corruption 
in the same way as small firms (Dixit, 2015). Moreover, large firms usually have more 
resources and human capital to secure themselves in the market and thereby avoid adverse 
effects from corruption. Concentrating on the IPO context, if corruption does not 
exacerbate problems with firm performance, the issuer is less likely to conceal any 
disadvantages when going public. Consequently, this leads to lower uncertainty and 
information asymmetry for firm values, which enables investors to collect information 
about an IPO at a lower cost. Given this argument, we propose our second hypothesis. 
 
H2: The level of corruption level should affect underpricing among small firms, with 
less or no effect among large firms. 
 
2.3.2 Corrupt environments and offer price revisions 
 
IPO revision is treated as an effective means for investment banks to collect 
private information from informed investors and induce them to reveal it (Benveniste and 
Spindt (1989); Hanley (1993)). During the bookbuilding process, the banks have 
discretion to distribute shares and make a final decision on the offer price. Benveniste and 
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Spindt (1989) develop an information acquisition model that suggests a good piece of 
news from informed investors lowers an IPO's offer price. This reduction represents 
compensation for providing private information. In contrast, some investors hide 
information deliberately. They are allocated fewer shares by investment banks as 
punishment. Offer price revision is sensitive to the uncertainty of firm value rather than 
the value per se (Cook, Kieschnick and Van Ness, 2006). A corrupt environment aggregates 
information asymmetry and market uncertainty; in other words, less informed investors 
trade in a corrupt environment, a situation that enlarges the information asymmetry 
problem between investors and investment banks. Thus, gathering information during 
road shows becomes more difficult when rent seeking is prevalent. We posit our third 
hypothesis by associating offer price revisions and corrupt environments. 
H3: The demand for collecting information in corrupt environments is higher and 
is reflected by a greater number of offer price revisions. 
 
2.3.3 The underwriter’s role in corrupt environments 
 
Habib and Ljungqvist (2001) point out that one of the promotional activities used 
by issuers is to hire prestigious investment banks that act as underwriters. Reputable 
underwriters are market participants that have been tested over the years and have 
reputations at stake. They have experience in promoting, supporting, and certifying IPOs. 
Their appearance in IPOs from rent-seeking environments should send a positive signal 
to investment organizations that have doubts about the new issues. Further, reputable 
underwriters have usually established close links with such investors (Alexander P 
Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2002); Chen and Wilhelm (2008)). Thus, the underwriters can take 
advantage of their experience and networks to target particular investors in rent-seeking 
environments. For example, underwriters can invite institutional investors with expertise 
in the industries of IPO firms during the bookbuilding process. These investors can 
analyze firms accurately and thereby increase their confidence about issues in corrupt 
environments. Such confidence, in turn, reduces the cost of collecting information by 
investors. This situation helps underwriters to price issues at their intrinsic value.   
 
Nevertheless, the ability of reputable underwriters to price issues close to their 
intrinsic value does not only depend on investors. If firms are from rent-seeking 
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environments, their transparency may be lower. This circumstance restrains underwriters 
when evaluating the issues. In this regard, reputable underwriter may pay high salaries to 
experienced analysts, such as all-star analysts, to help evaluate IPOs. In turn, such 
analysts may overcome the problems caused by corrupt environments; for instance, the 
difficulty in fairly judging the extra expenditure that firms incur through public rent 
seeking. From this point onward, prestigious investment banks have greater bargaining 
power over issuers in corrupt environments. Wei Wang and Yung (2011) assert that 
reputable underwriters can incorporate information into the pricing of issues more 
accurately. Consequently, issuers from corrupt environments are willing to pay higher 
premiums in exchange for accurate issue pricing from reputable underwriters (e.g., 
Sherman and Titman (2002)). The advantages and superior abilities of prestigious 
investment banks in corrupt environments thus lead to our fourth hypothesis. 
 
H4: Prestigious investment banks can price issues more accurately in politically 
corrupt environments. 
 




This study's sample includes shares of US common stock recorded in the Thomson 
One Banker database from January 1, 1990 to December 31, 2015. We exclude issues 
with offer prices below US$5 because of the restrictions imposed by the Penny Stock 
Reform Act of 1990 on such IPOs. In order to avoid further negative impacts on our 
sample from certain types of offerings, we follow prior literature and eliminate closed-
end funds, unit offerings, real investment trusts (REITs), American depositary receipts 
(ADRs), and financial institutions (SIC between 6000 and 6999). This approach leaves 
the sample with 4670 observations. We also rely on the same database to collect each 
offering's information, including the offer price, the underwriter’s information, the ratio 
of the shares that insiders retain during the IPO, the number of bookrunners, and the 
primary market where the stock trades. We gather firm age and each underwriter’s 
reputation from Jay Ritter’s website. In order to identify an issuer’s location, we obtain 
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information about its headquarters from Compustat and combine this with the source from 
Thomson One Banker to ensure the data's reliability. 
 
2.4.2 Measures of politically corrupt environments 
  
We extract the number of public corruption convictions from the Report to 
Congress on the Activities and Operations of the Public Integrity Section, released 
annually by the DOJ's Public Integrity Section (PIN) (Benveniste and Spindt, 1989), for 
each state between 1976 and 2015.1 The report includes corruption-related cases that were 
mostly prosecuted by the US Attorney’s Office and cases that were handled directly by 
PIN when the latter provided operational support. PIN's cases include criminal conflicts 
of interest, bribery, election crimes, and extortion.  
 
We follow Glaeser and Saks (2006) and Butler, Fauver and Mortal (2009) in using 
the local, politically corrupt environment as a proxy. In this regard, we use the number of 
corruption convictions divided by the population, in terms of millions of people, in each 
state. Prior research has widely adopted this method (e.g., Glaeser and Saks (2006); Butler, 
Fauver and Mortal (2009); Jared D Smith (2016)). However, in a departure from other 
related studies, we consider cases where, for example, a firm goes public in 2000 and the 
corrupt environment deteriorates in the firm's state after 2001. In order to avoid such 
problems related to the year affecting the offering and the corruption status, we create a 
unique measure of a corrupt environment for the time at which a firm goes public. Further, 
because an IPO is a long and complicated process, considering the associated politically 
corrupt environment in either the IPO year only or any short period is unsuitable. Thus, 
we use an accumulated corrupt environment measure that accounts for the information 
asymmetry in the market before a firm goes public.2 Namely, we calculate the number of 
public corruption convictions per million people from 1976 to the IPO year as follows.3  
 
 
1 For a missing value, we use the average number of convictions of the years adjacent to the missing observation. 
2 We must clarify that the accumulated corruption in a local environment various over time depending on the number of annual 
convictions and the population in the state. This situation is consistent with the notion that political corruption does not suddenly 
change but improves or worsens over the years. We provide examples in the Appendix. Nevertheless, the results remain quantitatively 
unchanged if we measure the corrupt environment at one, three, and five years before the firm going public. The results are provided 
in the Internet Appendix.  
3 We do not consider the lagging effect of a corrupt environment because corruption conviction cases have inherent characteristics 




𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠(𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 1976 𝑡𝑜 𝐼𝑃𝑂 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟)
𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖𝑛 𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 1976 𝑡𝑜 𝐼𝑃𝑂 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟)
                   (1) 
 
where PCR is the political corruption rate, which is the measure of the politically corrupt 
environment in a particular state. One could argue that an appropriate measure should 
consider an IPO's month because the level of corruption in a particular environment may 
vary across the year. However, the DOJ does not release conviction data monthly.  
 
We notice that IPOs from Washington D.C. have an environment with a higher 
level of corruption, ranging from 31.87 to 50.24 convictions per million people. Other 
states vary from 0.42 (Vermont) to 6.41 (Mississippi). It is unsurprising that Washington 
D.C. has such a highly corrupt environment for two reasons. First, Washington D.C. is 
the political center of the US, a circumstance that significantly increases the likelihood 
that public officials are corrupt. Second, there are fewer inhabitants in Washington D.C., 
thereby making the per capita conviction rate higher. Thus, we winsorize the PCR at the 
1% and 99% levels at each tail because of such a large difference in Washington D.C. In 
our robustness test, we exclude IPOs from Washington D.C. and report similar results.  
 
2.4.3 Sample statistics 
 
Panel A of Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the control variables used in 
our sample. The average IPO initial return is 19.01% with an average of 1.31 bookrunners 
involved. The mean (median) firm age is 15.05 years (eight years), with 40% of firms 
from the high-tech industry. Most issuers (73%) tend to hire prestigious underwriters. 
Firms backed by venture capital (VC) represent 44% of our sample. The average ratio of 
shares that insiders retained during IPOs (overhang) is 3.58%. The average IPO offer 
price revision is 11% with 65% experiencing upward revisions. Most IPOs (67%) were 
audited by the Big 4 accounting firms. 55% IPO insiders are able to manage positive gains, 
and 72% firms listed on Nasdaq and 73% were in hot market period. The average total 
proceeds raised by IPO firms are US $88.94 million. In term of financial performance, 
the average changes for Tobin’s Q, capital expenditure and profitability from IPO year to 




Panel B of Table 1 displays descriptive statistics categorized by the level of 
corruption. In order to define the corruption variable, we take the median of the PCR's 
time-series for each state and, if the PCR is greater (smaller) than the corresponding state's 
median, we classify it as an environment with a high (low) level of corruption. The results 
imply that the difference in IPO first-day returns and offer price revisions is large and 
significant. IPO firms with headquarters located in areas with high levels of corruption 
have an average initial return of 21.73%, which is greater than that of issuers from areas 
with relatively no corruption. The difference in offer price revisions is even larger: IPOs 
firms with headquarters in high-corrupt areas have average revisions that are 103% higher 
than an IPO from low-corrupt areas. Other control variables also exhibit statistical 
differences in means, except total assets, proceeds, ∆CapX, and ∆Prof. 
In Table 2, we provide a list of each 10 IPOs that are ranked as having their 
headquarters located in environments with the highest (lowest) levels of political 
corruption. For comparative purposes, we also present the average first-day returns and 
"money left on the table" in the IPO years. Specifically, panel A of Table 2 reports the 
least 10 IPOs operating in the low corrupt environment, and panel B displays the foremost 
10 IPOs operating in the highly corrupt environment and exclude the IPOs from 
Washington D.C. We take the lowest (highest) PCR value for the IPOs that share the 
same level of political corruption or are from the same state for panel A (panel B). We 
observe that, in most cases, the IPOs located in environments with relatively high (low) 
levels of corruption in the issuing years show excessive (reduced) initial returns and leave 
more (less) "money on the table" than those IPOs located in environments with average 
levels of corruption in the issuing years.  
 
The unilateral comparative results are consistent with our primary hypothesis that 
a corrupt environment leads to a higher incidence of underpricing and a greater number 
of offer price revisions. However, the analysis does not take into account other influential 
factors. Thus, we control additional explanatory variables and conduct multivariate 
regression analysis to investigate the association between corrupt environments and IPO 
performance in the following sections. 
 




2.5.1 The association between political corruption and IPOs' initial returns 
 
We now examine the relationship between politically corrupt environments and 
IPOs' initial returns. We control for various IPO-specific characteristics that have been 
found to have an impact on underpricing, together with year and industry effects (the 
coefficients are suppressed). Further, Butler, Fauver and Mortal (2009) argue that 
political corruption could be characterized by the general demographic features of  US 
regions. Thus, following the US Census Bureau, we classify our sample into the West, 
Midwest, South, and Northeast based on the locations of the IPO issuers' headquarters. In 
this way, we include regional control in our regressions. Panel A of Table 3 reports the 
results of the estimations. 
Column 1 of Table 3 includes only our main explanatory variable, PCR, which 
indicates the level of politically corrupt environment at the location of an IPO firm’s 
headquarters. The IPO initial return variable appears to be positively related to PCR in 
this specification (significant at 1% level), corroborating the results of the univariate 
comparisons. We then gradually incorporate additional control variables that could have 
an impact on IPO initial returns in columns 2 to 4. The coefficients of PCR show 
consistently positive and high significant signs (e.g., at 1% levels), which provide strong 
evidence that local, politically corrupt environments are associated with a higher 
incidence of underpricing, a situation that causes IPO issuers potential losses in the public 
capital market. Using column 4 to illustrate the economic magnitude of the impact of 
corrupt environments on IPOs' initial returns, we observe that a one standard deviation 
increase in PCR implies a 1.26% increase in initial returns. This finding translates into a 
US$1.13 million potential loss for an average issuer.      
 
We should emphasize that the foregoing analysis is based on the assumption that 
the selection of headquarters' locations by IPO issuers is exogenously determined. 
However, the location of a headquarters is not randomly selected. A firm can choose any 
state for its headquarters; however, states have environments with varied levels of 
corruption, levels that have an impact on the process of going public. Thus, the choice of 
headquarters' locations for IPO firms may act as an endogenous problem in our analysis. 
 
Following Faulkender and Petersen (2006), An and Chan (2008), and Lin and Su 
(2008), we use a two-stage instrumental variable model to address this self-selection 
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concern. The model requires the use of proper exogenous variables that can affect the 
dependent variable through a main explanatory variable but do not have a direct impact 
on the outcome (Wooldridge, 2015). Ideally, the variable should influence the choice of 
a firm's location of its headquarters in terms of the local, politically corrupt environment 
but should not influence the IPO's initial returns. Following Mauro (1995), Alesina, Baqir 
and Easterly (2000), Glaeser and Saks (2006), and Lochner (2007), we select educational 
level, racial heterogeneity, and the Gini ratio variables at state level to serve as 
identification restrictions. Prior studies demonstrate that racial heterogeneity can affect 
corruption because it may encourage politicians to use money transactions in exchange 
for political support from their ethnic groups (e.g., Glaeser and Saks (2006)). In order to 
construct the instrumental variables, we collect data from the US Census Bureau and 
match our sample by IPO year from t+1 to t+9 to a single value strictly after each census 
year.  
 
Column 5 of Table 3 reports the results from the second step of a two-stage least 
squares (2SLS) regression to control for endogeneity4. As can be seen, instrumented PCR 
is positively related to underpricing at the conventional level (5%). Importantly, the 
reported p-value of the Durbin–Wu–Hausman test reject the possibility that PCR is not 
exogenous (p-value=0.35). Thus, our results using OLS estimations are not biased by the 
selection issue. We specifically consider IPO revisions in column 6. The results suggest 
that the incremental explanatory power of this covariate positively affects underpricing; 
yet the effect of PCR remains unchanged. 
 
Next, we investigate the effect of corruption on underpricing among different firm 
dimensions. We keep all covariates included in panel A of Table 3 and divide the sample 
by firm size. We classify large firms as those with pre-IPO total assets in the top quartile 
in our sample. The results are presented in panel B. The estimations show a positive 
coefficient of 1.484 which is significant at 5% level for PCR for small-sized firms; in 
contrast, PCR displays a negative coefficient but with no statistical significance for large-
sized firms. The evidence, as expected, suggests that political corruption does have an 
 
4 In the first stage of 2SLS approach, we find that the level of education is negatively associated with the degree of 
local corruption; while the political corruption increases with the local racial heterogeneity and gini ratio. The 
estimations show expected results which are aligned with previous studies (e.g., Glaeser and Saks (2006)). The results 
are tabulated in Appendix B. 
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impact on small issuers but has no effect on large ones. Particularly, investors are less 
confident about small firms with headquarters in politically corrupt environments and 
require higher premiums (e.g., more first-day returns). This is consistent with our 
conjecture that the stock performances of large firms are less likely to be influenced by 
corruption because of the benefits such firms may receive from the use of illegal business 
means or because of the firms' ability to keep themselves safe from corruption, thus 
leading to less uncertainty about IPOs and reduced costs of information collection for 
investors. 
 
Most of the control variables are significant at the conventional level and show 
the expected signs in Penal A. Firm age appears to be negatively related to underpricing: 
An older firm generates lower information uncertainty because investors can acquire 
more knowledge about the business (Cliff and Denis (2004)). The positive and significant 
signs on Total Assets contradict the finding from Suman Banerjee, Dai and Shrestha (2011) 
which document a negative relation between firm size and underpricing, though they are 
partially consistent with Nielsson and Wójcik (2016). Leverage ratio is negatively 
associated with first-day returns, a finding that is aligned with the argument that when 
firms rely on debt financing, they should generate lower first-day returns (Gounopoulos 
et al. (2017)). High-tech firms and firms listed on Nasdaq stock exchange exhibit 
excessive initial returns as per Boulton and Campbell (2016) and Bajo and Raimondo 
(2017). The coefficients on Top-tier and Venture capital are positive, which support the 
view that investment banks lower the risk of underwriting new issues by underpricing 
more (Loughran and Ritter, 2004) and venture capitalists are likely to use underpricing to 
build their reputations (Neus and Walz, 2005).  Moreover, the negative value on Auditor 
is in line with the argument that issuers can reduce information asymmetry through hiring 
reputable auditors and therefore lowering initial returns (Titman and Trueman, 1986). 
Although signs on those financial intermediaries are generally aligned with previous 
studies, they are not statistically significant except the sign on Venture capital in column 
3. The positive and significant coefficients on Share overhang indicate that higher insider 
shareholdings implying lower dilution costs and greater level of underpricing (Bradley 
and Jordan, 2002). The number of bookrunners is related to lower underpricing because 
more bookrunners mean greater efforts regarding IPOs, resulting in fewer gaps between 
offer prices and firm value (Nielsson and Wójcik, 2016). Finally, the relationship between 
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Hot market and initial returns displays positive signs (e.g., Suman Banerjee, Dai and 
Shrestha (2011)), although they are not statistically significant.  
 
Overall, in this section, we address that political corruption has a positive effect 
on IPO initial returns, because of high uncertainty and information asymmetry in the 
financial market. 
 
2.5.2 IPO offer price revision  
 
In this section, we test the association between IPO offer price revision and IPO 
firms that go public in politically corrupt environments. We measure offer price revision 
as the percentage change from the midpoint of the initial price range to the offer price 
(Corwin and Schultz, 2005). In order to capture the magnitude of revisions and the distinct 
price patterns at different levels of political corruption, we use the absolute value of IPO 
revisions. In addition, we create a dummy variable (revision dummy) to indicate upward 
revisions; namely, when an offer price exceeds the midpoint of the initial price range. If 
a corrupt environment results in more frequent offer price revisions because of the need 
for information to be revealed from investors, such an environment is also likely to 
generate more positive revisions. We again include year, industry, and regional controls 
in our analysis. Table 4 presents the results. 
 
We first use absolute revision as the dependent variable. The insignificant 
estimate of PCR in column 1 of Table 4 suggests that IPOs are not easy to value alongside 
increases in local corruption. In column 2, the coefficient of Revisions is 0.433 and 
significant at 5% level, suggesting a positive relationship between IPO offer price 
revisions and politically corrupt environments. A one standard deviation increase in PCR 
results in a 0.348% rise in offer price revisions on average.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
In column 3, we run a logistic estimation using revision dummy as the outcome variable. 
In this instance, the coefficient of PCR is 0.103 and significant at the 1% level. The 
evidence implies that underwriters are more likely to revise offer price revisions upward 
in politically corrupt environments, which is corresponding to the results in column 2. 
Given that underwriters frequently revise offer prices because of the need for information 
production (Benveniste and Spindt, 1989), our results provide evidence that higher 
market uncertainty and severer information asymmetry exist in markets where there is 
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political corruption. The results support our second hypothesis that a high demand exists 
for underwriters to induce private information in a corrupt environment, resulting in more 
IPO offer price revisions. The signs of the control variables are generally in line with 
those in the IPO literature. 
 
2.5.3 The underwriter’s role  
  
Because we conjectured in our fourth hypothesis that prestigious banks have 
superior abilities to help firms operating in rent-seeking environments to mitigate the 
level of IPO underpricing, this section provides empirical evidence in support. We use 
two indicators to measure an underwriter’s reputation: the underwriter’s ranking, ranging 
from the lowest score of 0 to the highest score of 9, and a binary variable indicating 
whether an underwriter is from the top-tier by limiting the ranking to 7 or over. We follow 
prior related analysis and include year, industry, and regional controls. Table 5 presents 
the results.  
 
For example, in Table 5 the coefficient of the interaction term PCR*Underwriter 
Rank is negative (-0.184) and significant at the 5% level, suggesting that investment banks 
with higher rankings can reduce IPO underpricing when working in severely corrupt 
environments. Similarly, the sign of PCR*Top Tier remains negatively correlated with 
initial returns and significant at the 5% level. Other control variables display expected 
signs and are consistent with Table 3. Importantly, in both columns, the coefficients of 
PCR remain positive and significant at the 1% levels. Thus, the estimates of interaction 
terms suggest that prestigious underwriters can reduce the level of initial returns while 
working in politically corrupt environments, therefore enabling IPO issuers to incur less 
“money left on the table”. Overall, the results support our fourth hypothesis.  
 
2.5.4 Geographic concentration 
 
A firm’s geographic concentration refers to the degree of business dispersal across 
different regions (Garcia and Norli, 2012). Jared D Smith (2016) reveals that firms with 
more operations in the states where their headquarters are based face negative impacts 
from local corruption because such firms tend to increase leverage to avoid illegal 
expropriations from public officials. This finding supports that of Bai et al. (2014), who 
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use survey-based bribe-related data to document that firms with greater business mobility 
suffer less from demands for bribes. Further, public officials should gain bargaining 
power over a firm that has its business concentrated entirely in the local area (Jared D 
Smith, 2016). This means that a state governor with a tendency for corruption is likely to 
control regional commercial resources, such as export/import permits and tax abatements. 
Thus, we should expect that a firm with its business concentrated to a greater extent in 
the state where its headquarters is located is surrounded by a higher level of uncertainty 
and more information asymmetry when it goes public.  
 
In order to measure an IPO firm’s geographic concentration, we follow Garcia and 
Norli (2012) to see how many times each state is mentioned in a firm’s 10-K report from 
1993 to 2015.5 We use the first available related filling reported for the IPO year from the 
Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval (EDGAR) database. We merge our 
geographic concentration data with Garcia and Norli (2012) to ensure the data's 
authenticity. 6  Because of the information's availability, the sample reduces to 3504 
observations. 
 
Following Jared D Smith (2016), we create an indicator named Operation 
Concentration %. This indicator measures the percentage of a firm’s business 
concentration in the state where its headquarters is located by using the citation factor of 
headquarters' locations over all states. In order to examine the association between a firm's 
operational business concentration and IPO outcomes (e.g., initial returns and offer price 
revisions), we include an interaction between PCR and Operation Concentration %. We 
also include year, industry, and regional controls. The results are tabulated in Table 6. 
 
The dependent variable in column 1 is the percentage initial return. The coefficient 
of the interaction term, PCR*Operation Concentration %, is 3.14 and significant at the 
5% level. This finding suggests that a firm with a higher concentration of its business 
operations in the state where its headquarters is located, and where there is political 
corruption, has greater initial returns at the time of its IPO. Moreover, the coefficient of 
Operation Concentration % is significantly negatively related to initial returns. We, 
 
5 When the 10-K report is unavailable, we follow Garcia and Norli (2012) and use alternative reports. A further discussion can be 
found in Appendix A. 
6 Garcia and Norli (2012) collected the data from 1993 to 2008 which is available to download from their website. We thank them to 
generally sharing the data. 
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therefore, hypothesize that information asymmetry should be lower if a firm’s operation 
is intensified around the HQ location. To further examine this conjecture, we use IPO 
offer price revisions in column 2 as the dependent variable. First, the negative and 
significant sign on Operation Concentration% reveals a negative relation between firm’s 
operation concentration and revisions, which consequently leading to a less difficult 
information gathering process for investors and underwriters. Further, we find a positive 
and significant coefficient of the interaction term PCR*operation Concentration%. The 
result implies that there is high information asymmetry in the market when IPO firms 
have greater business concentration around the HQ locations, which support our third 
hypothesis. Finally, the estimates of PCR in columns 1 and 2 are not statistically 
significant, implying that political corruption does not affect an IPO's initial returns and 
offer price revisions if the firm does not operate any business in the state where its 
headquarters is located. 
 
We can draw two implications from the resulting estimates. First, when firms 
locate in an environment with a higher level of political corruption, they have an incentive 
to move their businesses to an area associated with less corrupt activities. This incentive 
should include the benefits from reduced initial returns and the potential to raise more 
capital during an IPO. Nevertheless, Jared D Smith (2016) argues that geographic 
concentration should be an outcome variable driven by local corruption. Consistent with 
this argument, we document a negative relationship between a corrupt environment and 
business concentration in the state where a firm has its headquarters (significant at 1%).7 
Second, the results indicate an investor’s ability to evaluate IPOs in politically corrupt 
environments. In particular, when a firm conducts no business in the state where its 
headquarters is located, there is less adverse impact from corruption and investors have 
better access to information to value a new issue. In contrast, investors require more time 
and incur higher costs to acquire information when an IPO is subject to the risks of a 
corrupt environment (and the firm has a higher concentration of its operations in the 




7 We use accumulated politically corrupt environment rates, while Smith (2016) uses the corruption rates only in the firm year. 
However, we reach the same conclusion as his study and provide robust evidence that political corruption incentivizes firms to move 
their business outside the states where their headquarters are located. The results are available on request. 
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2.5.5 Insiders' wealth  
 
One of the principal objectives for firms that go public is to take pre-IPO 
shareholders' net wealth gains into account. Loughran and Ritter (2002) argue that 
insiders gain by retaining shares when the stock price is high (the wealth effect) and lose 
by selling shares with high first-day returns that result in a substantial amount of "money 
left on the table" (the dilution effect). Such wealth gains, however, are affected by offer 
price revisions and initial returns. Pre-IPO shareholders benefit from a higher market 
price, which results from higher levels of revision and underpricing, depending on the 
number of shares that pre-IPO shareholders retain. However, pre-IPO shareholders suffer 
losses from low offer prices that do not reach intrinsic values (the dilution effect). Thus, 
the overall effect of offer price revisions and initial returns on insiders' wealth depends 
on the portion of shares they retain and sell during IPOs. Consequently, net wealth gains 
using the dilution effect abstracted from the insiders' wealth effect can appropriately 
capture the prosperity of pre-IPO shareholders. As a result, we are particularly interested 
in investigating how a corrupt environment affects insiders' wealth.  
 
We use insider wealth dummy as the dependent variable that indicates whether 
pre-IPO shareholders benefit from wealth gains. The measure we employ is the wealth 
effect minus the dilution effect. 8  In addition to the variables that interest us, we 
incorporate three control variables: initial return residuals, IPO float ratio, and the 
logarithm of IPO proceeds. The initial return residuals variable is obtained by regressing 
IPO first-day returns on measures of corrupt environments and is used as a proxy for the 
separate effect of underpricing on insiders' wealth (Cook, Kieschnick and Van Ness (2006); 
Cooney et al. (2015)). We include IPO float ratio because Cook, Kieschnick and Van Ness 
(2006) document that it influences underpricing and has an impact on insiders' gains. 
Following Alexander Ljungqvist, Nanda and Singh (2006), we control for the logarithm of 
IPO proceeds, given that an underwriter is likely to increase an offer's size to entice 
sentiment investors. Such investors determine the marginal valuation of an issue in the 
 
8 Following Bradley and Jordan (2002), Cook et al. (2006), and Cooney et al. (2015), we define insiders' wealth effect as (closing 
price of the first trading day minus midpoint filing range)*number of shares retained by pre-IPO shareholders. The dilution effect is 
calculated as (closing price of the first trading day minus offer price)*number of shares issued in the offering. We measure the number 




market. We perform a logistic regression to investigate the association between insiders' 
wealth and political corruption. The results are tabulated in Table 7.  
 
The results from the control variables are in line with Cook, Kieschnick and Van 
Ness (2006) and Cooney et al. (2015). Specifically, we find that increasing the amount of 
proceeds during an IPO and decreasing the IPO float ratio can improve the likelihood of 
net gains for pre-IPO shareholders. The initial return residuals also exhibit a positive 
relationship with insiders' wealth and are significant at 1%. Importantly, we observe that 
a corrupt environment does not reduce insiders' wealth because the variable of interest 
PCR shows a positive sign (0.109) with a high statistical significance level of 1%. This 
finding is consistent with the wealth maximizing hypothesis proposed by Ang and Brau 
(2003), which states that insiders use strategies to conceal the number of shares they sell 
in the aftermarket in order to boost their own benefits. In addition, Loughran and Ritter 
(2002) argue that issuers do not feel upset about the “money left on the table” because the 
perceived wealth gains exceed the losses from first-day returns. Our results support this 
finding and particularly indicate that a corrupt business environment may not be a concern 
for insiders because they still benefit from the shares they retain before an IPO.  
 
2.5.6 Matching estimation 
 
The results from Panel B of Table 1 show that most of our control variables are 
significantly different between the low and high corrupt environments. The statistical 
differences appear in majority of IPO and firm characteristics. Thus, the differences in 
IPO characteristics in two group of corrupt areas could be caused directly or indirectly by 
the local political corrupt environment, or by unobserved heterogeneity between IPO 
issuers. In this section, we use propensity score matching (PSM) to control for such 
observable differences. Using a propensity score matching analysis, we can statistically 
compare the outcome of a treated observation (IPO firm) with an effect (high corrupt 
environment) to the same observation but not treated based on a number of covariates. 
We define our treatment observations as those IPOs from high corrupt areas and include 
rich sets of covariates from the previous analysis. We extend our testing by controlling 
for year, industry, and region effects. Table 8 presents the results of the average of effect 
of the treatment on the treated (ATET) on the IPO initial returns for the newly listed firms 
from a high corrupt environment versus those from a low corrupt environment. The ATET 
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is positive, as the sign is 4.088, and strongly significant at 1%, indicating that IPO firms 
in a high corrupt environment incur high initial returns compared to their counterparts in 
a low corrupt environment. This finding supports our primary hypothesis and is aligned 
with the results from Table 3. 
 
2.5.7 Post-IPO financial performance 
 
The market timing for a firm to go public is important because it often relates to a 
firm's future performance. Çolak and Günay (2011) suggest that high quality firms are 
likely to wait to go public so that they do so strategically in a wave; thus, newly listed 
firms have lower productivity and perform worse after listings if they conduct their IPOs 
earlier (Christoffersen, Nain and Tang, 2010). Shantanu Banerjee, Güçbilmez and Pawlina (2016) 
document that early movers in a hot IPO market have better growth opportunities and 
higher valuations when they go public. Following their research, we question whether a 
firm goes public when the market is surrounded by political corruption that could affect 
post-IPO growth.   
 
In order to answer this question, we create three measures as proxies of firm 
financial performance. We first follow Khanna and Palepu (2000) and use Tobin’s Q ratio. 
We measure the ratio as (market value of equity + book value of preferred stock + book 
value of debt)/(book value of assets), where the price on the last trading day in the year 
is used for calculating the equity's market value. Second, we use capital expenditure and 
profitability, following Shantanu Banerjee, Güçbilmez and Pawlina (2016), to link the 
operating performance of an IPO firm. In order to explore how a corrupt environment 
around an IPO affects post-IPO performance, we use percentage changes of three 
performance indicators separately, from the IPO year to one year after the IPO, as 
dependent variables. We add a number of IPO characteristics as control variables that can 
have an impact on post-IPO performance (e.g., Shantanu Banerjee, Güçbilmez and Pawlina 
(2016)). The number of observations falls because of the availability of accounting data 
and the status of IPO firms (e.g., delisting and M&A). As in prior analyses, we control 





First, setting the level of Tobin’s Q in column 1 in the IPO year as a benchmark, 
newly listed firms experience reduced Q ratios one year after going public under 
conditions of greater political corruption. Further, we observe a negative coefficient, -
5.306 and significant at the 5% level, on the PCR in column 2, suggesting that going 
public in a corrupt environment hampers an IPO firm’s investment growth in the public 
capital market. Finally, when we focus on the changes in profitability in column 3, the 
variable of interest, PCR, displays a negative effect on IPO firms' profitability. In terms 
of economic significance, one standard deviation increase in PCR results in 0.018%, 
5.32%, and 2.374% reductions respectively of Tobin’s Q, capital expenditure, and 
profitability for IPO firms one year after listing compared with the IPO year. In 
unreported results, we fail to find such evidence in consecutive financial years (e.g., the 
second and third years), which suggest that going public under politically corrupt 
environments, firms suffer from the negative growth only for a limited period.  
Overall, the results are consistent with the view that newly listed firms not only 
suffer losses from the process of going public; they also experience negative growth for 
a short period immediately after going public.  
 
2.5.8 Alternative measures and robustness tests 
 
This study's main conclusion is that IPO issuers in politically corrupt 
environments incur higher initial returns; thus, a significant amount of money is "left on 
the table." In this section, in order to explore further the sensitivity of IPO underpricing 
in politically corrupt environments, we consider alternative measures of corrupt 
environments for IPO firms and use a different conviction database. We also derive full 
sets of control variables from our baseline regressions in Table 3. The results are 
presented in Table 10.    
 
In prior analyses, we measure corrupt environments from 1976 to the IPO year to 
account for accumulated local corruption. First of all, we use an alternative measure that 
only considers rent-seeking business environments from the time that the IPO firms are 
established in column 1. In other words, the new measure is defined as the number of 
convictions per million population for the period beginning with each firm's founding 
year to its IPO year. The intuition behind this measure is that the impact on an IPO in a 
politically corrupt environment may begin from the date of the firm's establishment. 
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Because of the limited conviction data provided by the DOJ, firms that started their 
businesses before 1976 are deemed to have begun from 1976 in our analysis. Next, in 
column 2, we use raw convictions without population adjustment as the political 
corruption measure. Furthermore, we exclude firms with headquarters located in 
Washington D.C. in column 3. Eliminating IPOs from Washington D.C. in our sample 
implies that such IPOs (which experience an extremely high level of corruption) do not 
drive our results.  As seen in Table 9, the resulting coefficients of PCR through columns 
1 to 3 remain positive and significant at the conventional levels, providing alternative 
evidence that a corrupt environment results in higher IPO initial returns.  
 
In column 4, we use the survey-based corruption measure developed by Boylan 
and Long (2003). In order to ensure the measure's effectiveness, we extend the sample to 
five years after the survey was conducted, which was 1999. The result, as expected, shows 
that a corrupt environment is positively associated with IPO underpricing. It presents a 
positive coefficient of 2.194 on the variable of interest and is statistically significant at 
the 5% level.  
 
In order to underpin our results, we apply an alternative conviction data source 
from Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC). The advantage of using 
TRAC is that the database employs the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) to request 
raw information from different agencies such as the FBI to ensure the quality of the data. 
However, TRAC only provides conviction data from 1986. Thus, we start measuring 
corrupt environments from 1986 to the IPO years. The PCR coefficient in column 5 shows 
that, even if we use an alternative conviction data source, political corruption has a 
positive (1.199) and significant (at the 1% level) impact on initial returns.  
 
Prior studies consider white-collar crime as additional rent-seeking behavior in 
the private sector (e.g., Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1993)). Such crime could be a 
plausible factor that influences our results because the related convictions have a more 
direct impact on firm performance (e.g., Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1996); Baucus 
and Baucus (1997); Marciukaityte et al. (2006)). Arguably, one would suspect that white-
collar crime, other than political corruption, causes high IPO first-day returns. Given this 
concern, we collect white-collar crime conviction data from TRAC and duplicate the 
measures used for political corruption. Column 6 presents the results of regressions that 
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we run to investigate the association between white-collar crime and IPO performance. 
From the empirical evidence, we find that no significant relationship exists between 
white-collar crime and initial returns. Further, the variable of interest PCR remains 
positive and significant at the 5% level. In fact, unlike government behaviors, which 
attract greater public attention, white-collar crime tends to be implicit. The firm and 
investor will not realize the crime until the offender is arrested. Thus, in this situation, 
IPO issuers have no incentive to conceal information; moreover, the investor does not 
pay attention to such a crime. Consequently, white-collar crime should not be a factor that 




2.5.9 Other sensitivity checks 
 
In order to provide further robust evidence, we use the following sensitivity 
checks. 1) Because of the nature of the distribution of the right-tail skewness and 
leptokurtosis of IPO initial returns, we follow prior studies (e.g., Leone, Rock and 
Willenborg (2007); Gounopoulos et al. (2017)) and use the natural logarithm of one plus 
the variable (Log (1+IPO Initial Returns)) to pursue the improved explanatory power of 
political corruption on IPO initial returns. 2) We construct event periods for corrupt 
environments using conviction data from the DOJ. We particularly use PCR in the year 
of issuing, three- and five-year windows to evaluate political corruption around the IPO 
of each newly listed firm in the state where its headquarters is located. In all tests, the 
variable of interest, PCR, remains positive and significant, suggesting a strong pattern 
that IPO firms in a politically corrupt environment incur higher initial returns on their 




2.6.1 How do pre-IPO shareholders achieve positive returns in a corrupt 
environment? 
 
A question that arises from our study is how do pre-IPO shareholders achieve 
positive returns in a corrupt environment from the shares they retain, even though political 
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corruption imposes costs for firms that access the IPO market by raising first-day returns? 
In this regard, we argue that an underwriter’s promotional efforts during an IPO play an 
important role in a corrupt environment.  
 
As discussed, a pre-IPO shareholder’s wealth gains depend on a greater number 
of IPO offer price revisions and reduced underpricing relative to the portion of shares that 
the shareholder retains. However, our evidence indicates that political corruption 
increases first-day returns, meaning that insiders continue to suffer losses in a corrupt 
environment. Thus, the results from section 5.2 give the impression that insiders' wealth 
gains may mainly derive from a greater number of offer price revisions, a circumstance 
that is attributed to the promotional efforts of underwriters (Cook, Kieschnick and Van Ness, 
2006). As our third hypothesis postulates, a corrupt environment results in a greater 
number of revisions because of the demand for information production in the market. On 
the one hand, underwriters can incorporate information into offer prices (Corwin and 
Schultz, 2005); moreover, a greater number of revisions brings benefits to issuers (e.g., 
the ability to raise more capital) (Cooney et al., 2015). On the other hand, investment 
banks need to balance the level of underpricing (Beatty and Ritter, 1986), especially when 
corruption is more prevalent. In addition, underwriters may lose investors' participation 
when aftermarket returns are low (i.e., collecting information in a corrupt environment is 
costly and investors do not receive sufficient compensation); thus, when IPOs are 
undervalued, other potential customers (i.e., IPO issuers) may attempt to free ride on this 
problem and decide not to hire the same banks in the future. This situation forces 
underwriters to make their best efforts to support IPOs in politically corrupt environments. 
 
Further, in order to examine the IPO relationship with corruption levels separately, 
our unreported results (which are available on request) use gross spread, which has total 
fees as a proxy, and selling concession, which represents the reward for selling an issue. 
These results reveal that both compensation measures are positively associated with 
corrupt environments. This finding suggests that issuers pay more for underwriters when 
political corruption is more prevalent. There is also evidence that investment banks regard 
their prestige in the market as an important symbol for future business. Thus, higher fees 
provide underwriters with greater incentives to secure their reputations and increase the 
number of offer price revisions for IPO firms that are from corrupt environments. Insiders, 
in turn, benefit from price revisions. Success in conducting IPOs in corrupt environments 
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can promote the status of banks and thereby attract more issuers that are conducting 
business in such environments. Thus, reciprocal relationships between IPO firms and 
investment banks increase the likelihood of positive wealth gains for pre-IPO 
shareholders in corrupt environments.    
  
2.6.2 Why firms go public under high politically corrupt environments? 
 
             One would consider that firms go public when market uncertainty is high (e.g., 
with politically corrupt environment) may represent a successful market timing. In this 
case, the negative post-offering growth is merely a by-product for such activities. Thus, 
there would cause confounding results while explaining the market timing and IPO 
outcomes (e.g., positive insider wealth gains and the unfavorable growth). In this section, 
we argue that there are multiple reasons and incentives for firms to decide whether to go 
public when there is a high corrupt environment.  
 
First, firms going public is necessarily rather than randomly. On the one hand, 
conducting the IPO could be a result of raising more capital for the future development. 
For instance, Bernstein (2015) empirically documents that firms with the enhanced access 
to the public capital market gain external opportunities to acquire other firms in order to 
increase their innovations and attract new human capital; while they continue to focus 
more on conventional investments. On the other hand, institutional investors, such as 
venture capitalists, may prefer to take the advantage of going public to exit the investees 
because of high returns (e.g., Amit, Brander and Zott (1998)); whereas some firms choose 
to use the IPO to facilitate merge and acquisition (M&A) activities (e.g., Celikyurt, Sevilir 
and Shivdasani (2010); Gill and Walz (2016)).  Therefore, under some circumstances, 
firms have to go public even if they realize there is a high politically corrupt environment 
around the scheduled IPO date.  
 
Further, as the evidence shows in the Section 5.4, shifting the business 
concentration away from the HQ location to an area where there is a lower corrupt 
environment significantly reduces initial returns. However, going public is a rigorous 
process which basically requires firms with stable financial and managerial systems. Once 
a firm decides to move the operation from the HQ location to other areas, it may take a 
long time to deploy the new business strategy. Furthermore, tax incentive tends to be 
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another reason which explains why firms do not change the location of their headquarter 
easily. Dyreng, Lindsey and Thornock (2013) reveal that tax factors play an important 
role on firms’ decisions regarding whether to locate subsidiaries in Delaware, because 
firms can gain values in tax heavens (e.g., Choy, Lai and Ng (2017)). In other words, 
firms can benefit from local tax regulations. They may choose the location of 
headquarters or subsidiaries based on the local tax levels. In the long run, it is costly for 
firms to change the location of the headquarters in order to decrease IPO underpricing, 
because they would lose more by paying additional taxes. Thus, changing the business 
concentration to exchange for the reduced initial returns could be extraordinarily costly 
and may negatively affect the IPO process. As indicated in the Section 6.1, underwriters 
charge higher fees for taking firms to go public in politically corrupt environments. In 
this scenario, if firms which cannot sustain the costly change in the business concentration, 
they have to rely on the underwriters. Therefore, regardless of market timing 
consideration, pre-IPO shareholders that can manage positive gains in a corrupt 
environment may largely attribute to underwriters’ promotion efforts, even though the 
insiders can also reach the wealth-maximizing target through strategically concealing 
their shareholdings (Ang and Brau, 2003).  
 
Overall, firms go public under a high corrupt environment may not be a well-
scheduled market timing because those firms incur higher initial returns and experience 
lower post-offering financial performance.             
                                                                                
2.7 Conclusion 
 
This study provides initial evidence about the relationship between corrupt 
environments and IPO short-term performance in the US. Such evidence is consistent 
with the argument that political corruption increases the uncertainty of business 
environments and has a negative impact on firm performance. Specifically, we reveal that 
political corruption is associated with a higher incidence of IPO initial returns but only 
for small-sized firms and firms that conduct their business in the states where their 
headquarters are located. This finding translates into a US$1.13 million loss for a mean-
sized issuer in the form of excessive first-day returns. Moreover, the finding is consistent 
with information asymmetry as the cause of a higher incidence of underpricing. In this 
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regard, such information asymmetry is due to the market uncertainty that surrounds IPOs 
in corrupt environments. We also address the role of underwriters in risk-adverse markets. 
We document that those investment banks with higher rankings reduce the incidence of 
underpricing for issuers that operate in politically corrupt environments. This finding is 
in accord with the banks' certification roles in terms of IPOs. Further, in accordance with 
the information-acquisition model, underwriters revise offer prices frequently in corrupt 
environments because there is a greater demand to gather information from informed 
investors. Moreover, our examination of pre-IPO shareholders' wealth gains shows that 
issuers in rent-seeking environments may not worry about “money left on the table” 
because they still benefit from the shares they retain. Finally, we find that firms that go 
public in politically corrupt environments experience negative post-IPO growth. 
 
In our analysis, we consider an endogeneity issue. This occurs because, in our 
sample, the locations of IPO firms' headquarters are not randomly selected. We conduct 
an instrumental variable approach and use educational level, racial heterogeneity, and the 
Gini ratio as instruments for political corruption. In robustness tests, we employ 
alternative ways to measure corrupt environments, use the TRAC database for corruption 
convictions, and exclude factors that may drive our analysis (e.g., we exclude IPOs from 
Washington D.C). All the analyses strengthen our propositions and suggest that political 
corruption in the US raises costs for firms that go public by leaving millions of dollars 
“on the table.” 
 
In response to the questions raised in the introduction, the findings of this paper 
imply the following. (1) Political corruption aggregates the uncertainty of the business 
environment and creates barriers for firms that wish to enter the public capital market 
through higher first-day returns. (2) Underwriters play an important role in eliminating 
market information asymmetry and can reduce the incidence of underpricing for issuers 
in corrupt environments. (3) Corruption has a positive impact on pre-IPO shareholders' 
wealth because of investment banks' promotional efforts. (4) Firms suffer negative post-
IPO financial performance if they go public in environments with high levels of political 
corruption. Overall, our study uncovers the significance of corruption in terms of IPO 
initial returns. Thus, our study adds to the growing literature on the dynamics of how 








Table 1 Summary statistics 
The table provides summary statistics for the main control variables used in the analysis. The sample consists of initial public offerings from 1990 to 2015 in the US stock 
market. The variables contain IPO characteristics collected from Thomson One., including IPO initial returns, calculated as the percentage changes from first day closing 
price to offer price. IPO revision is defined as changes from offer price to midpoint of the initial price range over offer price. The missing values from database trim the 
sample size on IPO revision, Revision UP dummy and insider’s wealth dummy.  All variables are defined in the appendix.  
Panel A: Summary statistics  
Variables  N  Mean  Std.Dev  5th  Median  95th 
IPO Initial returns  4670  19.01  34.81  -7  8.13  85.65 
Firm Age  4670  15.05  20.51  1  8.00  62.00 
Total Assets  4670  344.50  1511.46  7.31  75.02  1267.03 
Leverage  4670  0.37  0.30  0.06  0.30  0.84 
High-tech  4670  0.40  0.49  0  0  1 
Top-tier  4670  0.73  0.45  0  1  1 
Venture Capital  4670  0.44  0.50  0  0  1 
Auditor  4670  0.67  0.47  0  1  1 
Nasdaq  4670  0.72  0.45  0  1  1 
Share Overhang  4670  3.58  4.23  0.37  2.81  8.49 
No. of Bookrunners  4670  1.31  0.90  1  1  3 
Hot market  4670  0.73  0.45  0  1  1 
Revision  4670 
 0.11  14.27  -23.80  0  20.80 
Revision dummy  4670 
 0.65  0.48  0  1  1 
Insider's wealth dummy  4337 
 0.55  0.50  0  1  1 
Proceeds  4337  88.94  324.53  6  41.6  272 
∆Tobin's Q  3424  -0.03  1.66  -0.81  -0.18  1.05 
∆CapX  3951  205.62  3159.77  -68.00  45.80  579 









Panel B: Summary Statistics by Corrupt and Non-Corrupt areas 
Variables     Low-corrupt areas     High-corrupt areas       
difference in means 
 (p-value) 
IPO Initial returns    15.73    21.73    0.00 
Firm Age    15.67    14.53    0.03 
Total Assets    348.44    341.24    0.44 
Leverage    0.38    0.36    0.03 
High-tech    0.35    0.44    0.00 
Top-tier    0.72    0.74    0.07 
Venture Capital    0.39    0.49    0.00 
Auditor    0.62    0.70    0.00 
Nasdaq    0.70    0.74    0.00 
Share Overhang    3.78    3.74    0.00 
No.of Bookrunners    1.27    1.35    0.00 
Hot market    0.77    0.69    0.00 
Revision    -0.45    0.58    0.00 
Revision dummy    0.62    0.67    0.00 
Insider's wealth dummy    0.53 
   0.57    0.01 
Proceeds    84.50 
   92.60    0.21 
∆Tobin's Q    0.02 
   -0.06    0.07 
∆CapX    245.80 
   171.72    0.23 
∆Prof    104.24 
   46.61    0.12 
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Table 2 Sample IPOs based on the level of political corrupt environment 
The table reports ten IPOs in the top/lower level of political corrupt environment in the US, based on the headquarter locations. The sample consists of initial public offerings from 1990 
to 2015 in the US stock market. IPO first-day returns are calculated as the percentage changes from first day closing price to offer price.  We use political corruption rate (PCR) calculated 
as number of corruption convictions from 1976 to the IPO year divided by the population in millions in the same period to proxy the local corrupt environment. Panel A presents the ten 
IPOs in states with the lowest corrupt environment; Panel B presents the ten IPOs from the states with top corrupt environment, but excluding the district of Washington D.C. We take 
the lowest (highest) PCR value for IPOs from the different states as examples in Panel A and B. The average IPO initial returns and average money left on the table in the IPO year are 
obtained from Jay Ritter’s website. 
Panel A 










on the table 
($, million) 
 
Avg. money left on 
the table (IPO year 
,$, million) 
03/09/1995  Fort Howard Corp  76  Wisconsin  1.41  1.58  21.2  3.91  4.90 
06/24/2004  Cabelas Inc  43  Nebraska  1.31  30  12.3  46.88  3.86 
08/22/1991  BMC West Corp  4  Idaho  1.23  0  11.9  0  1.5 
10/24/1996  Uroquest Medical Corp  0  Utah  1.15  0  17.2  0  6.76 
02/12/1999  Bottomline Technologies Inc  10  New Hampshire  1.14  57.46  71.2  25.40  37.11 
07/24/2000  Evoke Communications Inc  3  Colorado  1.11  0  56.4  0  29.81 
12/17/1997  Information Advantage Software  5  Minnesota  1.04  1  14.0  0.2  4.56 
12/14/2004  Cascade Microtech Inc  21  Oregon  0.71  -1.79  12.3  -13.28  3.86 
04/27/1993  Interlinq Software Corp  11  Washington  0.55  0  12.8  0  3.52 
03/10/1993  Specialty Paperboard Inc  25  Vermont  0.42  3.85  12.8  1.16  3.52 
Panel B 










on the table 
($, million) 
 
Avg. money left on 
the table (IPO year 
,$, million) 
02/04/2000  eOn Communications Corp  9  Mississippi  6.41  91.67  56.4  39.64  29.81 
05/23/1991  Envoy Corp  10  Tennessee  5.72  42.50  11.9  8.5  1.5 
09/26/1990  Matrix Service Co  6  Oklahoma  5.49  1.63  10.8  0.42  0.34 
01/30/2006  H&E Equipment Services Inc  45  Louisiana  5.46  28.33  12.1  55.78  3.95 
11/26/1997  Brass Eagle Inc  2  Alaska  5.38  13.64  14.0  3.41  4.56 
06/13/2006  Verasun Energy Corp  5  South Dakota  5.01  30.43  12.1  127.73  3.95 
06/26/2000  Stratos Lightwave Inc  54  Illinois  4.71  62.5  56.4  89.46  29.81 
09/27/1994  Baby Superstore Inc  24  South Carolina  4.70  93.06  9.6  45.65  1.43 
02/09/1998  Duane Reade Inc  38  New York  4.35  30.67  21.9  36.83  5.25 
08/08/2013  Cvent Inc  14  Virginia  4.33  56.76  21.1  66.75  7.94 
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Table 3 Impact of public corruption on IPO initial returns 
The table displays the effects of political corruption on IPO initial returns. The sample consists of initial public offerings from 1990 to 2015 in the US stock market. The 
dependent variable is the IPO initial return, calculated as the percentage changes from first day closing price to offer price. We use political corruption rate (PCR) calculated 
as number of corruption convictions from 1976 to the IPO year divided by the population in millions in the same period to proxy the local corrupt environment.  In Panel A, 
column (1) to (4) use ordinary least square (OLS) regressions, and column (5) and (6) use Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) approaches. The instrumental variables used are 
Education Level, Racial Heterogeneity, and Gini Ratio at the state level, where the first stage of the IV model is suppressed for brevity. All regressions include year and 
industry controls, and a region control.  In Panel B, we define large firms are with total assets in the IPO year at the top quartile of our sample, then the rest belong to small 
firms. PCR is winsorized at the 1% at each tail. One, two and three asterisks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. The t-statistics are included in the 
parentheses and are reported for heteroscedasticity robust standard errors clustered by year and industry. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
Panel A     
  OLS  2SLS 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)                 
PCR  1.135***  1.227***  1.278***  1.252***  2.233**  1.873*   
 
 (2.67)  (2.88)  (3.03)  (2.99)  (2.08)  (1.83)    
Firm Age    -2.683***  -2.550***  -2.636***  -2.618***  -2.146*** 
 
 
  (-5.68)  (-5.81)  (-6.12)  (-6.23)  (-5.39)    
Total Assets    3.277***  3.253***  3.224***  3.194***  1.587**  
 
   (3.30)  (3.17)  (3.24)  (3.28)  (2.01)    
Leverage    -15.378***  -14.050***  -13.950*** 
 -14.021*** -7.313**  
 
   (-3.61)  (-3.63)  (-3.74) 
 (-3.76)    (-2.45) 
High-tech    8.796***  7.920***  7.495***  7.522***  5.756*** 
    (4.49)  (4.53)  (4.51)  (4.53)  (4.23)    
Top-tier      0.454  0.118  0.158  0.183    
 
   
  (0.34)  (0.09)  (0.12)  (0.15)    
Venture capital      3.791*  3.298  3.348  2.982    
 
   
  (1.80)  (1.62)  (1.64)  (1.59)    
Auditor      -0.392  -0.156  -0.152  0.314    
 
   
  (-0.38)  (-0.15)  (-0.14)  (0.31)    
Nasdaq      1.200  1.174  1.161  1.379    
 
   
  (1.20)  (1.20)  (1.19)  (1.49)    
Share Overhang        0.571**  0.568**  0.475**  
 
   
    (2.03)  (2.03)  (1.99)    
No. of Bookrunners        -1.446***  -1.441***  -1.330**  
 
   
    (-2.67)  (-2.66)  (-2.57)    
Hot Market        5.877  5.950  3.357    
 
   
    (1.52)  (1.56)  (1.05)    
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Revision            0.712*** 
    
        (7.79)    
Intercept  -1.478  2.846  0.724  1.465  -0.892  1.401    
  (-0.30)  (0.54)  (0.12)  (0.25)  (-0.13)  (0.22)    
Hausman Test (p-value)          0.35  0.34 
Year control  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry control  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Region control  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adjusted R2  0.1604  0.1936  0.1956  0.2009  0.2003  0.2760    
Number of observations  4670  4670  4670  4670  4670  4670    
 
Panel B Small VS large firms 
      Large Firms      Small Firms 
PCR      -0.150      1.484**  
      (-0.25)      (2.52)    
Intercept      1.613      -4.097    
      (0.18)      (-0.61)    
Year control      Yes      Yes 
Industry control      Yes      Yes 
Region control      Yes      Yes 
Adjusted R2      0.2952      0.1834    




Table 4 Impact of public corruption on IPO offer price revisions 
The table displays the effect of political corruption on IPO offer price revisions. The sample consists of 
initial public offerings from 1990 to 2015 in the US stock market. The dependent variables are IPO 
absolute revisions in column (1), IPO revisions in column (2), and a positive revision dummy in Column 
(3), respectively. The IPO revision is measured as the percentage change from offer price to the midpoint 
of the initial price range; the absolute revision is the absolute value of IPO revisions; the positive revision 
dummy is a binary variable indicating whether offer price exceeds the midpoint of the initial price range. 
We use political corruption rate (PCR) calculated as number of corruption convictions from 1976 to the 
IPO year divided by the population in millions in the same period to proxy the local corrupt environment. 
Column (1) and (2) use ordinary least square (OLS) regressions. Column (3) uses a logistic regression.  
All regressions include year and industry controls, and a region control.  One, two and three asterisks 
denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. Revisions and PCR are winsorized at 1% at 
each tail, respectively. The t-statistics are included in the parentheses and are reported for 
heteroscedasticity robust standard errors clustered by both year and industry. All variables are defined 
in Appendix A. 
  OLS  Logit Model 
  (1)  (2)  (3)    
Dependent Variable:  Absolute Revisions  Revisions  Revision Dummy 
PCR  -0.242  0.433**  0.103*** 
 
 (-1.45)  (2.10)  (3.25)    
Firm Age  -0.132  -0.622***  -0.144*** 
 
 (-0.62)  (-3.04)  (-3.40)    
Total Assets  0.019  2.064***  0.213*** 
 
 (0.10)  (8.50)  (4.99)    
Leverage  1.932  -8.552***  -1.459*** 
 
 (1.43)  (-5.78)  (-7.38)    
High-tech  0.876**  2.370***  0.223**  
  (2.42)  (3.39)  (2.17)    
Top-tier  2.839***  -0.018  -0.232**  
 
 (5.62)  (-0.03)  (-2.37)    
Venture capital  1.613***  0.383  -0.070    
 
 (5.60)  (0.64)  (-0.69)    
Auditor  0.481  -0.582  -0.150**  
 
 (1.32)  (-1.50)  (-2.29)    
Nasdaq  1.412***  -0.256  -0.174*   
 
 (4.36)  (-0.51)  (-1.83)    
Share Overhang  0.055  0.129*  0.004    
 
 (1.15)  (1.78)  (0.51)    
No. of Bookrunners  0.060  -0.142  0.038    
 
 (0.35)  (-0.52)  (0.70)    
Hot Market  0.552  3.602**  0.515**  
  (0.84)  (2.46)  (2.09)    
Intercept  7.463*** 
 -3.818*  0.716**  
  (2.88) 
 (-1.83)  (2.18)    
Year control  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry control  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Region control  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adjusted R2/Pseudo R2  0.0482 
 0.1203   0.062 
Number of observations  4670 
 4670  4670    
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Table 5 Analysis of underwriter’s role on IPO initial returns in a corrupt environment 
The table displays the joint effects of political corruption and underwriter’s reputation in a corrupt 
environment on IPO initial returns using ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions. The sample consists 
of initial public offerings from 1990 to 2015 in the US stock market. The dependent variable is the IPO 
initial return, calculated as the percentage changes from first day closing price to offer price. We use 
political corruption rate (PCR) calculated as number of corruption convictions from 1976 to the IPO year 
divided by the population in millions in the same period to proxy the local corrupt environment. Column 
(1) uses underwriter’s rank from Jay Ritter’s website. The rank ranges from score 0 to 9, where 0 means 
the lowest reputation of an investment bank and 9 indicates the highest reputation of the bank.  Column 
(2) limits the only top-tier underwriters who have a score above (including) 7. All regressions include 
year and industry controls, and a region control. One, two and three asterisks denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. PCR is winsorized at the 1% at each tail. The t-statistics are 
included in the parentheses and are reported for heteroscedasticity robust standard errors clustered by 
year and industry. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
  (1)  (2)      
PCR  2.623***  2.862*** 
  (3.27)  (3.12) 
PCR*Top-tier  -0.184**   
  (-1.99)   
PCR*Underwriter Rank    -0.246** 
  
  (-2.28) 
Firm Age  -2.605***  -2.593*** 
  (-6.05)  (-5.99) 
Total Assets  3.221***  3.398*** 
  (3.24)  (3.70) 
Leverage  -13.877***  
  (-3.77)  (-3.78) 
High-tech  7.458***  7.493*** 
  (4.50)  (4.56) 
Top-tier  5.134**   
  (2.52)   
Underwriter Rank   
 0.506* 
    (1.79) 
Venture capital  3.267  3.417* 
  (1.60)  (1.71) 
Auditor  -0.071  -0.033 
 
 (-0.07)  (-0.03) 
Nasdaq  1.160  1.268 
  (1.19)  (1.28) 
Share Overhang  0.571**  0.573** 
  (2.03)  (2.05) 
No. of Bookrunners  -1.448***  -1.545*** 
  (-2.67)  (-2.85) 
Hot Market  5.965  6.037 
  (1.55)  (1.56) 
Intercept  -2.435  -2.815 
  (-0.39)  (-0.45) 
Year control  Yes  Yes 
Industry control  Yes  Yes 
Region control  Yes  Yes 
Adjusted R2  0.2014  0.2015 




Table 6 Political corruption, IPO initial return, and business operation concentration 
The table displays the joint effects of business operation concentration in the headquarter state and 
political corruption on IPO initial returns using ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions. The sample 
consists of initial public offerings from 1990 to 2015 in the US stock market. The dependent variables 
are the IPO initial return in column (1), calculated as the percentage changes from first day closing price 
to offer price; and the IPO offer price revision in column (2), measured as the percentage change from 
offer price to the midpoint of the initial price range. We use political corruption rate (PCR) calculated as 
number of corruption convictions from 1976 to the IPO year divided by the population in millions in the 
same period to proxy the local corrupt environment. Following Garcia and Norli (2012), we define the 
percentage of IPO firm’s business operation concentration in the headquarter as number of times that the 
HQ state has been mentioned over all other states in the earliest 10-K (or relevant) report after Initial 
Public Offering. Thus, the variable Operation Concentration% range from zero to one, where zero means 
that the IPO issuer does not have any businesses in the HQ state and one indicates that the firm has fully 
concentrated operations in the headquarter location. All regressions include year and industry controls, 
and a region control.  One, two and three asterisks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
level. PCR is winsorized at the 1% at each tail. The t-statistics are included in the parentheses and are 
reported for heteroscedasticity robust standard errors clustered by year and industry. All variables are 
defined in Appendix A. 
  (1)  (2) 
  Initial returns  Revisions 
PCR  -0.313  -0.242    
  (-0.42)  (-0.55)    
Operation Concentration%  -7.994*  -4.011**  
  (-1.72)  (-2.42)    
PCR*Operation Concentration%  3.140**  1.356**  
  (2.11)  (1.99)    
Firm Age  -2.833***  -0.618**  
  (-5.21)  (-2.33)    
Total Assets  4.729***  2.497*** 
  (3.64)  (8.91)    
High-tech  -14.724***  -9.124*** 
  (-2.86)  (-6.59)    
Leverage  9.014***  3.263*** 
  (4.55)  (3.45)    
Auditor  1.145  -0.160    
  (0.79)  (-0.35)    
Top-tier  1.331  -0.022    
  (0.76)  (-0.03)    
Venture capital  5.654**  1.115    
  (2.23)  (1.52)    
Nasdaq  2.394*  -0.907**  
  (1.71)  (-1.99)    
Share Overhang  0.472  0.120    
  (1.52)  (1.39)    
No. of Bookrunners  -2.139***  -0.385    
  (-3.22)  (-1.21)    
Hot Market  7.595*  5.038*** 
  (1.80)  (3.64)    
Intercept  -9.957  -7.788    
  (-0.83)  (-1.50)    
Year control  Yes  Yes 
Industry control  Yes  Yes 
Region control  Yes  Yes 
Adjusted R2  0.2151  0.1509    







Table 7 Analysis of insider wealth gains in a corrupt environment 
The table displays the effects of political corruption on IPO insider’s wealth gains using a logistic 
regression. The sample consists of initial public offerings from 1990 to 2015 in the US stock market. 
The dependent variable is insider wealth gains dummy, taking one if insider's wealth effects are greater 
than the dilution effects, otherwise is zero. Following Cook et al. (2006), wealth effect is defined as 
(closing price of the first trading day-midpoint filling range) *number of shares retained by pre-IPO 
shareholders; dilution effect is defined as (closing price of the first trading day-offer price) *number of 
shares issued in the offering. Number of shares retained by pre-IPO shareholder are calculated as 
(number of shares outstanding after offering - number of shares issued in the offering). We use political 
corruption rate (PCR) calculated as number of corruption convictions from 1976 to the IPO year divided 
by the population in millions in the same period to proxy the local corrupt environment. All regressions 
include year and industry controls, and a region control. One, two and three asterisks denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. PCR is winsorized at the 1% at each tail. The t-statistics are 
included in the parentheses and are reported for heteroscedasticity robust standard errors clustered by 
year and industry. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
  Insider's wealth dummy                
PCR  0.109*** 
  (3.32)    
Initial return residuals  0.079*** 
  (8.95)    
Ln (Proceeds)  0.406*** 
  (7.61)    
Float Ratio  -6.679*** 
  (-8.89)    
Intercept  -0.851*   
  (-1.91)    
Year control  Yes 
Industry control  Yes 
Region control  Yes 
Pseudo R2  0.3176 




Table 8 Endogeneity control-Propensity score matching 
The table displays the analysis of the effect of high corrupt environment on the IPO initial returns, 
controlling for the endogeneity of IPO firm HQ selection using propensity score matching. The sample 
consists of initial public offerings from 1990 to 2015 in the US stock market. The dependent variable is 
the IPO initial return, calculated as the percentage changes from first day closing price to offer price. 
The variables used for matching include: Firm age, Total assets, Leverage, High-tech, Top-tier, Venture 
capital, Auditor, Nasdaq, Share overhang, No. of Bookrunners and Hot market. The matching includes 
year and industry controls, and a region control. One, two and three asterisks denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. Z-statistics are included in the parentheses.  All variables are 
defined in Appendix A. 
       IPO initial returns 
ATET    4.088*** 
High corrupt environment vs. Low corrupt environment   (2.72) 
Year control       Yes 
Industry control       Yes 
Region control       Yes 
Number of observations       4670 
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Table 9 Political corruption and post-IPO financial performance 
The table displays the effects of IPO firms that went public under political corruption on the post-
offering financial performance using ordinary least square (OLS) regressions. The sample consists 
of initial public offerings from 1990 to 2015 in the US stock market. The dependent variable is the 
change of a post-IPO financial performance measure from one year after offering to the IPO year.  
We define Tobin’s Q as (Market value of equity + book value of preferred stock + book value of 
debt)/ (book value of assets), where we calculate the market value of equity using the stock price on 
the last trading day of the fiscal year. Thus, ∆Tobin’s Q is the percentage change of Q ratio from IPO 
year to one year after going public. ∆CapX (∆Prof) is the change of capital expenditure (profitability) 
between the year of listing and one year after listing, where profitability is calculated as the ratio of 
EBITDA over total assets. We use political corruption rate (PCR) calculated as number of corruption 
convictions from 1976 to the IPO year divided by the population in millions in the same period to 
proxy the local corrupt environment. All regressions include year and industry controls, and a region 
control.  One, two and three asterisks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
PCR and ∆Tobin's Q are winsorized at the 1% at each tail; ∆CapX and ∆Prof are winsorized at 5% 
at each tail. The t-statistics are included in the parentheses and are reported for heteroscedasticity 
robust standard errors clustered by year and industry. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
  (1) 
 (2)  (3)    
  ∆Tobin's Q 
 ∆CapX  ∆Prof 
PCR  -0.018** 
 -5.306**  -2.368*   
  (-1.99) 
 (-2.23)  (-1.68)    
Firm Age  0.004  -13.368***  -5.485*** 
  (0.34)  (-4.97)  (-3.17)    
Total Assets  -0.007  4.901  4.935**  
  (-0.69)  (1.60)  (2.33)    
Leverage  0.138**  -75.962***  -38.784*** 
  (2.59)  (-7.03)  (-4.82)    
High-tech  0.057  -30.161***  -9.110**  
  (1.30)  (-3.36)  (-2.52)    
Top-tier  -0.054**  -11.227*  -14.830*** 
  (-2.22)  (-1.67)  (-3.94)    
Venture capital  0.076**  -1.728  15.722*** 
  (2.26)  (-0.23)  (4.27)    
Auditor  0.007  -9.145  -4.359    
  (0.35)  (-1.63)  (-1.26)    
Nasdaq  -0.056**  11.382  -6.531    
  (-2.51)  (1.60)  (-1.51)    
Share Overhang  -0.006**  -1.315*  -0.152    
  (-2.32)  (-1.81)  (-0.64)    
No.of Bookrunners  0.023  -8.397***  -1.182    
  (1.18)  (-2.86)  (-0.46)    
Hot Market  0.054  -5.835  -7.642    
  (0.67)  (-0.44)  (-0.78)    
Intercept  0.017  142.021***  8.775    
  (0.12)  (3.85)  (0.49)    
Year control  YES  YES  YES 
Industry control  YES  YES  YES 
Region control  YES  YES  YES 
Adjusted R2  0.1155  0.0654  0.0502    
Number of observations  3424  3951  4014    
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Table 10 Alternative Measures of Corrupt Environment and Robustness Checks 
The table displays the effects of political corruption with alternative measures on IPO initial returns using ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions. The sample consists of 
initial public offerings from 1990 to 2015 in the US stock market. The dependent variable is IPO initial return, calculated as the percentage changes from first day closing 
price to offer price. We use political corruption rate (PCR) calculated as number of corruption convictions (e.g., Department of Justice (DOJ)) from IPO firm founding year 
to the IPO year divided by the population in millions in the same period to proxy the local corrupt environment in column (1). In column (2), we use number of raw 
convictions. We exclude IPO firms located in Washington D.C. from the sample in column (3). In column (4), we adopt corruption measures from Boyland and Long (2003). 
In column (5) and (6), we measure political corruption rate (PCR) and white-collar crime environment using conviction date from Transactional Records Access 
Clearinghouse (TRAC). All regressions include year and industry controls, and a region control.  One, two and three asterisks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% level. PCR and WCC are winsorized at the 1% at each tail, except in column (4). The t-statistics are included in the parentheses and are reported for heteroscedasticity 
robust standard errors clustered by year and industry. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
Dependent variable:                                 
IPO Initial Returns 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
 PCR from 
founding year 
 Raw conviction  
Excl. Washington 
D.C. 





PCR  1.423***  0.002**  1.332***  2.194**  1.199***  1.058** 
  (3.28)  (2.07)  (3.22)  (2.08)  (3.05)  (2.35) 
WCC            0.076 
          
  (0.92) 
Firm Age  -2.424***  -2.605***  -2.688***  -3.102***  -2.621***  -2.610*** 
 
 (-5.64)  (-5.18)  (-6.20)  (-5.27)  (-6.04)  (-6.02) 
Total Assets  3.247***  3.251***  3.231***  3.652***  3.277***  3.256*** 
 
 (3.27)  (5.76)  (3.19)  (5.82)  (3.30)  (3.27) 
Leverage  -14.002***  -13.875***  -14.034***  -20.850***  -13.855***  -13.881*** 
 
 (-3.77)  (-4.43)  (-3.72)  (-8.06)  (-3.73)  (-3.74) 
High-tech  7.485***  7.407***  7.461***  7.335***  7.556***  7.602*** 
  (4.48)  (6.19)  (4.54)  (5.01)  (4.60)  (4.66) 
Top-tier  0.070  0.087  0.109  -0.841  0.089  0.130 
 
 (0.05)  (0.08)  (0.08)  (-0.61)  (0.07)  (0.10) 
Venture capital  3.243  3.233***  3.243  1.379  3.214  3.324 
 
 (1.59)  (2.95)  (1.62)  (1.10)  (1.56)  (1.63) 
Auditor  -0.222  -0.224  -0.150  0.007  -0.173  -0.127 
 
 (-0.21)  (-0.23)  (-0.14)  (0.01)  (-0.16)  (-0.12) 
Nasdaq  1.153  1.282  1.161  1.340  1.214  1.227 
 
 (1.17)  (1.29)  (1.17)  (1.16)  (1.24)  (1.26) 
Share Overhang  0.574**  0.579**  0.573**  1.260***  0.575**  0.574** 
 
 (2.05)  (2.11)  (2.03)  (4.56)  (2.03)  (2.03) 




 (-2.72)  (-2.52)  (-2.61)  (0.66)  (-2.75)  (-2.73) 
Hot Market  5.881  5.840**  5.964  3.762  5.843  5.815 
 
 (1.51)  (2.23)  (1.53)  (1.14)  (1.52)  (1.51) 
Intercept  -0.115  3.848  1.403  0.029  2.528  0.898 
  (-0.02)  (0.91)  (0.24)  (0.00)  (0.44)  (0.16) 
Year control  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry control  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Region control  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adjusted R2  0.2022  0.2007  0.2024  0.2166  0.2010  0.2009 





Appendix A Variable definitions 
Variable Description (data source) 
 
Corrupt environment measures  
PCR 
 The local politically corrupt environment for firms at the time of IPO and is measured as number of corruption convictions 
per million population from 1976 to IPO year. (DOJ& The US Census Bureau) 
 
IPO and firm characteristics  
IPO initial returns Presented as a percentage and calculated as (first day closing price-offer price)/offer price*100. (Thomson One Banker) 
Firm Age 
Natural logarithm of 1 plus company's age prior to the IPO. Company's age prior to the IPO is defined as the calendar time 
of the IPO minus calendar time of the company's founded date. (Jay Ritter's website) 
Total Assets Nature logarithm of firm total assets before IPO. (Compustat) 
Leverage The ratio of total liabilities over total assets before the IPO. (Compustat) 
High-tech Dummy variable taking one if the IPO firm belong to high-tech industry, otherwise is zero. (Thomson One) 
No. of Bookrunners 
The number of bookrunners is the number of managers assuming the responsibility of the bookrunner's role. (Thomson One 
Banker) 
Overhang 
The ratio of shares retained by the insider. Calculated as the number of shares retained by the block shareholders over total 
number of shares in the IPO 
Underwriter rank 
A continues variable ranges from score 0 to 9 indicating underwriter's reputation, where 0 is the lowest and 9 is the highest. 
(Jay Ritter's website)         
Top-Tier Dummy variable taking 1 if underwriter's rank is equal to 7 or above, otherwise is 0. (Jay Ritter's website) 
Venture capital 
Dummy variable used to indicate whether the IPO has venture capital support. 1 denotes the IPO is VC-backed, otherwise 
is 0. (Thomson One) 
Auditor A binary variable taking one if the IPO is audited by the top-4 auditing agents, otherwise is zero. (Thomson One) 
Nasdaq  Dummy variable taking one if the IPO was listed on Nasdaq exchange, otherwise is zero. (Thomson One) 
Share Overhang 
The ratio of pre-IPO shares retained over shares filed during IPO, where pre-IPO shares retained contains shares owned by 
pre-IPO shareholder that are not sold in the offering and share filed includes primary and secondary shares. (Thomson One) 
No. of Bookrunners Number of bookrunners working together during Initial Public Offering. (Thomson One) 
Revision 
Presented as a percentage and calculated as (offer price minus the mid-point of the initial filling price range)/the mid-point 
of the initial filling price range. (Thomson One) 
Revision dummy Dummy variable taking one if final offer price is greater than the mid-point of the initial filling price range. (Thomson One) 
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Insider’s wealth dummy 
Dummy variable taking one if insider's wealth effects are greater than the dilution effects, otherwise is zero Following Cook 
et al. (2006), wealth effect is defined as (closing price of the first trading day-midpoint filling range) *number of shares 
retained by pre-IPO shareholders; dilution effect is defined as (closing price of the first trading day-offer price) *number of 
shares issued in the offering. (Thomson One) 
Proceeds Natural logarithm of total proceeds in millions. (Thomson One) 
Hot market Dummy variable taking one if the IPO was listed during hot IPO market, otherwise is zero. (Own calculation) 
∆Tobin's Q 
Percentage change of Tobin's Q from IPO year to one year after IPO. Following Khanna and Palepu (2000), we measure the 
ratio as (market value of equity + book value of preferred stock + book value of debt)/(book value of assets), where the price 
on the last trading day in the year is used for calculating the equity's market value. (Compustat) 
∆CapX Percentage change of capital expenditures from IPO year to one year after IPO. (Compustat) 
∆Prof Percentage change of net sales from IPO year to one year after IPO. (Compustat) 
 
Business operation concentration variables  
Operation Concentration (%) 
Following Garcia and Norli (2012), we count number of times that the headquarter location mentioned in the IPO firm's 10-
K report in sections "Item 1: Business," "Item 2: Properties," "Item 6: Consolidated Financial Data," and "Item 7: 
Management's Discussion and Analysis.". If the first 10-K report after IPO is not available, we follow their study to use 
alternative Forms 10-K/A, 10-K405, 10-KSB,10-KT,10KSB,10KSB40,10KT405 to count states, whichever is firstly 
available after IPO. We measure an IPO firm's operation concertation in the HQ state as the ratio of how many times that 
the headquarter location is mentioned over all states mentions in the report. The variable ranges from 0 (IPO firm has zero 
business in the HQ state) to 1 (IPO firm has fully concentrated businesses in the HQ state) . 
 
Instrumental variables  
Education Level Share of people that are above 25 years old with more than 4 years collage attended in each state. (The US Census Bureau) 
Racial 
The variable is used to measure the ethnic diversity in the US in each census year since 1990. Racial heterogeneity =1 −
∑ 𝑠𝑖
2, where si is the share of race group i in each state in the US. The race shares from 1990 are composed of white, black, 
American Indian, Eskimo or Aleut, Asian, Pacific Islander and others.  The race shares from 2000 and 2010 are composed 
of white, black or African American, American Indian and Alaska native, Asian, native Hawaiian and another Pacific Island, 
and some other race. The data is from the US Census. 
Gini Ratio The Gini coefficient in each state. Data is from US Census Bureau. (the US Census Bureau) 
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Appendix B: First stage of 2SLS approach 
The table displays the first-stage results of Table 3 regressions which uses two-state least square 
approaches. The sample consists of initial public offerings from 1990 to 2015 in the US stock market. 
We use political corruption rate (PCR) calculated as number of corruption convictions from 1976 to the 
IPO year divided by the population in millions in the same period to proxy the local corrupt environment. 
We regress all variables used in Table 3 and a list of PCR determinants. The instrumental variables used 
are Education Level, Racial Heterogeneity, and Gini Ratio at the state level. All regressions include year 
and industry controls, and a region control.  PCR is winsorized at the 1% at each tail. One, two and three 
asterisks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. The t-statistics are included in the 
parentheses and are reported for heteroscedasticity robust standard errors clustered by year and industry. 
All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
  (1)  (2) 
  1st Stage  1st Stage with revision 
Firm Age  0.006 
 0.006    
  (0.44) 
 (0.50)    
Total Assets  0.018 
 0.015    
  (1.49) 
 (1.29)    
Leverage  0.060 
 0.070*   
  (1.46) 
 (1.73)    
High-tech  -0.006 
 -0.008    
  (-0.23) 
 (-0.34)    
Top-tier  -0.025 
 -0.025    
  (-0.75) 
 (-0.75)    
Venture capital  -0.019 
 -0.020    
  (-0.65) 
 (-0.67)    
Auditor  -0.037 
 -0.036    
  (-1.30) 
 (-1.28)    
Nasdaq  0.063** 
 0.064**  
  (2.41) 
 (2.42)    
Share Overhang  0.003 
 0.003    
  (1.18) 
 (1.15)    
No. of Bookrunners  0.006 
 0.006    
  (0.24) 
 (0.24)    
Hot Market  -0.074 
 -0.078    
  (-1.28) 
 (-1.35)    
Education  -6.203*** 
 -6.199*** 
  (-10.49) 
 (-10.49)    
Racial heterogeneity  2.954*** 
 2.952*** 
  (12.29) 
 (12.28)    
Gini ratio  15.321*** 
 15.318*** 
  (11.80) 
 (11.83)    
Revision  
  0.001    
  
  (1.29)    
Intercept  -3.667*** 
 -3.664*** 
  (-6.21) 
 (-6.22)    
Year control  Yes 
 Yes 
Industry control  Yes 
 Yes 
Region control  Yes 
 Yes 
Adjusted R2  0.4758 
 0.4759    
Number of observations  4670 
 4670    
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Appendix C Correlation matrix  
Variables  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Firm Age (1) 1 
           
Total Assets (2) 0.296 1 
          
Leverage (3) 0.288 0.372 1 
         
High-tech (4) -0.115 -0.092 -0.211 1         
Top-tier (5) 0.117 0.457 0.049 0.078 1 
       
Venture capital (6) -0.195 -0.095 -0.294 0.296 0.187 1 
      
Auditor (7) 0.041 0.225 -0.004 0.078 0.193 0.166 1 
     
Nasdaq (8) -0.082 -0.207 -0.223 0.150 0.092 0.247 0.053 1 
    
Share Overhang (9) 0.019 0.169 0.006 0.152 0.127 0.114 0.062 -0.011 1 
   
No. of Bookrunners (10) 0.134 0.469 0.201 -0.042 0.065 -0.048 0.170 -0.201 0.096 1 
  
Hot Market (11) -0.116 -0.342 -0.106 0.048 -0.050 -0.074 -0.182 0.093 -0.056 -0.500 1  
Revision (12) -0.065 0.076 -0.172 0.155 0.100 0.088 0.023 0.034 0.086 -0.033 0.085 1 
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Appendix D Summary Statistics for Political Corruption Environment Measures by the States 
The table provides the summary statistics for the political corruption environment measures for each US 
state based on the issuers’ headquarter location. The sample consists of initial public offerings from 1990 
to 2015 in the US stock market. We use political corruption rate (PCR) calculated as number of 
corruption convictions from 1976 to the IPO year divided by the population in millions in the same 
period to proxy the local corrupt environment. The data is organized by the median of PCR. 
States  N  Mean  Median  Std.Dev  Min  Max 
District of Columbia  15  44.399  45.075  5.411  31.866  50.241 
Mississippi  12  5.977  5.947  0.209  5.729  6.410 
Alaska  2  5.316  5.316  0.096  5.249  5.384 
Tennessee  73  5.192  5.296  0.426  4.520  5.971 
Louisiana  17  4.705  4.717  0.636  3.943  6.299 
Oklahoma  41  4.525  4.473  0.459  3.997  5.493 
South Dakota  6  4.436  4.388  0.293  4.222  5.011 
Illinois  161  4.426  4.494  0.251  3.914  4.711 
South Carolina  17  4.399  4.507  0.423  2.912  4.695 
New York  320  4.216  4.264  0.139  3.755  4.349 
Alabama  21  4.034  4.034  0.101  3.868  4.268 
Georgia  124  3.870  3.978  0.260  3.207  4.083 
North Dakota  2  3.821  3.821  0.000  3.821  3.821 
Montana  5  3.517  3.515  0.447  3.080  4.184 
Pennsylvania  175  3.472  3.432  0.135  3.319  3.740 
Virginia  102  3.350  3.290  0.305  2.945  4.377 
West Virginia  3  3.052  3.114  0.198  2.830  3.212 
New Mexico  6  3.020  2.976  0.101  2.906  3.173 
Ohio  88  2.951  2.871  0.277  2.598  3.618 
Florida  218  2.908  2.835  0.399  2.313  3.675 
Kentucky  11  2.774  2.679  0.393  2.438  3.574 
Maryland  91  2.691  2.674  0.255  2.293  3.327 
Wyoming  3  2.559  2.658  0.174  2.357  2.661 
New Jersey  178  2.551  2.358  0.422  2.156  3.412 
Delaware  5  2.322  2.063  0.745  1.602  3.168 
Massachusetts  350  2.321  2.328  0.195  2.021  2.637 
Rhode Island  7  2.280  2.316  0.168  2.108  2.530 
Maine  4  2.264  2.315  0.313  1.888  2.538 
California  1237  2.236  2.301  0.159  1.844  2.375 
Connecticut  99  2.234  2.196  0.091  2.121  2.523 
Hawaii  3  2.214  2.097  0.449  1.836  2.711 
Missouri  42  2.161  2.072  0.261  1.871  2.713 
Indiana  46  1.996  1.975  0.046  1.947  2.116 
Texas  419  1.971  1.946  0.267  1.638  2.653 
Nevada  33  1.961  1.943  0.142  1.740  2.357 
Kansas  16  1.950  1.975  0.110  1.766  2.122 
Arkansas  8  1.915  1.945  0.185  1.609  2.091 
Arizona  65  1.874  1.829  0.215  1.580  2.553 
Idaho  11  1.810  1.905  0.387  1.231  2.316 
Michigan  52  1.804  1.789  0.056  1.737  1.963 
North Carolina  78  1.735  1.731  0.058  1.640  1.868 
Nebraska  13  1.663  1.734  0.168  1.313  1.828 
Wisconsin  35  1.511  1.488  0.093  1.410  1.690 
Iowa  18  1.460  1.470  0.060  1.309  1.541 
Colorado  127  1.365  1.380  0.162  1.114  1.792 
Utah  36  1.322  1.286  0.154  1.149  1.721 
New Hampshire  16  1.310  1.270  0.132  1.136  1.493 
Minnesota  103  1.095  1.081  0.046  1.037  1.193 
Washington  106  0.832  0.780  0.185  0.536  1.117 
Oregon  43  0.785  0.781  0.038  0.711  0.862 
Vermont  7  0.499  0.418  0.104  0.418  0.651 
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Appendix E Summary statistics for political corruption measures by year 
The table provides the summary statistics for the political corruption environment measures on the year 
basis. The sample consists of initial public offerings from 1990 to 2015 in the US stock market. We use 
political corruption rate (PCR) calculated as number of corruption convictions from 1976 to the IPO year 
divided by the population in millions in the same period to proxy the local corrupt environment. 
States  N  Mean  Median  Std. Dev  Min  Max 
1990  97  2.336  1.844  1.106  0.536  5.971 
1991  213  2.744  2.189  2.316  0.598  31.866 
1992  326  2.406  2.027  1.040  0.570  5.729 
1993  405  2.510  2.069  1.088  0.418  5.942 
1994  359  2.637  2.122  2.128  0.558  37.045 
1995  359  2.579  2.264  2.239  0.651  39.982 
1996  556  2.665  2.355  1.904  0.753  41.054 
1997  358  2.889  2.367  3.089  0.586  41.687 
1998  200  3.044  2.362  4.343  0.725  45.075 
1999  340  2.915  2.375  3.569  0.733  47.382 
2000  287  2.675  2.366  2.857  0.753  48.605 
2001  48  2.578  2.358  0.949  1.017  5.018 
2002  47  2.915  2.768  1.040  1.015  4.603 
2003  38  2.553  2.326  0.821  1.151  4.538 
2004  135  3.290  2.319  5.851  0.711  50.241 
2005  110  2.796  2.376  1.006  0.727  5.264 
2006  127  3.518  2.444  5.896  1.084  49.331 
2007  121  2.617  2.293  0.769  1.096  4.450 
2008  15  2.834  2.283  1.018  1.392  4.679 
2009  32  2.953  2.582  1.111  1.099  4.631 
2010  65  2.699  2.369  0.877  1.102  4.585 
2011  55  2.571  2.182  0.905  1.099  4.520 
2012  75  2.536  2.187  0.814  0.862  6.299 
2013  109  2.574  2.169  0.853  1.084  4.400 
2014  139  2.582  2.612  0.767  1.085  4.539 



















Graph Top 10 States with the Most IPOs: Change of Accumulated Political Corrupt 
Environemnt Over Time 
California NewYork Texas Massachusetts Florida
Illinois New Jersey Pennsylvania Georgia Colorado
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Internet Appendix A: Impact of public corruption on IPO initial returns using an alternative 
return measure 
The table displays the effects of political corruption on IPO initial returns. The sample consists of initial 
public offerings from 1990 to 2015 in the US stock market. The dependent variable is Log (1+IPO initial 
return). The initial return is calculated as the percentage changes from first day closing price to offer 
price. We use political corruption rate (PCR) calculated as number of corruption convictions from 1976 
to the IPO year divided by the population in millions in the same period to proxy the local corrupt 
environment. All regressions include year and industry controls, and a region control. PCR is winsorized 
at the 1% at each tail. One, two and three asterisks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
level. The t-statistics are included in the parentheses and are reported for heteroscedasticity robust 
standard errors clustered by year and industry. All variables are defined in the appendix A. 
Dependent variables: 
 Log (1+IPO Initial 
Return)  
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)    
PCR  0.011***  0.012***  0.013***  0.013*** 
  (2.67)  (2.88)  (3.03)  (2.99)    
Firm Age    -0.027***  -0.025***  -0.026*** 
    (-5.68)  (-5.81)  (-6.12)    
Total Assets    0.033***  0.033***  0.032*** 
    (3.30)  (3.17)  (3.24)    
Leverage    -0.154***  -0.140***  -0.139*** 
    (-3.61)  (-3.63)  (-3.74)    
High-tech    0.088***  0.079***  0.075*** 
    (4.49)  (4.53)  (4.51)    
Top-tier      0.005  0.001    
      (0.34)  (0.09)    
Venture capital      0.038*  0.033    
      (1.80)  (1.62)    
Auditor      -0.004  -0.002    
      (-0.38)  (-0.15)    
Nasdaq      0.012  0.012    
      (1.20)  (1.20)    
Share Overhang        0.006**  
        (2.03)    
No. of Bookrunners        -0.014*** 
        (-2.67)    
Hot Market        0.059    
        (1.52)    
Intercept  0.985***  1.028***  1.007***  1.015*** 
  (19.90)  (19.37)  (17.24)  (17.65)    
Year control  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Industry control  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Region control  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Adjusted R2  0.1604  0.1936  0.1956  0.2009    
Number of 
observations  4670  4670  4670  4670    
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Internet Appendix B: Impact of public corruption on IPO initial returns using alternative PCR 
measures 
The table displays the effects of political corruption with alternative measures on IPO initial returns 
using ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions. The sample consists of initial public offerings from 1990 
to 2015 in the US stock market. The dependent variable is IPO initial return, calculated as the percentage 
changes from first day closing price to offer price.   We use political corruption rate (PCR) calculated as 
number of corruption convictions from 1976 to the IPO year divided by the population in millions in the 
same period to proxy the local corrupt environment. Column 1 uses PCR measured in the IPO year. 
Column 2 and 3 use PCR measured in 3-year and 5-year windows before IPO year (including issuing 
year), respectively. All regressions include year and industry controls, and a region control. One, two 
and three asterisks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. PCR is winsorized at the 
1% at each tail. The t-statistics are included in the parentheses and are reported for heteroscedasticity 
robust standard errors clustered by year and industry. All variables are defined in the Appendix A. 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
  PCR: IPO year  Lagged PCR:3Ys  Lagged PCR: 5Ys 
PCR  0.711**  1.316***  1.376*** 
  (2.46)  (3.98)  (4.04)    
Firm Age  -2.637***  -2.613***  -2.603*** 
  (-6.08)  (-6.07)  (-6.05)    
Total Assets  3.259***  3.253***  3.235*** 
  (3.29)  (3.30)  (3.27)    
Leverage  -13.975***  -14.056***  -14.036*** 
  (-3.74)  (-3.76)  (-3.75)    
High-tech  7.453***  7.547***  7.558*** 
  (4.52)  (4.56)  (4.53)    
Top-tier  0.069  0.063  0.087    
  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.06)    
Venture capital  3.247  3.305  3.327    
  (1.58)  (1.62)  (1.63)    
Auditor  -0.222  -0.289  -0.264    
  (-0.21)  (-0.27)  (-0.25)    
Nasdaq  1.176  1.227  1.170    
  (1.20)  (1.25)  (1.19)    
Share Overhang  0.573**  0.571**  0.577**  
  (2.02)  (2.03)  (2.05)    
No.of Bookrunners  -1.467***  -1.464***  -1.460*** 
  (-2.71)  (-2.69)  (-2.70)    
Hot Market  5.758  5.862  5.861    
  (1.48)  (1.51)  (1.52)    
Intercept  2.500  -0.405  -0.406    
  (0.43)  (-0.07)  (-0.07)    
Year control  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry control  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Region control  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adjusted R2  0.2010  0.2026  0.2025    




Internet Appendix C: Impact of pollical corruption on underwriter’s compensation 
The table displays the effects of political corruption on underwriter’s compensations using ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regressions. The sample consists of initial public offerings from 1990 to 2015 in the US 
stock market. The dependent variables are the logarithm of the dollar gross spread in Column (1) and the 
logarithm of the selling concessions in Column (2), respectively. PCR is political corruption rate and 
defined as number of convictions per million population in each state. All regressions include year and 
industry controls, and a region control. One, two and three asterisks denote statistical significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% level. PCR is winsorized at the 1% at each tail; Ln ($Selling Concession) is winsorized 
at 5% at each tail. The t-statistics are included in the parentheses and are reported for heteroscedasticity 
robust standard errors clustered by year and industry. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
  Ln ($Gross Spread) 
 Ln ($Selling Concession) 
  (1) 
 (2) 
PCR  0.016** 
 0.012* 
  (1.98) 
 (1.71) 
Firm Age  0.108*** 
 0.080*** 
  (7.68) 
 (7.38) 
Underwriter Rank  0.049*** 
 0.044*** 
  (4.65) 
 (5.04) 
Venture capital  -0.097*** 
 -0.081*** 
  (-4.65) 
 (-5.09) 
High-tech  0.010 
 0.006 
  (0.51) 
 (0.39) 
Ln (number of IPOs_180, filing date)  -0.073* 
 -0.061** 
  (-1.89) 
 (-2.01) 
Intercept  0.657*** 
 0.410*** 
  (3.71) 
 (2.96) 
Year control  Yes  Yes 
Industry control  Yes  Yes 
Region control  Yes  Yes 
Adjusted R2  0.4515 
 0.4625 










Initial public offerings (IPOs) play an important role in the financial system, 
enabling companies to raise equity finance and contributing to growth for States of 
operations. The number of U.S. States that IPOs operate spreads all over the span. 
Although the fluctuation in IPO operations range is well expected the underlying impact 
of geographically distributed business interests are not well known. Firms choose to 
expand operations to different areas, becoming more geographically dispersed, to access 
local resources, such as labor forces, market share, customers, and suppliers. Previous 
literature (i.e. Gao, Ng and Wang (2008); Garcia and Norli (2012); Giroud (2013); 
Platikanova and Mattei (2016); Addoum, Kumar and Law (2017)) has revealed that such 
business dispersion in different U.S. States influences corporate performance.  
 
Specifically, Gao, Ng and Wang (2008) argue that firms with divisions in different 
regions nationwide experience valuation discounts, because of higher agency problems 
among those firms. Garcia and Norli (2012) find that stock returns tend to be lower for 
geographically dispersed firms. Some studies also suggest that firms with spatially 
distributed business interests significantly affect corporate decisions. Landier, Nair and 
Wulf (2009) document that geographic dispersion raises issues around management 
decision-making in relation to internal human resources (e.g. employee dismissal) and 
investments (e.g. division divesture), which go against shareholder interests. Giroud 
(2013) indicates that firms prefer to build plants near their headquarters in order to 
perform closer monitoring and increase productivity. Moreover, geographically dispersed 
business interests have a negative impact on earnings forecasts due to the spatially 
distributed firm-specific information (e.g., Platikanova and Mattei (2016); Addoum, 
Kumar and Law (2017)). Nevertheless, those studies only address the short-term effects 
of corporate dispersion on firm performance. Thus, in this paper, we question whether 
geographically dispersed business interests have an impact on a firm’s long-term 




Our study focuses on the initial public offering (IPO) market because going public 
represents a transfer of ownership structure from the private to the public, which exposes 
firms to greater market risk and more rigorous scrutiny from investors and financial 
regulators. Moreover, managers in newly listed firms also experience enhanced 
challenges from the public capital market to make decisions that take more responsibility 
for a variety of market participants, including shareholders. Hence, the viability of public 
firms in periods subsequent to their IPO becomes particularly important. Fama and 
French (2004) report a significant delisting rate (44%) between 1980 and 1991 for firms 
in the first ten years after being newly listed due to poor corporate performance (see, for 
example, Loughran and Ritter (2002) and Demers and Joos (2007) for similar findings). 
Evidence shows that a variety of firm and offering characteristics at the time of going 
public are deemed as important signals for a firm’s future performance and therefore 
affect post-offering survival times, including venture capitalist participation (Jain and 
Kini, 2000), strategic and cornerstone investors (Espenlaub et al., 2016), and the CEO’s 
working experience (Gounopoulos and Pham, 2018). However, the relationship between 
a firm’s geographical characteristics and its post-IPO survival remains unexplored.  
 
Thus, this study investigates the impact of a firm’s geographic dispersion at the time 
of going public on its survivability in periods subsequent to the offering. We obtain a 
comprehensive sample of newly listed firms from 1994 to 2012 in the U.S. stock market. 
Following previous studies (e.g. Garcia and Norli (2012); Platikanova and Mattei (2016); 
Addoum, Kumar and Law (2017)), we use a text-based measure by counting state names 
from the operations-related sections in the Form 10-K to proxy firms’ geographically 
dispersed business interests. We construct a normalized Herfindahl–Hirschman Index 
(HHI) to indicate to what extent a firm is geographically dispersed across different U.S. 
states at the time of going public. This study is focused on geographical dispersion in the 
U.S., which provides us with a comparatively more homogenous, within-country 
environment (e.g. in relation to political and regulatory considerations), and discounts 
additional risks stemming from overseas dispersion (e.g. international diversification).  
  
Agency theory refers to the conflict of interests arising between an agent (e.g. 
managers) and the principal (e.g. shareholders) in which self-interested agents seek 
private benefits from either financial or non-financial incentives and eventually omit to 
maximize shareholder value (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In this study, we argue that 
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geographic dispersion hampers information flow within the organization, which 
negatively affects management decision-making, thereby exacerbating agency conflicts 
and giving rise to poor corporate performance and IPO failure. Geographically dispersed 
firm-specific information results in a reduced ability for managers to completely 
summarize operating information (Addoum, Kumar and Law, 2017), and increases 
information disparity between insiders and outsiders (Platikanova and Mattei, 2016). 
Distance affects information quality when it is transferred between different locations 
(Petersen and Rajan, 2002), and causes agency conflicts because of the low observability 
of managers’ behaviors (John, Knyazeva and Knyazeva, 2011). Thus, information 
asymmetry tends to be higher in geographically dispersed firms, which inherently 
increases internal and external monitoring costs. Shareholders may experience 
monitoring difficulties in those firms, resulting in moral hazard issues for managers in 
making decisions. Further, geographically dispersed firms face various challenges due to 
differing market conditions in states where firms have business interests. Managerial 
decision-making in geographically dispersed firms can be more flexible, depending on 
the operating environment (see, for example, Landier, Nair and Wulf (2009)). As a result, 
such firms feature more volatile operating environments, which aggravate the moral 
hazard problem (Clifford W Smith and Watts (1992); Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia 
(1999)). Managers who do not align with shareholder interests are likely to make 
inefficient decisions that result in IPO failure (see, for example, Gounopoulos and Pham 
(2018)). Therefore, we should expect geographic dispersion to increase the probability of 
firm failure risk in the post-offering period.  
 
We find strong evidence to support our conjecture. By implementing a Cox 
proportional-hazards (CPH) model, we reveal that more geographically dispersed firms 
are likely to fail and experience shorter survival times in periods subsequent to going 
public. When categorizing a firm by its degree of geographic dispersion, we find that 
lower levels of dispersion make it 0.756 times less likely that a firm will fail compared to 
a firm with higher levels of dispersion. The results are consistent when using 
nonparametric methodologies. Moreover, we document a similar negative geographic-
dispersion effect when investigating a firm’s post-IPO operating performance growth, 





We also reveal two additional effects of geographic dispersion on IPO survival. 
First, consistent with the notion that firms competing in the same states exhibit 
comparable information that enables shareholders to perform better monitoring and 
managers to make more efficient decisions, we find that IPO failure risks tend to be lower 
for firms with geographical similarities in the same industry. Second, we reveal that firms 
with spatially distributed business interests that are closely associated with local 
economic shocks experience lower failure risks, which indicates more efficient 
information collection and process analysis on their part.  
 
We further explore possible mechanisms for the failure of geographically 
dispersed IPO firms. Because of the evolution of information technologies in some 
industries (e.g. hard information environments), information collection increasingly relies 
on more impersonal means, which explains the increased distance between banks and the 
firms they service (Petersen and Rajan, 2002). On the other hand, in a soft information 
environment, personal interactions dominate information processing, which makes the 
information more difficult to transfer and verify. Thus, geographically dispersed firms in 
a soft information setting experience greater information asymmetry because distance has 
a larger impact on information flow and the means of information acquisition (Petersen, 
2004). Moreover, Landier, Nair and Wulf (2009) argue that information quality should 
be homogenous when the information is quantifiable (e.g. hard information). Hence, we 
should not expect there to be a link between IPO firm failure risk and geographical 
dispersion in firms operating in hard information environments. Conversely, consistent 
with the high information-asymmetry argument from previous studies (e.g., Platikanova 
and Mattei (2016)), we find that the failure risks among dispersed newly listed firms are 
more pronounced in soft information environments. The evidence is consistent with our 
conjecture that information flow matters to geographically dispersed firms for survival in 
post-offering periods.  
 
Because information collection in a soft information environment mainly relies 
on personal interactions, managerial decisions are more likely to be affected by social 
concerns. We find that geographically dispersed IPO firms are more likely to fail in small 
communities in a soft information setting. This result supports the argument that social 
factors affect managerial decision-making by affording more consideration to personal 
relationships, thereby exacerbating agency conflicts and corporate performance issues 
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(Landier, Nair and Wulf, 2009). In more concentrated firms, shareholders can better 
monitor management behaviors and ameliorate such managerial social concerns. Taken 
together, the evidence is consistent with our hypothesis that information asymmetry 
causes agency conflicts in relation to managerial decision-making, resulting in IPO 
failures in geographically dispersed firms.  
 
Finally, using a text-based measure to proxy the sizes of firms’ headquarters, we 
reveal a positive relationship between the degree of business concentration around the 
headquarters location and post-IPO survival. Regardless of geographic dispersion, the 
evidence implies an important function for HQ size on firm performance, which is 
consistent with notions from previous studies (e.g. Eisenhardt (1985); Hill, Hitt and 
Hoskisson (1992); Collis, Young and Goold (2007) ). 
 
We make several contributions to geography and IPO-based literature. Previous 
studies document various negative impacts on firm performance stemming from 
geographic dispersion, including firm valuation discount (Gao, Ng and Wang, 2008), 
lower stock returns (Garcia and Norli, 2012), and biased and inaccurate earnings forecasts 
(Platikanova and Mattei, 2016), and inefficient corporate decision-making (Landier, Nair 
and Wulf, 2009). To better understand how geographic dispersion affects corporate 
performance, we contribute to this stream of literature by addressing how newly listed 
firms with business interests heavily distributed across different U.S. states experience 
increased failure risk in the periods subsequent to the offering, with the ultimate 
consequence that firms are bankrupted or liquidated. To the best of our knowledge, we 
provide the first study to associate geography and corporate survival.  
 
Previous studies focus on a variety of firm and offering characteristics that affect 
IPO survival, such as firm age, size, and risk factors (Hensler, Rutherford and Springer, 
1997), the participation of venture capitalists (Jain and Kini, 2000), strategic and 
cornerstone investors (Espenlaub et al., 2016), and CEO’s working experience 
(Gounopoulos and Pham, 2018). However, it is unclear how geography affects the 
survivability of newly listed firms. In this regard, our results, using a novel dataset on 
firms’ geographically distributed business interests, could help to explain a sizable 




Our study is also closely related to the work of Landier, Nair and Wulf (2009). 
They find that geographically dispersed firms are less employee-friendly as a result of 
information limitations in a soft information environment where information asymmetry 
is high, and managers make decisions according to their social standings in small 
communities that are potentially against shareholder interests. This study replicates their 
research design and updates their work to show that information constraints and 
managerial social concerns in geographically dispersed newly listed firms result in 
corporate failures.  
 
Finally, our results produce several implications that are applicable in the financial 
marketplace. First, geographically dispersed firms are usually large in size (Garcia and 
Norli, 2012), which draws investors’ interests in the market. However, our results show 
that those dispersed firms exhibit a high tendency to failure in periods subsequent to going 
public. Thus, investors can reply on the observable factor of a firm’s geographically 
dispersed business interests at the time of the offering event to anticipate the implications 
of corporate failure for further valuation. Second, even though rapid expansion of a 
business to different geographical areas brings some financial benefits to firms, such as 
gaining greater market share and achieving higher sales, managers and shareholders need 
to take the side effects into account. For instance, compromised information from remote 
business operations deflects managers’ judgments from what might be rational, while 
closer proximity between headquarters and divisions enables managers to make more 
frequent trips to offer constructive advice for firm development (e.g. Giroud (2013)). 
Newly listed firms can benefit from running more concentrated businesses, in which 
failure risks are likely to be reduced. 
 
 The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 develops our primary 
hypothesis, while Section 3 discusses the data and methodologies. Section 4 presents our 
primary findings, including robustness checks. Finally, Section 5 provides a conclusion 






3.2 Geographic dispersion and IPO survival 
Previous literature discusses the relation between geographic dispersion and stock 
returns. Pirinsky and Wang (2006) find that the stock returns are comoved with the 
location of headquarters. They argue that the geographic component is considered to 
convey considerable information in the stock price.  Garcia and Norli (2012) indicate that 
local firms reach higher monthly returns compared to geographically dispersed firms. 
They argue that this is because local firms are associated with lower investor recognition, 
resulting in higher compensation to investors in order to meet their expectations, which 
is consistent with the investor recognition hypothesis proposed by Merton (1987). 
Addoum, Kumar and Law (2017) reveal that firms’ geographic dispersion can be used as 
patterns to predict stock returns, which is because market participants cannot fully 
incorporate the dispersed information of earnings into stock prices. Bernile, Kumar and 
Sulaeman (2015) conclude that geographic factors at the firm level causes local-biased 
information asymmetry in stock returns. Therefore, firms’ geographic diversification is 
associated with dispersed information, which affects investors and stock returns. In a 
similar vein, we argue that such information asymmetry would also affect managers’ 
decision making in geographic dispersed firms. 
As a background to diversification studies, Litov, Moreton and Zenger (2012) 
argue that mixed information from industry diversification increases difficulties for 
analysts in evaluating a firm. Duru and Reeb (2002) document that international 
diversification increases information complexity, and is therefore associated with less 
accurate analyst forecasts. In a similar vein, Platikanova and Mattei (2016) reveal that the 
economic interests of firms that are geographically dispersed across different states in the 
U.S. increase information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders. Operating 
information in geographically dispersed firms tends to be fragmentary, especially in 
historical financial performance records (Addoum, Kumar and Law, 2017), because 
managers may not be able to collect dispersed business information efficiently. After all, 
a firm’s spatially distributed business interests are often associated with geographically 
dispersed firm-specific information. Moreover, previous literature also suggests that 
market participants prefer to make geographically proximate investments for reasons 
associated with information disparity (see, for example, Coval and Moskowitz (1999); 
Garmaise and Moskowitz (2003)). Indeed, distance affects the means of information 
acquisition(Petersen and Rajan, 2002), and therefore exacerbates the information 
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asymmetry issue. Thus, geographic dispersion can compromise information quality when 
it requires transfer over a long distance. In the spirit of their work, we conjecture that 
firms with business interests geographically dispersed across different U.S. states 
experience greater information asymmetry problems within the organization. 
  
 The IPO market is characterized by high information asymmetry. For instance, 
newly listed firms are required by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
to include up to three year’s financial information in their prospectus. Thus, there is very 
limited knowledge about firm operations in their pre-IPO period. However, insiders have 
access to private information that is not publicly available to outsiders. In this scenario, 
managers have more incentives to seek private benefits and omit shareholder objectives 
when making decisions for the firm. For instance, managers could manipulate the 
financial report in order to deceive shareholders, which could result in severe damage to 
the firm. Consequently, a conflict of interests exists between the principal (e.g. 
shareholders) and the agent (e.g. firm managers), which will result in agency problems 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Bertrand and Schoar (2003) document that managerial 
decisions affect firm performance and behavior. In terms of alleviating agency problems, 
Gounopoulos and Pham (2018) find that specialist CEOs who are more likely to pursue 
shareholder objectives significantly reduce mortality rates for newly listed firms. Thus, a 
manager’s decision is a determinant of a firm’s future. In our study, we argue that in the 
face of the high information asymmetry that stems from geographically distributed 
business interests, managers are likely to make decisions that are against shareholder 
interests, potentially impacting on corporate performance and leading to IPO firm failures. 
 
A firm’s geographic diversification is associated with high information 
complexity (Duru and Reeb (2002); Denis, Denis and Yost (2002)), which affects the 
quality and quantity of information exchange between management and investors 
(Jennings, Seo and Tanlu, 2013). Moreover, the expansion of business operations and the 
raised level of information asymmetry, in turn, increase internal and external monitoring 
costs (Gao, Ng and Wang, 2008). John, Knyazeva and Knyazeva (2011) argue that 
distance can cause an agency problem, because shareholders cannot observe managers’ 
behaviors remotely. Thus, managers from geographically dispersed firms face a moral 
hazard problem when making managerial decisions because of monitoring challenges, 




 Furthermore, firms with operations in multiple states face a variety of challenges, 
such as local market competition, local economic conditions, and diverse political and 
regulatory influences. Jared D Smith (2016) documents that local political corruption 
affects firms’ financial policies. His study implies that managers may behave differently 
in making decisions depending on the operating environment in which the firm has 
business interests. Thus, decision-making in geographically dispersed firms is required to 
be more flexible. In this regard, Landier, Nair and Wulf (2009) document that managerial 
decisions in such firms could be made according to a manager’s social standing, which is 
potentially against the principle of maximization of shareholder value. As a result, 
spatially distributed business interests enable managers to enjoy discretion in operations, 
including moving income between different areas of the U.S. (e.g. Dyreng, Lindsey and 
Thornock (2013)). Therefore, geographically dispersed firms feature more volatile 
operating environments, which will exacerbate moral hazard issues associated with 
management decisions (Clifford W Smith and Watts (1992); Himmelberg, Hubbard and 
Palia (1999)).  
 
Geographic dispersion may also have an impact on the product differentiation. 
Because firms’ geographically dispersed business interests may require more resources, 
managers are likely to divert their focus away from the main business activities, thereby 
negatively affecting the product scope (e.g., Meyer (2006)). Moreover, the reduced level 
of the product differentiation is likely to lower firms’ competitiveness with industry rivals 
in the market (e.g., Dickson and Ginter (1987)). Afterall, the dispersed information at the 
firm level may affect managers’ decisions that are related to expand the product lines. 
During the process of going public, firms raise a large amount of capital to 
facilitate different purposes, such as financing further investments or accessing additional 
market sources. If a firm’s business is highly geographically dispersed across different 
U.S. states at the time of going public, the firm is more likely to maintain ongoing 
investment and operational expansion after the offering. One source of firm expansion is 
through merger and acquisition (M&A) activities, because many firms take advantage of 
going public to expedite future M&As (e.g. Celikyurt Celikyurt, Sevilir and Shivdasani 
(2010)). Consequently, the information asymmetry problem between managers and 
shareholders could remain longer in the subsequent periods after the public offerings, 
which is likely to divert managerial incentives away from maximizing shareholder 
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benefits and result in poor corporate performance. On the basis of these arguments, we 
should expect that firms with geographically dispersed business interests at the time of 
going public are negatively associated with post-IPO survival. 
 
3.3 Data and methodology 
 
3.3.1 IPO data 
 
We collected the share information of common stocks in the U.S. between 1st 
January 1994 and 31st December 2012 from the Security Data Corporation’s (SDC) New 
Issue database. To eliminate the negative impacts associated with specific offerings, we 
follow previous studies in excluding the following cases from our sample: 1) issues with 
an offer price below $5; 2) special vehicles, including closed-end funds, unit offerings, 
real investment trusts (REITs), American depositary receipts (ADRs), leveraged buyouts 
(LBOs), and financial institutions. We further obtain the firms’ financial information 
from Compustat and stock price data from the Center for Research in Security Prices 
(CRSP).  
 
Following previous studies (e.g. Gounopoulos and Pham (2018)), we track each 
IPO firm from the date of listing to its delisting date or the end of 2017, whichever is 
earlier. To distinguish each firm’s listing status, we obtain the delisting codes from CRSP 
and classify firms as survived if the code is 100 (i.e. it continued to trade at the end of 
2017), and as acquired if the IPO firm has assigned to it a code between 200 and 299. 
Previous studies, such as Espenlaub et al. (2016), and Gounopoulos and Pham (2018), 
define failed firms as those that delisted from the market for negative reasons (e.g. 
liquidation, bankruptcy, insufficient capital, failure to meet financial regulation, or 
delinquent in filings), rather than delisting motives with less harmful impacts on investors 
(e.g. M&A). Therefore, the failed firms in our sample are those with a code equal to or 
greater than 300.  
 




We measure the geographically dispersed business interests of newly listed firms 
using the content of 10-K forms (an annual report required by the U.S. SEC) retrieved 
from the Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval (EDGAR) database. This 
approach has been widely examined and accepted by previous studies (e.g. Garcia and 
Norli (2012); Bernile, Kumar and Sulaeman (2015); Platikanova and Mattei (2016); 
Addoum, Kumar and Law (2017); Smajlbegovic (2018)). To capture the characteristics 
of geographic dispersion at the time of the offering event, for each firm we download 
from EDGAR the Form 10-K that was reported for the year preceding IPO. Following 
prior literature, we count the number of times that any state is mentioned in the following 
sections: Item 1: Business; Item 2: Properties; Item 6: Consolidated Financial Data; Item7: 
Management’s Discussion and Analysis 9. Bernile, Kumar and Sulaeman (2015) and 
Addoum, Kumar and Law (2017) confirm that these four sections outline a firm’s 
geographically diversified operating activities, such as properties and equipment, store 
and office locations, and M&A activities, that are associated with stock and corporate 
performances. Moreover, this method of measuring firms’ spatially distributed business 
interests can avoid the problem of firms not disclosing accounting numbers by state 
(Garcia and Norli, 2012). We merge our data with that of Garcia and Norli (2012)10 to 
improve data availability and reliability. Ultimately, our sample of 2,432 IPOs with valid 
information comprises 507 survivors, 1,201 acquired firms, and 724 failed firms. 
In our sample, the most frequently mentioned states in the 10-K forms are 
California (9.71%), Delaware (8.4%), and New York (5.99%), and the least frequently 
cited states are Vermont (0.34%), South Dakota (0.33%), and North Dakota (0.31%). 
Because many firms are incorporated in Delaware or Washington, these two states are 
likely to be outliers in our analysis. In unreported results, we show that our findings are 
robust when these two states are excluded. 
 
Following Platikanova and Mattei (2016), we measure the level of a firm’s 
geographic dispersion by computing a normalized Herfindahl–Hirschman index: 
 
 
9 In the case of missing 10-K reports, we follow Garcia and Norli (2012) in using alternative reports: forms 10k/A, 10-
K405, 10-KSB, 10-KT, 10KSB, 10KSB40, 10KT405 and the amendments to these forms. We require all reports used 
to have been issued in the IPO year, which addresses the time constraint on a firm for filing the report. 
10 We thank Garcia and Norli for providing the data, which is available from their website. 
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                                                                           (2)                                                                                                                         
 
where SSi,(IPO year) in Equation 1 is the aggregated value of the squared ratio of each state 
count divided by all state citations for firm i in the IPO year, and Concentrationi,(IPO year) 
in Equation 2 is the normalized HHI of the degree of an IPO firm’s geographic dispersion 
across different states. 
 
The variable Concentration ranges from 0 to 1, where a value of 0 indicates that 
a firm has business interests equally distributed across the 50 U.S. states at the time of 
going public, and a value of 1 indicates that a firm entirely conducts its business activities 
in just one state. Thus, larger values of the variable Concentration suggest that an IPO 
firm has more geographically concentrated business interests, implying that the firm is 
less dispersed.  
 
Following Platikanova and Mattei (2016), we construct two additional measures 
of geographic dispersion, which are related to industry competitors and local economic 
shocks. First, the variable of GEOSIMILAR is a cosine similarity for each observation in 
our sample, which uses relative state citations to calculate the pairwise similarity of the 
level of geographic dispersion between any two newly listed firms at the same 3-digit SIC 
level. The measure implies to what extent an IPO firm’s business activities across U.S. 
states are similar to those of their competitors, which distinguishes differing distances 
between firms in the 10-K based geographically dispersed business interests and 
differentiate firms from other industry rivals. 
 
Next, we consider the correlation between firm’s spatially distributed business 
interests and local economic shocks. The local shocks derive from the variance of 
personal income per capital at the state level which are detrended from its economic series 
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and measured over a 10-years period11. We weight the correlation between local shocks 
by the importance of each state where firms have business interests (e.g., relative state 
citations). The variable GEOCORR captures to what extent a firm’s geographic dispersion 
is correlated with local economic shocks. The measure takes 1 if the newly listed firm has 




Survival analysis has been widely applied to predict events such as bank and 
corporate failures, employee turnover (Somers, 1996), and venture capitalists’ 
participation in firms and subsequent M&As after IPOs (Gill and Walz, 2016). Previous 
studies also use survival analysis to investigate the determinants of post-IPO firm failures 
(e.g. Jain and Kini (2000); Jain and Kini (2008); Espenlaub et al. (2016); Gounopoulos 
and Pham (2018)). Compared to conventional econometrical models (e.g. logistic or 
probit regressions) that only predict the occurrence of an event, survival analysis is 
capable of incorporating time horizon factors before the event occurs, and also taking 
censored observations into account. An observation is treated as censored if the event has 
not yet taken place during the study period. Thus, our sample is right-censored because 
many IPO firms continued to trade after the end of the tracking period (e.g. 31 December 
2017). In addition, the time horizon window is different for each firm depending on the 
time that the IPO occurred. For example, we track a firm that went public in 2005 for ten 
years, but if it went public in 2010 we only track it for seven. 
 
Our analysis of the relationship between geographic dispersion and a newly listed 
firm’s survival involves two stages. We first use nonparametric approaches: by 
implementing a survival function, we are able to assess the newly listed firm’s survival 
probability up to a specific time. The Kaplan–Meier survival function is presented as:  
 
                                                    (3)                                                                
 
11 Unlike Platikanova and Mattei (2016), we use the archival state-level economic time series from 1959 to 2017. 
Because our sample period spans 18 years, which is longer than their study. The data is from the Federal Reserve Bank 




where 𝑡𝑗  indicates the time when an IPO firm’s delisting occurs, 𝑛𝑗  is the number of 
surviving IPOs before the time 𝑡𝑗, and 𝑑𝑗 is the number of failed IPOs at time 𝑡𝑗. We use 
a log-rank test to examine whether the survival functions are significantly different 
between different groups of firms distinguished by their geographic-dispersion levels.  
 
In the main analysis that follows, we implement parametric approaches that 
include the Cox proportional-hazards (CPH) model. The CPH procedure combines a 
hazard model and a maximum partial likelihood estimation process (David, 1972). The 
advantage of using the CPH model is that it does not need the hazard function to be pre-
specified and can take any function form (Allison, 2010). We estimate the Cox 
proportional-hazards model as follows: 
 
ℎ(𝑡) = ℎ0(𝑡)exp [𝛽1𝐺𝑒𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎ℎ𝑖𝑐 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 +
𝛽4𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑠 + 𝛽5𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟 + 𝛽6𝑉𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 + 𝛽7𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟 + 𝛽8𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒 +
𝛽9𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽10𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛽11𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 − 𝑡𝑜 − 𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑑𝑖𝑒𝑠 +
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠]                                                                                                 (4)                                                                        
 
where ℎ0(𝑡) is the hazard function; the dependent variable is the hazard ratio relating to 
firm failure risk. A positive (or negative) coefficient implies that the IPO firm is more (or 
less) likely to be delisted in the future; likewise, the corresponding survival time is shorter 
(or longer). For each of the control variables, the hazard ratio is calculated as an 
exponentiated coefficient, which indicates the probability of firm failure risk. For binary 
variables, the hazard ratio is served as the ratio of estimated hazard for those with value 
1 to that of those with value 0. For continuous variables, the change of estimated hazard 
for a unit increase in the covariate is measured as 100× (hazard ratio–1) (Jain and Kini 
(2008); Allison (2010)). Moreover, adopting the CPH regression requires that the model 
is proportional hazards, which indicates that any two variables display the ratios of 
hazards that are proportional over time. In unreported results, we conduct relevant test 





The variable of interest is a firm’s geographic dispersion related measure. We 
incorporate into the analysis control variables that are found to have an impact on IPO 
survival. First, we include variables Proceeds, Sales, and Firm age,  because large firms 
(or firms with a longer operating history) reduce information asymmetry and have less 
valuation uncertainty, and therefore lower IPO failure risk (Hensler, Rutherford and 
Springer (1997); Demers and Joos (2007)). Moreover, some studies document that the 
participation of financial intermediaries in newly listed firms also improves post-IPO 
survival profile. Specifically, top-tier underwriters and auditors play a certification role 
in reducing firms’ specific risks and the information disparity between offerings and 
investors during the process of going public, thereby lowering post-IPO failure risks (e.g. 
Schultz (1993); Carter, Dark and Singh (1998); Weber and Willenborg (2003); Corwin 
and Schultz (2005)). Moreover, venture capitalists (VCs) add value to the portfolios of 
firms by exercising intensive monitoring through their expertise in the industry and board 
positions, which improves corporate performance (e.g. Brav and Gompers (1997); 
Hellmann and Puri (2002); Krishnan et al. (2011)). Jain and Kini (2000) reveal a positive 
relationship between VC involvement and IPO survival. We, therefore, consider these 
information-reducing and value-adding intermediaries by incorporating the variables 
Venture capital, Underwriter, and Auditor in the analysis. Furthermore, IPO initial 
returns may be used as a signal of the quality of issuers (Welch, 1989). Thus, we follow 
Demers and Joos (2007) in controlling this effect by incorporating Initial return in the 
study. We also control for other financial characteristics of firms at the time of going 
public, including Leverage, Profitability and Market-to-book (e.g. growth opportunities) 
(see, for example, Gounopoulos and Pham, 2017 Gounopoulos and Pham (2018)). We 
report a correlation matrix of the variables used in our study in Appendix B and find no 
evidence of multicollinearity. Definitions of the variables are provided in Appendix A. 
 
3.3.4. Data description 
 
Table 1 displays IPO distributions of the sample. In Panel A, when tracking from 
offering date to the end of 2017, firms that failed, were acquired, or survived occupy 
29.77%, 49.38%, and 20.85% of our sample, respectively. When tracking up to five years 
after going public, 19.28% of firms had failed, 24.96% were acquired, and 55.76% 
survived. Panels B and C report IPO distributions by year and industry, and firms’ 
delisting status is tracked up to five years after offering. According to Panel B, the 
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percentage of firms delisted was highest in 1994 and lowest in 2004 (2012 and 2005 for 
acquired firms), accounting respectively for 40% and 3.85% of firms (36.67% and 10.23% 
for acquired firms). More than half of the IPO firms survived their first five years of 
listing, except in years 1996, 1997, and 2008. In Panel C, we note that health services and 
chemical products industries account respectively for the highest (33.33%) and lowest 
(9.84%) percentages of firm failures. Entertainment services, wholesale and retail trade, 
and transportation and public utilities exhibit relatively high delisting rates, ranging from 
25.49% to 29.03%. Moreover, in our sample, firms in the entertainment services industry 
are the most likely to be acquired (33.33%), and firms in the health services industry are 
the least likely to be acquired (19.05%). In the majority of industries, more than 50 
percent of firms survived five years after going public.   
 
In Table 2, we report Kaplan–Meier survival rates for subgroups of firms up to 
five years after going public, stratified by the firms’ business concentration levels. In 
Panel A, we categorize firms into low- and high-concentration groups based on the 
median value of the HHI. The overall survival rates for highly concentrated firms are 
consistently greater than those of lightly concentrated firms through the first year of 
listing until the fifth year of listing. For example, the survival rate for highly concentrated 
firms is 80.54% in the fifth year, indicating a 5.07% excessive value compared to the 
figure of 75.47% for lightly concentrated firms. In Panel B, we stratify our sample 
according to concentration-level quartiles. We observe that, consistent with Panel A, 
survival rates increase in line with higher levels of business concentration. The reported 
p-values of a log-rank test are 0.003 for Panel A and 0.011 for Panel B, which reject the 
null hypothesis that the survival functions for the different levels of firm business 
concentration are equal. Overall, the evidence from nonparametric analysis provides 
initial support to our hypothesis that a firm’s geographically dispersed business interests 
are negatively associated with post-IPO survival. 
 
Table 3 provides descriptive statistics of variables associated with geographic 
dispersion, as well as firm and offering characteristics, grouped by low and high business 
concentration features. Panel A reports firms’ geographical characteristics for our sample. 
In the issuing year, the average number of states in which firms show business interests 
is 6.169 (3.807 for regions). The average cosine similarity value for firms that share 
geographically dispersed business interests with industry competitors (GEOSIMILAR) is 
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0.29, and the average value for the correlation between a firm’s dispersion and local 
economic shocks (GEOCORR) is 0.227. In particular, the dispersed business interests in 
highly concentrated firms are more deeply correlated with local economic shocks than 
lightly concentrated ones (0.366 vs. 0.088), and the difference is statistically significant 
at the 1% level. The average business concentration around the headquarters location is 
0.501. Firms with more concentrated business interests exhibit greater focus on their HQ 
than firms with highly dispersed business interests (0.688 vs. 0.314). On average, 51.2% 
of issuers are located in a large community (e.g. higher local population at the county 
level). 
 
Panel B reports offering and firm characteristics. Firms went public at an average 
age of 13.134 years and raise mean proceeds of $104.649 million. The mean initial returns 
for new issuers is 28.348%. In terms of financial intermediaries interacting with IPO firms, 
48.8% were supported by venture capitalists, 37.7% hired top-tier investment banks, and 
over half of the issuers (67.9%) were audited by ‘Big Four’ auditors. Moreover, the mean 
sales for firms around IPO is $280.624 million, with average leverage and market-to-
book ratios of 0.34 and 6.095, respectively. IPO firms report a mean profitability ratio of 
-0.048, which is consistent with the argument that firms prefer to go public before 
generating positive profits from 1990s (Jain et al., 2008). This finding is also close to the 
figure recorded by previous studies (e.g. Gounopoulos and Pham, 2017). Finally, on 
average, firms operate in 1.704 industries and 0.808 foreign countries (e.g., outside the 
U.S.) at the time of going public.  
 
A majority of firm and offering characteristics exhibit significant differences 
between low- and high-concentration firms, exceptions being market-to-book ratio and 
international segments (Intl.SEG). IPO firms with more concentrated business interests 
are younger than firms with less concentrated ones (11.658 years vs. 14.617 years). In 
addition, less geographically dispersed firms experience lower initial returns than firms 
with highly dispersed business interests (25.035% vs. 31.677%). This finding potentially 
supports our informational argument that geographic dispersion gives rise to information 
asymmetry, because previous studies present the general notion that asymmetric 
information between insiders and outsiders results in higher initial returns (e.g. Levis 
(1990); Loughran and McDonald (2013); Bajo and Raimondo (2017)). Less concentrated 
firms raise nearly double the capital during the process of going public than highly 
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concentrated firms ($136.259 million vs. $73.194 million). In addition, the average sales 
for firms with lightly concentrated business interests are 50 percent above those of firms 
with highly concentrated business interests ($380.112 million vs. $181.626 million). This 
evidence implies that geographically dispersed firms are usually larger in size, which 
supports the argument of Garcia and Norli (2012).  
 
Furthermore, IPO firms in the two groups show evidence of different financial 
policies. Specifically, the average leverage ratio for lightly concentrated firms is greater 
than highly concentrated ones (0.374 vs. 0.307), which is consistent with our argument 
that managers may make different decisions depending on the operating environment (e.g. 
according to the level of a firm’s geographic dispersion). The mean market-to-book ratio 
is 6.427 for firms with lightly concentrated business interests, and 5.764 for firms with 
highly concentrated interests. Moreover, VCs are more likely to invest in highly 
concentrated firms than lightly concentrated ones (54.2% vs. 43.4%); one possible reason 
is that VCs can better monitor and screen a portfolio if the firm is less geographically 
dispersed, resulting in proximity investment preference (see, for example, Lerner (1995)). 
Firms with lower business concentrations show a higher preference for hiring reputable 
investment banks and auditors (41% and 69.2%, respectively) than firms with high 
business concentrations (34.5% and 66.5%, respectively). On average, lightly 
concentrated firms are more diversified than highly concentrated ones in terms of the 
industry and international segments in which they operate. Lastly, regarding the IPO 
failure, significantly greater portion of firms with lightly concentrated business are 
delisted due to negative reasons within the first five years after the offering than that of 
firms with highly concentrated business (21.4% and 17.2%, respectively).  
 
3.4 Empirical analysis of firms’ geographical dispersion on IPO survival 
 
3.4.1 Survival analysis of geographically dispersed IPO firms (CPH model) 
 
We now estimate variants of Equation 4 to investigate the impact of geographic 
dispersion on IPO firms’ survivorship, after controlling for various firm and offering 
characteristics that are related to the probability of IPO failure risk. In order to control for 
unobserved effects on the delisting of IPO firms (e.g. financial crisis years), we 
89 
 
incorporate year and industry effects in all regression analyses in which coefficients are 
suppressed. The results of the estimations from the CPH model are tabulated in Table 4 
in the form of four specifications.  
 
In specification (1), we first use our state-citation-based HHI measure 
(Concentration), which indicates the degree of geographical dispersion in an IPO firm. 
The coefficient for the variable of interest is -0.563, at a significance level of 1 percent, 
implying a strong negative relationship between the level of an IPO firm’s business 
concentration and its post-offering failure risk. In other words, more geographically 
dispersed business interests (i.e. distributed across more states) in a newly listed firm 
significantly increase the hazard of being delisted and decrease survival times in post-
offering periods. The hazard ratio of 0.569 implies that a one-unit increase in 
Concentration is associated with a 43.1% reduction in the risk of failure in periods 
subsequent to the offering. In specification (2), the coefficient for High-concentration 
firms is -0.279 and is statistically significant at the 1% level, suggesting that highly 
geographically dispersed IPO firms are more likely to experience failure compared to 
their counterparts with less dispersed business interests. The hazard ratio of High-
concentration firms suggests that lower levels of geographic dispersion in firms make it 
0.756 times less likely that such firms will fail relative to firms with higher levels of 
geographic dispersion.  
 
 In specification (3), we present the analysis using the degree of geographic 
similarity for a newly listed firm within the same industry. Higher values of variable 
GEOSIMILAR imply that an IPO firm’s business interests across U.S. states are similar 
to those of their industry competitors. Platikanova and Mattei (2016) document that 
analysts’ precision is increased in a given state if more firms in the same industry share 
geographically similar economic activities, because the cost of collecting information is 
reduced. In a similar vein, we expect that such lower-cost information collection 
processes may also be applied to alleviate potential agency conflicts between managers 
and shareholders. One explanation could be that, for instance, shareholders may more 
easily identify the advantages and disadvantages of operating in a given state by 
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comparing information from competitors, and can thereby more readily direct managers 
to take actions to improve corporate performance.12 
 
Next, in specification (4), we consider the effect on corporate failure of firm’s 
geographically dispersed business interests related local economic shocks. Higher values 
of GEOCORR indicate that the IPO firm either operates in one state only, or that its 
operations in multiple states are closely correlated with local economic disturbance(s). 
The integrity of operations in different states that are closely correlated with local shocks 
enables firms to have better access to local resources, including customers, suppliers, and 
local regulators, among many others. In such circumstances, we expect that insiders can 
collect and analyse information more efficiently from closely correlated states in which 
the firm has business interests. Therefore, we conjecture that geographically dispersed 
IPO firms that are closely tied in to local shocks are less likely to experience failure.  
 
In specification (3) of Table 4, we find a negative coefficient (-0.751) for 
GEOSIMILAR, at a highly significant level of 1 percent. This result is consistent with the 
conjecture that firms sharing geographically dispersed business interests with industry 
counterparts experience lower failure risk, because there is more comparable information 
in the marketplace. In specification (4), we observe that the variable GEOCORR displays 
a negative sign (-0.548) and is statistically significant at the 1% level. This finding 
provides evidence that IPO firms are less likely to fail if their geographically dispersed 
business interests are closely associated with local economic shocks. Given the hazard 
ratios for GEOSIMILAR and GEOCORR of 0.472 and 0.578, respectively, a one-unit 
increase in GEOSIMILAR indicates that IPO failure risk decreases by 52.8% (42.2% in 
the case of a similar rise in GEOCORR). 
A majority of our control variables display the expected signs and significance at 
conventional levels. Specifically, we find that offering factors such as longer operating 
history, the raising of more proceeds, and larger firm size (e.g., higher sales) significantly 
extend survival times for IPO firms, which is consistent with findings from Hensler, 
Rutherford and Springer (1997) and Demers and Joos (2007). Moreover, the participation 
of financial intermediaries, including venture capitalists and reputable underwriters, also 
 
12 Our argument is similar to that of De Franco et al. (2011), which finds that comparable accounting information 
among different firms lowers information asymmetry and improves information quality and quantity between insiders 
and outsiders (e.g., analysts). 
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contributes to better survival profiles (e.g. Jain and Kini (2000)). Firms with high leverage 
are associated with shorter survival times in the periods after IPO, as per Gounopoulos 
and Pham (2018). Finally, in line with Jain and Kini (2008), firms survive longer if they 
have higher profitability and better market-to-book ratio at the time of going public. 
 
Overall, the results support the earlier findings from the use of nonparametric 
approaches, shown in Table 2. That is, a higher level of geographic dispersion in an IPO 
firm increases the probability of failure risk and reduces survival times in periods 
subsequent to the offering, which is aligned with our primary hypothesis.  
 
3.4.2 Geographic dispersion and IPO survival: Information and social concern 
            
In this section, we replicate the research design of Landier, Nair and Wulf (2009) 
to address how the information environment and managerial social concerns affect the 
survival of geographically dispersed IPO firms. 
 
3.4.2.1 Information environment 
 
Petersen (2004) suggests that information transmission performs differently 
depending on the information environment. Specifically, he argues that some information 
is quantifiable (e.g. accounting figures) and is easy to store and transfer through advanced 
means (e.g. technologies such as email), which is characterized as hard information. On 
the other hand, the collection and processing of soft information (e.g. rumors) mainly 
relies on personal interaction, and is difficult to completely summarize and verify over 
distance13. Such an information mechanism explains the increasing distances between 
lenders and borrowers, as bankers more readily lend to remotely located firms when 
relevant information can be rendered harder or more impersonal14. Therefore, a soft 
information environment features higher information asymmetry than a hard one. 
 
 
13 An example is that the variation of stock price could depend on the informal market observations that constitute soft 
information, rather than the hard information conveyed by official means (e.g. financial reports, earnings calls) (see, 
for example, Loughran and Schultz (2005)). 
14 Berger et al. (2005) find that large banks prefer to lend to more distant firms because lenders take advantage of 
technologies to communicate with customers in a hard information environment. Similar evidence can also be found 
in Petersen and Rajan (2002). 
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Because distance affects the means of information acquisition, we should expect 
that geographically dispersed firms will experience higher information asymmetry when 
operating in a softer information environment. Managers may experience greater 
difficulties in obtaining information from spatially distributed business interests in 
support of precise decisions, and shareholders may also find that it is not easy to observe 
management behaviors remotely in such an information setting. Conversely, firms with 
greater business concentrations enjoy better within-organization information flow and 
more intensive monitoring from shareholders, which should be less affected by the type 
of information environment in operation. After all, less dispersed business interests 
provide firms with better communication channels. Moreover, Landier, Nair and Wulf 
(2009) suggest that information quality should remain unchanged when that information 
is quantifiable, regardless of distance factors. On the basis of the discussion above, we 
expect the low survivability among geographically dispersed firms to be more prominent 
in a soft information setting.  
 
To examine this conjecture, we collect data on the distance between firms and 
financial institutions from the National Survey of Small Business Finance before 
calculating the average change in this distance between survey years at the two-digit 
industry level15. We define firms as operating in a soft information environment if the 
mean distance change is below the median value, and in a hard information environment 
otherwise. The results are tabulated in Table 5. 
 
In specification (1), we introduce an interaction term between the level of 
geographic concentration (Concentration) and our measure of the information 
environment in a firm’s industry (Soft information) to our CPH model of IPO survival. 
We find a negative coefficient (significant at the 5% level) for Concentration*Soft 
information, which suggests that the level of a firm’s geographic dispersion is positively 
associated with failure risk if the firm operates in a soft information environment. This 
result supports empirical evidence from previous studies that documents a relationship 
between information asymmetry issues and different information settings. For instance, 
Platikanova and Mattei (2016) show that earnings forecasts for geographically dispersed 
 
15 The survey report is only available for the years 1987, 1993, 1998, and 2003. Our approach to measures of soft and 
hard information environments is similar to that of Landier, Nair and Wulf (2009) and Platikanova and Mattei (2016). 
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firms are less accurate in an environment where information cannot be made impersonal 
at low cost (i.e. soft information), which points to high information disparity between 
insiders and outsiders. Thus, we reveal the importance of the information environment in 
determining the survival of geographically dispersed newly listed firms, which partially 
supports our hypothesis. 
 
3.4.2.2 Managerial social concern 
 
Landier, Nair and Wulf (2009) suggest that managerial decisions could be made 
on the basis of personal social standing. They find that managers are more likely to protect 
employees in small communities, for avoidance of embarrassment and/or other selfish 
motivations. Such social concerns are likely to divert managers away from managerial 
incentives and increase moral hazard issues. For instance, when a firm seeks a supplier, 
managers in small communities may prefer to cooperate with acquaintances (e.g. friends, 
family members) rather than selecting the most appropriate partner (e.g. through quality 
matching). Because the information collection process in a soft information environment 
mainly relies on personal interactions, we explore how social concerns affect survival 
profiles of geographically dispersed IPO firms within such settings.  
 
Our social concern measure derives from the finding of Landier, Nair and Wulf 
(2009) that community size can influence a manager’s decision-making. To capture this 
social effect on managerial decisions in relation to the survivability of geographically 
dispersed IPO firms, we first collect the county names in which firms’ headquarters are 
located according to the addresses and zip codes obtained from Compustat. Next, we 
gather population data for each such county from the U.S. Census Bureau. We define a 
firm as being in a large community if the local population is above the sample median 
(701,080), and small if it is below. The community size is expected to capture the 
potential agency conflicts between managers and shareholders.  
 
We divide our sample on the basis of small and large community sizes, as shown 
in Table 5. We observe that the coefficient for the interaction term Concentration*Soft 
information appears negative and significant at the 5% level in specification (2), which 
suggests that geographic dispersion increases IPO firms’ failure risk in a soft information 
environment only when a firm’s headquarters is located in a county with a small 
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population. We do not find such evidence in which firms operate in a hard information 
environment, in specification (3). Our results are less likely to be attributable to the costs 
of information collection in less or more populated counties, otherwise we should also 
find similar evidence in large communities.  
 
Overall, the results offer important implications in relation to geographic 
dispersion and firm survival. First, we show that geographically dispersed IPO firms are 
more likely to fail in a soft information environment, which is consistent with our 
information asymmetry argument. Second, the empirical evidence from small 
communities is consistent with the view of Landier, Nair and Wulf (2009) that managerial 
social concerns affect management decision-making, potentially in opposition to the 
objective of maximizing shareholder value. Thus, our hypothesis that geographically 
dispersed firms experience greater internal information asymmetry that negatively affects 
managerial decisions, leading to a higher probability of failure in post-IPO periods, is 
upheld.  
 
3.4.3 Post-IPO performance 
 
Because we conjectured that managers in geographically dispersed firms are more 
likely to make decisions against shareholder interests and give rise to post-IPO failure, it 
is natural to examine whether such behavior can be related to a firm’s operating 
performance in post-IPO periods.  
 
Our measure used to proxy the post-IPO operating performance is the operating 
return on assets, which is the ratio of operating income before depreciation to total assets 
(e.g., Jain and Kini (1994)). This variable captures to what extent a firm is efficient in 
converting the capital it invests into net income; a high value indicates that a firm 
generates more profit with less investment. The method we adopted to identify the 
matching firm is similar to that of Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004) and Shantanu 
Banerjee, Güçbilmez and Pawlina (2016). Specifically, we match each IPO firm in our 
sample with an industry peer (at the 3-digit SIC code) based on the comparable sales and 
EBITDA profit margins, where the EBITDA profit margin is defined as the ratio of 
EBITDA to sales. For the matching firm, we apply the following restrictions: 1) the firm 
has been trading at least three years at the time of issuer’s initial public offering; 2) a 
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stock price is no less than $5 in the same fiscal year that the IPO firm starts trading in the 
market. 3) firms are ordinary shares, and exclude closed-end funds, unit offerings, REITs, 
ADRs, LBOs, and financial institutions. During the matching process, we use the next 
available matching firm if any firm has a missing accounting value in a particular fiscal 
year, but the IPO firm’s accounting information is available in the same year. We 
calculate the growth of the IPO firm’s post-operating performance as the change of 
operating return on assets between the offering year and year y less the corresponding 
change for the matching firm. Because of the matching restrictions, accounting data 
availability from Compustat, and the IPO’s listing status, our sample drops and varies 
between different post-offering years. We include all control variables from the baseline 
regression analysis as well as year and industry dummies whose coefficients are 
suppressed for brevity. The results are tabulated in Table 6.  
 
First, in Panel A, we use univariate analysis to compare the post-IPO performance 
growth for each of our subsamples: low and high business concentration firms. We find 
that IPO firms with more concentrated business consistently outperform counterparts with 
less concentrated business in three years subsequent to the offering, and the differences 
are highly significant at the 1% level. Further, over the first year of listing, both 
subsamples of firms are associated with the operating performance growth that is on 
average higher than the performance of matched firms. However, staring in the second 
year, we observe that firms with less concentrated business experience declined operating 
performance growth compared to IPO year; while firms with more concentrated business 
enjoy continuously positive growth. The OLS regressions confirm those results in Panel 
B, where we regress the growth of operating return on assets on the firm’s geographic 
dispersion measures. Specifically, the coefficients on Concentration and High CONC are 
positive and statistically significant at the 1% level, suggesting that the growth of an IPO 
firm’s ability to generate profits based on their investments increases with decreasing 
levels of geographic dispersion. 
 
Overall, the evidence supports our hypothesis that a firm’s geographically 




3.4.4 Additional test: Firm headquarters size 
 
A firm’s headquarters takes responsibility for allocating resources to 
geographically dispersed business units, including labor, R&D funds, and manufacturing 
equipment. Divisions, therefore, perform activities and tasks according to the orders 
received from headquarters. Further, a well-defined control system adopted by an HQ to 
monitor and screen division activities reduces agency costs (Eisenhardt, 1985). Therefore, 
the corporate headquarters is important to financial and managerial performance because 
it has decision-making, coordinating and value-adding functions within the organization 
(e.g. Chandler (1991); Collis, Young and Goold (2007)). Because the magnitude of the 
headquarters matters to its fundamental roles (Hill, Hitt and Hoskisson, 1992), we 
specifically evaluate the importance of headquarters size to survival profiles of 
geographically dispersed IPO firms. 
 
We take advantage of our state-count data to construct a variable HQ% by using 
the citation share of the headquarters state relative to all other relevant states as a proxy 
for the magnitude of the HQ. Larger values of HQ% indicate higher levels of business 
concentration in the headquarters state. This variable provides us with a clear picture of 
the extent of an IPO firm’s operational concentration at the headquarters location, 
regardless of the level of geographical dispersion. The results are tabulated in Table 7.  
 
We find that the coefficient for the variable of interest HQ% is -0.402 and is 
significant at the 5% level, indicating that IPO firms with a higher percentage of business 
concentration around the headquarters location are associated with lower probabilities of 
failure. The hazard ratio of 0.669 indicates that a one-unit increase in HQ% is associated 
with a 33.1% reduction in post-offering failure risks. This finding is consistent with the 
notion that the size of corporate headquarters plays a dominant role in firm performance, 
which supports previous studies (e.g., Hill, Hitt and Hoskisson (1992)).  
 
3.5 Robustness tests 
 
3.5.1 Control for high-tech firms 
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High-tech firms are usually young and associated with more growth opportunities. 
Thus, they feature higher risks than others and are also more likely to engender greater 
agency conflicts between managers and shareholders. Moreover, such firms tend to have 
more intangible assets (e.g. patents, trademarks), which may be less affected by 
geographical dispersal of business interests. Therefore, we investigate whether the impact 
of a firm’s geographic dispersion on IPO survival is a result of differing industries (e.g. 
high-tech vs. non-high-tech). In specification (1) of Table 8, we observe that the 
coefficient for Concentration is negative and significant at the 5% level, which is 
consistent with the evidence from the baseline analysis that geographic dispersion is 
negatively associated with IPO survival. The coefficient for the interaction term 
Concentration*High-tech is not statistically significant, suggesting that the impact of a 
firm’s geographic dispersion on IPO survival is not dependent on whether or not the firm 
operates in a high-tech industry. In specifications (2) and (3), we conduct an analysis of 
the high-tech and non-high-tech industries subgroups by dividing our sample on this basis. 
As expected, the variable Concentration consistently displays negative and significant 
signs, confirming that geographic dispersion increases the level of IPO failure risk. A 
one-unit increase in Concentration decreases IPO failure risk by 50.3% for high-tech 
firms, and by 39% for non-high-tech firms. 
 
3.5.2 Endogeneity control 
 
In this section, we first question whether the impact of an IPO firm’s geographic 
dispersion is driven by other corporate diversification factors rather than by within-
country geographic dispersion. International diversification could expose firms to 
additional risks, such as fluctuations in exchange rates, localized policy variations, and 
foreign country regulations (Duru and Reeb, 2002). Moreover, Denis, Denis and Yost 
(2002) reveal that firms with foreign operations are associated with value reduction. 
Furthermore, industrial diversification is also associated with information asymmetry 
problems (e.g. Litov, Moreton and Zenger (2012)) and corporate performance (e.g. Jain, 
Jayaraman and Kini (2008); Lin and Su (2008)). Gao, Ng and Wang (2008) document 
that industrially diversified firms also exhibit a greater tendency to expand their business 
to other geographical areas. Further, both international and industrial diversifications may 
increase management’s power and reputation through higher compensation and reduced 
personal risk, which also represents a potential conflict of interest with shareholders (see, 
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for example, Denis, Denis and Yost (2002)). Therefore, we collect the number of 
international geographic and industry segments for the sample firms from Compustat 
Segments data and include variables Intl.SEG and IndustrySEG in the analysis. In Table 
9, the sign of the coefficient for Concentration is consistent with previous findings and 
statistically significant at the 5% level. The evidence suggests that geographic dispersion 
positively affects firm failure risk in post-IPO periods, and is not attributable to systematic 
risks and additional issues stemming from other corporate diversifications.  
 
 Second, the t-tests shown earlier (e.g., in Table 3) indicate that most of our control 
variables are significantly different between high- and low-concentration firms. The 
differences in firm and IPO characteristics in the two groups of firms could be caused 
directly or indirectly by firm’s business expansion, or by unobserved heterogeneity 
between IPO issuers. Thus, we use propensity score matching (PSM) to control for such 
observable differences. Using a propensity score matching analysis, we can statistically 
compare the outcome (e.g. post-IPO failure) of a treated observation (IPO firm) with an 
effect (high business concentration across U.S. states) to the same untreated observation 
on the basis of a number of covariates. Specifically, we incorporate rich sets of covariates 
for various offering and firm characteristics in the probit regression including Firm age, 
Initial return, Proceeds, Venture capital, Underwriter, Auditor, Sales, Leverage, 
Profitability, Market-to-book, Intl.SEG, IndustrySEG, year and industry dummies. We 
define our treatment observations as IPOs from highly concentrated firms to evaluate the 
effect of geographic dispersion on the occurrence of IPO failure.  As shown in Table 10, 
the average treatment effect on the treated (ATET) is -0.074 with a significance level of 
5%, suggesting more geographically concentrated IPO firms experience lower failure 
risks than their less concentrated counterparts. These findings are consistent with the 
results of the previous analysis.  
3.5.3 Alternative measures of a firm’s geographic dispersion 
 
We consider alternative measures of geographic dispersion in this section. We 
first construct a variable NState by simply counting the number of different states in 
which a firm has business interests at the time of going public. Following Gao, Ng and 
Wang (2008), we then categorize in how many U.S. geographical regions an IPO firm 
has business activities. The variable Region is a count indicator ranging from one to nine 
in our sample. Further, because Garcia and Norli (2012) report that localized firms 
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outperform dispersed ones in terms of stock returns, we follow their study and define the 
variable Local, which takes a value of 1 if the IPO firm has geographically dispersed 
business interests in one or two states, and is otherwise 0. The results from specifications 
(1) to (3) shown in Table 11 continue to support our hypothesis that geographic dispersion 
negatively relates to IPO survival. 
 
Furthermore, geographically dispersed firms with operations in different states 
can exhibit distinct financial performance as a result of local economic conditions (e.g. 
Platikanova and Mattei,  2016). We use the gross domestic product (GDP) at the state 
level to construct a GDP-weighted HHI for firms’ geographical dispersion. The variable 
Concentration (GDP) is expected to capture the effect of economic factors in the local 
state on the post-IPO performance of dispersed firms. In specification (4) of Table 11, we 
find a negative coefficient that is significant at the 5% level, suggesting that firms with 
more concentrated business interests are less likely to fail in post-IPO periods.  
 
Firms are required to report major subsidiaries in Exhibit 21 of Form 10-K. 
Following Dyreng, Lindsey and Thornock (2013), we hand-collect the number of an IPO 
firm’s subsidiaries from the corresponding reports used in our study. We then merge our 
data with their database provided by Dyreng, Lindsey and Thornock (2013) to increase 
the sample size16. We further require that each such firm has at least one subsidiary in the 
year of going public (e.g. Addoum, Kumar and Law (2017)), which eventually generates 
1087 valid observations 17 . We take advantage of the state information about firm 
subsidiaries in Exhibit 21 to compute an HHI and use this as an alternative measure of 
geographic dispersion. In specification (5) of Table 11, we find a negative relationship 
between the level of a firm’s subsidiary geographical concentration and IPO failure risk, 
the coefficient being -0.351 and significant at the 10% level.  
 
Overall, we show that the results from our preceding analysis are robust to 
alternative measures of geographic dispersion. 
 
 
16 We thank Dyreng for providing the data, which is available from his website. 
17 This is consistent with the finding from Platikanova and Mattei (2016) that geographically dispersed firms are more 
likely to provide incomplete filings. 
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3.5.4 Other sensitivity checks 
             
Welbourne and Andrews (1996) report that firms suffer from stock price declines 
around acquisitions and the acquired firms experience financial distress. In our main 
analysis, we classify failed firms as those that are delisted for adverse reasons (e.g. 
bankruptcy). In the spirit of Welbourne and Andrews, we redefine failed firms by also 
including those that are delisted because of M&As (i.e. delisting codes between 200 and 
299). Moreover, we also follow previous studies (e.g. Jain, Jayaraman and Kini (2008)) 
and exclude acquired firms from the sample. We rerun our tests with these two restrictions 
on the definition of failed firms and find similar results to those in Table 4.  
 
We also consider alternative analysis approaches. We first use an Accelerated 
Failure Time (AFT) model. Unlike the CPH model, the exponential of the coefficient for 
each independent variable in the AFT approach is the time ratio, known as an 
“acceleration factor” (Espenlaub et al., 2016). A time ratio greater than 1 indicates that 
the variable factor increases the survival time (less than 1 that it decreases it). Further, 
using the AFT approach requires a specific distribution for the model. The Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC) test is used to determine the appropriate distribution for non-
nested models, such as the log-logistic and lognormal distributions (e.g. Espenlaub et al. 
(2016)). Thus, we select the lognormal distribution because the AIC test shows it to have 
the lowest value. Moreover, we use the logit model to explore the likelihood of the 
occurrence of IPO failure. Finally, we only consider IPO firm’s delisting caused by any 
negative reasons for up to five years after the offering. The results are consistent with our 
main findings that the level of geographic dispersion is negatively related to the survival 
profile of newly listed firms. The results of these alternative analyses are tabulated in 
Appendixes C, D, and E. Finally, we use CPH, AFT, and logit models to replicate our 
baseline regression by considering state fix effect. The results displayed in Appendix F 




In this study, we examine the impact of geographic dispersion on an IPO firm’s 
survivability. We argue that managers from geographically dispersed firms suffer from 
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receiving information in which quality is compromised, and are therefore more likely to 
make decisions that are against shareholder objectives and cause agency conflicts. 
Ultimately, such decisions will be detrimental to corporate performance.  
 
We use a unique text-based dataset from the Form 10-Ks released in the issuing 
year to measure an IPO firm’s geographic dispersion. Based on the state citations, we 
construct a normalized HHI to serve as an indicator of the firm’s geographically dispersed 
business interests. Through application of survival analysis, we document that geographic 
dispersion significantly escalates firm failure risk and shortens survival time in post-
offering periods. Further, we find that geographically similar firms and firms with 
dispersed business interests that are closely associated with local economic shocks are 
less likely to fail.  
 
We also explore the mechanisms that might affect the survival profile of 
geographically dispersed IPO firms. First, consistent with our conjecture that geographic 
dispersion causes information asymmetry, our empirical evidence reveals that dispersed 
IPO firms are more likely to fail when information is difficult to transfer and verify 
remotely (e.g. soft information). Second, we find that geographically diversified firms in 
small communities where social concerns may drive managerial decision-making are 
negatively associated with survivability in post-offering periods. The evidence suggests 
that information asymmetry and manager’s decision-making are important factors in the 
survival profiles of geographically dispersed IPO firms. Finally, we document a negative 
relationship between firms with spatially distributed business interests and operating 
performance in post-IPO periods, which implies that geographic dispersion degrades 
corporate performance and may help to explain newly listed firm failure rates. 
 
Our study contributes to the literature that investigates the association between 
geography and firm performance. In particular, it contributes to IPO studies by revealing 
that a firm’s geographically dispersed business interests across different U.S. states serve 
as a significant determinant of a newly listed firm’s post-IPO survival. Importantly, this 
study provides new insights to corporate performance which suggests firms should stay 




Table 1 IPO distribution 
The table displays the distribution of IPO listing status for our sample. The sample includes newly listed 
firms in the US stock market from 1994 to 2012. Delisting status is tracked for five years after IPO by 
year (Panel B) and industry (Panel C). Survived firms are defined as those continuing to trade at the end 
of our tracking period (CRSP delisting code is 100); acquired firms are those that are delisted for reasons 
such as M&A (CRSP delisting codes between 200 and 299); failed firms are those that are delisted for 
negative reasons, such as bankruptcy and liquidation (CRSP delisting codes equal to or above 300). 
Panel A: Distribution of IPOs from 1994 to 2012 
  
 From IPO date to  
December 2017  
    From IPO date to five 
years after the offering 
  
 Obs.   %     Obs.   % 
Failed  
 724   29.77      469   19.28  
Acquired  
 1201   49.38      607   24.96  
Survived  
 507   20.85      1356   55.76  
Total  
 2432        2432                   
Panel B: Distribution by IPO year            
Year 
   Failed  Acquired  Survived 
 Obs.  Obs.  %  Obs.  %  Obs.  % 
1994  10  4  40.00  0  0.00  6  60.00 
1995  194  38  19.59  47  24.23  109  56.19 
1996  493  113  22.92  139  28.19  241  48.88 
1997  309  76  24.60  92  29.77  141  45.63 
1998  177  52  29.38  35  19.77  90  50.85 
1999  323  80  24.77  89  27.55  154  47.68 
2000  243  46  18.93  52  21.40  145  59.67 
2001  47  7  14.89  7  14.89  33  70.21 
2002  38  4  10.53  11  28.95  23  60.53 
2003  36  4  11.11  11  30.56  21  58.33 
2004  104  4  3.85  30  28.85  70  67.31 
2005  88  10  11.36  9  10.23  69  78.41 
2006  88  7  7.95  21  23.86  60  68.18 
2007  96  8  8.33  24  25.00  64  66.67 
2008  3  1  33.33  1  33.33  1  33.33 
2009  23  1  4.35  5  21.74  17  73.91 
2010  55  6  10.91  7  12.73  42  76.36 
2011  45  4  8.89  5  11.11  36  80.00 
2012  60  4  6.67  22  36.67  34  56.67 














Panel C: Distribution by industry            
  
  Failed  Acquired  Survived 
Industry  Obs.  Obs.  %  Obs.  %  Obs.  % 
Oil and gas 
 (13)  
53  8  15.09  11  20.75  34  64.15 
Food products 
 (20)  
21  4  19.05  5  23.81  12  57.14 
Chemical products 
 (28)  
254  25  9.84  50  19.69  179  70.47 
Manufacturing 
 (30–34)  
49  10  20.41  14  28.57  25  51.02 
Computer equipment & 
services 
 (35, 73)  
880  167  18.98  256  29.09  457  51.93 
Electronic equipment  
 (36)  
205  27  13.17  47  22.93  131  63.90 
Scientific instruments 
 (38)  
192  21  10.94  57  29.69  114  59.38 
Transportation & public 
utilities 
 (41, 42, 44–49)  
186  54  29.03  41  22.04  91  48.92 
Wholesale & retail trade 
 (50–59)  
219  61  27.85  43  19.63  115  52.51 
Entertainment services 
 (70, 78, 79)  
51  13  25.49  17  33.33  21  41.18 
Health services 
 (80)  
63  21  33.33  12  19.05  30  47.62 
All others 
 (01, 12, 15, 17, 22–27, 29, 
37, 39, 72, 75, 82, 87, 96)  
259  58  22.39  54  20.85  147  56.76 
Total  
  469    607    1356   
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Table 2 Kaplan–Meier survival rates stratified by IPO firm business concentration levels 
The table displays the results of survival analysis for IPO firms from 1994 to 2012 for five years after 
listing using a Kaplan–Meier nonparametric approach. Panel A divides the sample into low and high 
business concentration groups: firms are assigned to the high-concentration group if the HHI-based 
geographic-dispersion measure is above the median value; and the low-concentration group otherwise. 
Panel B divides the sample into quartiles according to business concentration levels (25%, 50%, 75%, 
and 100%). We track firm’s status up to five years after listing. Surviving firms are defined as those 
continuing to trade at the end of tracking period (CRSP delisting code 100); acquired firms are those 
delisted for reasons such as M&A (CRSP delisting codes between 200 and 299); failed firms are those 
delisted for negative reasons, such as bankruptcy and liquidation (CRSP delisting codes equal to or above 
300). A log-rank test is used to assess the statistical significance of differences between survival 
functions across concentration levels.  
Panel A: Kaplan–Meier survival rates by median of IPO firm business concentration (%) 
  Cumulative Survival Rates 
  N 
 1 Yr  2 Yrs  3 Yrs  4 Yrs  5 Yrs 
Low-concentration IPO firms  1213 
 99.75  94.76  87.58  80.42  75.47 
High-concentration IPO firms  1219 
 99.75  95.79  90.78  85.41  80.54 
Log-rank test for equality of 
survival functions  
           
Chi-squared  8.62 
          
P-value  0.003 
          
             
Panel B: Kaplan–Meier survival rates by quartile of IPO firm business concentration level (%) 
  Cumulative Survival Rates 
Quartile  
  1 Yr  2 Yrs  3 Yrs  4 Yrs  5 Yrs 
1  
  99.51  95.88  89.77  82.22  77.15 
2  
  100.00  93.65  85.38  78.67  73.89 
3  
  99.67  95.90  90.76  85.70  81.36 
4  
  99.83  95.66  90.75  85.05  79.63 
Log-rank test for equality of 
survival functions  
           
Chi-squared  11.12 
          
P-value  0.011 
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Table 3 Descriptive statistics 
The table displays the descriptive statistics for the sample. The sample includes newly listed firms in the US stock market from 1994 to 2012. Panel A reports firm’s geographical 
characteristics, and Panel B reports firm and IPO characteristics. A t-test is conducted to compare differences in means between two subsamples of IPO firms with low and high 
levels of geographically dispersed business interests. All variables are defined in Appendix A.  




value)   Obs.  Mean  p25  p50  p75  SD  Obs.  Mean  Obs.  Mean  
Panel A: Geographical characteristics          
   
 
   
  
NState  2432  6.169  3  4  8  5.834  1213  8.969  1219  3.382  0.000 
Region  2432  3.807  2  3  5  2.019  1213  4.981  1219  2.638  0.000 
GEOSIMILAR  2432  0.290  0.117  0.227  0.397  0.245  1213  0.282  1219  0.298  0.057 
GEOCORR  2432  0.227  0.061  0.148  0.296  0.253  1213  0.088  1219  0.366  0.000 
HQ%  2432  0.501  0.256  0.500  0.733  0.291  1213  0.314  1219  0.688  0.000 
Community  2432  0.512  0  1  1  0.500  1213  0.486  1219  0.538  0.005 
Panel B: Firm and IPO 
characteristics                    
Firm age  2432  13.134  4  7  13.5  18.970  1213  14.617  1219  11.658  0.000 
Initial return  2432  28.348  0  10.71  31.4  71.300  1213  31.677  1219  25.035  0.011 
Proceeds  2432  104.649  27.5  49.2  89.65  415.387  1213  136.259  1219  73.194  0.000 
Venture capital  2432  0.488  0  0  1  0.500  1213  0.434  1219  0.542  0.000 
Underwriter  2432  0.377  0  0  1  0.485  1213  0.410  1219  0.345  0.001 
Auditor  2432  0.679  0  1  1  0.467  1213  0.692  1219  0.665  0.076 
Sales  2432  280.624  12.034  42.787  136.165  1451.883  1213  380.112  1219  181.626  0.000 
Leverage  2432  0.340  0.142  0.263  0.481  0.319  1213  0.374  1219  0.307  0.000 
Profitability  2432  -0.048  -0.181  0.039  0.134  0.328  1213  -0.025  1219  -0.070  0.000 
Market-to-book  2432  6.095  2.308  3.656  6.295  23.878  1213  6.427  1219  5.764  0.247 
IndustrySEG  2405  1.704  1  2  2  0.803  1192  1.776  1213  1.632  0.000 
Intl.SEG  2057  0.808  0  0  1  1.582  1015  0.833  1042  0.784  0.244 




Table 4 Geographic dispersion and firm survival  
The table displays the results of using a Cox proportional-hazards (CPH) model to investigate the impact of a firm’s geographic dispersion at the time of going public on the 
probability of post-IPO failure. The sample includes newly listed firms in the US stock market from 1994 to 2012. Business Concentration is calculated using a normalized 
Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI). High CONC is 1 if a firm’s business concentration level as measured by HHI is above the sample median, otherwise 0. GEOSIMILAR 
measures the degree of similarity of a firm’s geographic dispersion within its industry; GEOCORR measures to what extent a firm’s economic activities are correlated with 
local economic shocks. Surviving firms are defined as those continuing to trade at the end of our tracking period (i.e. the end of 2017) (CRSP delisting code 100); acquired 
firms are those that are delisted for reasons such as M&A (CRSP delisting codes between 200 and 299); failed firms are those delisted for negative reasons, such as bankruptcy 
and liquidation (CRSP delisting codes equal to or above 300). All regressions are controlled for year and industry effects, whose coefficients are suppressed for brevity. Z-
statistics are presented in parentheses below coefficients and a hazard ratio is reported for each variable. One, two and three asterisks denote statistical significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 





 Coefficient  
Hazard 
ratio 
 Coefficient  
Hazard 
ratio 
 Coefficient  
Hazard 
ratio 
Concentration  -0.563*** 
 0.569     
      
  
  (-3.43) 
            
  
High CONC  
    -0.279***  0.756         
  
    (-3.53)           
GEOSIMILAR  
        -0.751***  0.472     
  
        (-3.90)       
GEOCORR  
            -0.548***  0.578 
  
            (-3.43)      
Firm age  -0.240*** 
 0.787  -0.236***  0.790  -0.258***  0.772  -0.246***  0.782 
  (-4.96) 
 
 
 (-4.87)   
 (-5.32)   
 (-5.08)                  
Initial return  -0.000 
 1.000  -0.000  1.000  -0.000  1.000  -0.000     1.000 
  (-0.36) 
 
 
 (-0.40)   
 (-0.25)   
 (-0.35)                  
Proceeds  -0.178** 
 0.837  -0.175**  0.839  -0.162**  0.850  -0.177**   0.838 
  (-3.14) 
 
 
 (-3.08)   
 (-2.86)   
 (-3.11)                  
Underwriter  -0.211** 
 0.810  -0.205**  0.814  -0.192*  0.825  -0.211**   0.810 
  (-2.08) 
 
 
 (-2.03)   
 (-1.90)   
 (-2.08)                  
Venture capital  -0.265** 
 0.767  -0.259**  0.772  -0.249**  0.780  -0.261**   0.770 
  (-3.01) 
 
 
 (-2.93)   
 (-2.83)   
 (-2.96)                  
Auditor  -0.046 
 0.955  -0.044  0.957  -0.003  0.997  -0.045     0.956 
  (-0.56) 
 
 
 (-0.53)   
 (-0.03)   
 (-0.55)                  
Sales  -0.222*** 
 0.801  -0.220***  0.802  -0.203***  0.817  -0.215***  0.806 
  (-6.49) 
 
 
 (-6.44)   
 (-5.99)   
 (-6.34)                  
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Leverage  1.121*** 
 3.068  1.122***  3.072  1.110***  3.035  1.119***  3.063 
  (7.63) 
 
 
 (7.63)   
 (7.67)   
 (7.57)                  
Profitability  -0.510*** 
 0.601  -0.521***  0.594  -0.532***  0.587  -0.504***  0.604 
  (-4.65) 
 
 
 (-4.75)   
 (-4.90)   
 (-4.57)                  
Market-to-book  -0.002** 
 0.998  -0.002**  0.998  -0.002**  0.998  -0.002**   0.998 
  (-2.08) 
   (-2.14)    (-2.15)    (-2.27)      
Chi-square  455.281 
   455.540    459.744    455.877      
Wald Chi-square Test Prob>x2  0.000 
   0.000    0.000    0.000   
Obs.  2432 
   2432    2432    2432      
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Table 5 Geographic dispersion and firm survival: Information and managerial social interaction 
The table displays the results of using a Cox proportional-hazards (CPH) model to investigate the impact of a firm’s geographic dispersion in a hard information environment, 
and the population of the firm’s headquarters county on the probability of post-IPO failure. The sample includes newly listed firms in the US stock market from 1994 to 
2012. Business Concentration is calculated using a normalized Herfindahl–Hirschman Index. We define firms as operating in a hard information environment if the average 
change of distance at industry level (3-digit) between borrowers and lenders is above the sample median; otherwise, it is a soft information environment. A small (or large) 
community is defined by whether the population of the firm’s headquarters county is below (or above) the sample median. Surviving firms are defined as those continuing 
to trade at the end of our tracking period (i.e. the end of 2017) (CRSP delisting code 100); acquired firms are those that are delisted for reasons such as M&A (CRSP delisting 
codes between 200 and 299); failed firms are those that are delisted for negative reasons, such as bankruptcy and liquidation (CRSP delisting codes equal to or above 300). 
All regressions are controlled for year and industry effects, whose coefficients are suppressed for brevity. Z-statistics are presented in parentheses below coefficients and a 
hazard ratio is reported for each variable. One, two and three asterisks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. All variables are defined in 
Appendix A. 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
  Full sample  Small community  Large community 
  Coefficient 
 Hazard ratio  Coefficient 
 Hazard ratio  Coefficient 
 Hazard ratio 
Concentration  -0.391*  0.676  -0.586**  0.557  -0.254     0.776 
  (-1.83)    (-1.97)    (-0.79)                  
Concentration*Soft information  -0.655**  0.519  -1.172**  0.310  -0.134     0.875 
  (-2.00)    (-2.49)    (-0.28)                  
Soft information  -0.055  0.946  0.046  1.047  -0.222     0.801 
  (-0.32)    (0.19)    (-0.85)                  
Firm age  -0.239***  0.787  -0.243***  0.784  -0.258***  0.773 
  (-4.94)    (-3.69)    (-3.48)                  
Initial return  -0.000  1.000  0.000  1.000  -0.000     1.000 
  (-0.29)    (0.14)    (-0.19)                  
Proceeds  -0.198***  0.821  -0.181**  0.834  -0.196**   0.822 
  (-3.47)    (-2.24)    (-2.30)                  
Underwriter  -0.214**  0.807  -0.245  0.782  -0.145     0.865 
  (-2.10)    (-1.62)    (-1.02)                  
Venture capital  -0.246**  0.782  -0.371**  0.690  -0.200     0.818 
  (-2.78)    (-2.97)    (-1.49)                  
Auditor  -0.050  0.951  -0.161  0.851  0.035     1.036 
  (-0.60)    (-1.39)    (0.28)                  
Sales  -0.219***  0.804  -0.221***  0.802  -0.227***  0.797 
  (-6.42)    (-4.37)    (-4.56)                  
Leverage  1.064***  2.899  1.021***  2.777  1.302***  3.678 
  (7.07)    (5.01)    (4.87)                  
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Profitability  -0.494***  0.610  -0.803***  0.448  -0.401**   0.670 
  (-4.45)    (-4.27)    (-2.61)                  
Market-to-book  -0.002**  0.998  -0.015**  0.985  -0.002**   0.998 
  (-2.33)    (-2.20)    (-2.14)      
Chi-square  470.483    285.851    237.941      
Wald Chi-square Test Prob>x2  0.000 
   0.000    0.000   





Table 6 Post-IPO operating performance 
The table displays the results of investigating the impact of a firm’s geographic dispersion on post-IPO 
operating performance. The sample includes newly listed firms in the U.S. stock market from 1994 to 
2012. Business Concentration is calculated using a normalized Herfindahl–Hirschman Index. High 
CONC is 1 if a firm’s business concentration level as measured by HHI is above the sample median, 
otherwise 0. The growth of the IPO firm’s post-operating performance is calculated as the change of 
operating return on assets between the offering year and year y less the corresponding change for the 
matching firm, where operating return on assets is measured as the ratio of operating income before 
depreciation to total assets. Panel A reports the univariate analysis results; and Panel B shows the results 
from using ordinary least squares regressions. The post-IPO operating performance measure is 
winsorized at the top and bottom 1%. All regressions include control variables used in baseline 
regression analysis, as well as year and industry dummies. One, two and three asterisks denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The t-statistics are included in parentheses and 
are reported for heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
Panel A Univariate analysis       
  (1)  (2)  
Diff. in means 
(1) vs (2) 
(p-value)   
Low-concentration  
IPO firms  
High-concentration 
IPO firms  
  Obs. Mean  Obs. Mean  
IPO year+1  1045 0.307  1082 0.994  0.000 
IPO year+2  930 -0.188  952 1.042  0.000 
IPO year+3  835 -0.069  873 1.095  0.000 
         
   
Panel B OLS analysis 
  Dependent variable: ∆Operating return on assets 
  IPO year+1   IPO year+2   IPO year+3 
Concentration  0.666***   2.163***   0.985*** 
  (3.10)   (6.40)   (3.18) 
Intercept  0.050   -2.459*   -2.391 
  (0.08)   (-1.86)   (-1.51) 
R-squared  0.025   0.026   0.023 
Obs.  2127   1882   1708 
         
High CONC  0.549***   1.071***   1.081*** 
  (5.74)   (3.54)   (4.56)    
Intercept  0.099   -1.964   -2.517    
  (0.15)   (-1.31)   (-1.42)    
R-squared  0.027   0.026   0.026    






Table 7 Headquarters size and firm survival 
The table displays the results of using a Cox proportional-hazards (CPH) model to investigate the impact 
of the level of business concentration around the firm headquarters on the probability of post-IPO failure. 
HQ% is the ratio of a firm’s HQ state counts to all state citations in the Form 10-K, which measures the 
degree to which an IPO firm operates its business around its headquarters location. Surviving firms are 
defined as those continuing to trade at the end of our tracking period (i.e. the end of 2017) (CRSP 
delisting code 100); acquired firms are those delisted for reasons such as M&A (CRSP delisting codes 
between 200 and 299); failed firms are those delisted for negative reasons, such as bankruptcy and 
liquidation (CRSP delisting codes equal to or above 300). All regressions are controlled for year and 
industry effects, whose coefficients are suppressed for brevity. Z-statistics are presented in parentheses 
below coefficients and a hazard ratio is reported for each variable. One, two and three asterisks denote 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix 
A. 
  Coefficient 
 Hazard ratio 
HQ%  -0.402**   0.669 
  (-3.11)                      
Firm age  -0.240***  0.786 
  (-4.96)                      
Initial return  -0.000     1.000 
  (-0.32)                      
Proceeds  -0.175**   0.839 
  (-3.08)                      
Underwriter  -0.213**   0.808 
  (-2.11)                      
Venture capital  -0.264**   0.768 
  (-2.99)                      
Auditor  -0.035     0.965 
  (-0.42)                      
Sales  -0.218***  0.805 
  (-6.39)                      
Leverage  1.121***  3.067 
  (7.64)                      
Profitability  -0.516***  0.597 
  (-4.70)                      
Market-to-book  -0.002**   0.998 
  (-2.10)                       
Chi-square  452.757      
Wald Chi-square Test Prob>x2  0.000   




Table 8 Geographic dispersion and firm survival: Controlling for high-tech firms 
The table displays the results of using a Cox proportional-hazards (CPH) model to investigate the impact of a firm’s 
geographic dispersion on the probability of post-IPO failure, controlling for high-tech industries. High-tech takes a 
value of 1 if the firm operates in a high-tech industry, otherwise it is 0. The sample includes newly listed firms in the 
U.S. stock market from 1994 to 2012. Surviving firms are defined as those continuing to trade at the end of our 
tracking period (i.e. the end of 2017) (CRSP delisting code 100); acquired firms are those delisted for reasons such 
as M&A (CRSP delisting codes between 200 and 299); failed firms are those delisted for negative reasons, such as 
bankruptcy and liquidation (CRSP delisting code equal to or above 300). All regressions are controlled for year and 
industry effects, whose coefficients are suppressed for brevity. Z-statistics are presented in parentheses below 
coefficients and a hazard ratio is reported for each variable. One, two and three asterisks denote statistical significance 
at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 














Concentration  -0.572**  0.564  -0.699**  0.497  -0.494**   0.610 
  (-2.61)    (-2.84)    (-2.22)                  
Concentration*High-tech  -0.086  0.918                                    
  (-0.27)                                      
High-tech  -0.047  0.954                                    
  (-0.28)                                      
Firm age  -0.232***  0.793  -0.239**  0.787  -0.213***  0.808 
  (-4.80)    (-2.65)    (-3.69)                  
Initial return  -0.000  1.000  -0.002**  0.998  0.000     1.000 
  (-0.30)    (-2.13)    (0.39)                  
Proceeds  -0.222***  0.801  -0.010  0.990  -0.316***  0.729 
  (-3.99)    (-0.11)    (-4.40)                  
Underwriter  -0.231**  0.793  -0.177  0.838  -0.238     0.788 
  (-2.30)    (-1.23)    (-1.63)                  
Venture capital  -0.323***  0.724  -0.290**  0.748  -0.359**   0.699 
  (-3.72)    (-2.29)    (-2.84)                  
Auditor  -0.077  0.926  0.111  1.118  -0.225**   0.798 
  (-0.95)    (0.87)    (-2.07)                  
Sales  -0.150***  0.861  -0.198***  0.820  -0.144***  0.866 
  (-4.63)    (-3.57)    (-3.46)                  
Leverage  1.096***  2.992  0.706**  2.025  1.231***  3.425 
  (7.47)    (2.41)    (7.16)                  
Profitability  -0.514***  0.598  -0.844***  0.430  -0.327**   0.721 
  (-4.79)    (-5.11)    (-1.98)                  
Market-to-book  -0.002**  0.998  -0.002  0.998  -0.010     0.990 
  (-2.06)    (-1.64)    (-1.56)      
Chi-square  402.678    200.101    263.468      
Wald Chi-square Test 
Prob>x2  
0.000 
   
0.000 
   
0.000 
  











 Table 9 Geographic dispersion and firm survival: Controlling for industrial and 
international diversifications 
The table displays the results using a Cox proportional-hazards (CPH) model to investigate the impact 
of a firm’s geographic dispersion on the probability of post-IPO failure, controlling for industrial and 
international diversifications. The sample includes newly listed firms in the US stock market from 1994 
to 2012. Business Concentration is calculated using a normalized Herfindahl–Hirschman Index. 
IndustrySEG is the number of industries in which a firm is involved. Intl.SEG is the number of 
geographic segments of a firm. Surviving firms are defined as those continuing to trade at the end of our 
tracking period (i.e. the end of 2017) (CRSP delisting code 100); acquired firms are those delisted for 
reasons such as M&A (CRSP delisting codes between 200 and 299); failed firms are those delisted for 
negative reasons, such as bankruptcy and liquidation (CRSP delisting codes equal to or above 300). All 
regressions are controlled for year and industry effects, whose coefficients are suppressed for brevity. Z-
statistics are presented in parentheses below coefficients and a hazard ratio is reported for each variable. 
One, two and three asterisks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
  Coefficient 
 Hazard ratio 
Concentration  -0.564**   0.569 
  (-3.27)                      
Firm age  -0.212***  0.809 
  (-4.17)                      
Initial return  -0.000     1.000 
  (-0.17)                      
Proceeds  -0.195**   0.823 
  (-3.11)                      
Underwriter  -0.168     0.845 
  (-1.51)                      
Venture capital  -0.336***  0.714 
  (-3.55)                      
Auditor  -0.016     0.984 
  (-0.18)                      
Sales  -0.259***  0.772 
  (-6.62)                      
Leverage  1.120***  3.064 
  (7.10)                      
Profitability  -0.372**   0.689 
  (-3.05)                      
Market-to-book  -0.002*    0.998 
  (-1.92)                      
Intl.SEG  -0.009     0.991 
  (-0.24)                      
IndustrySEG  -0.056     0.945 
  (-1.00)      
Chi-square  404.304      
Wald Chi-square Test Prob>x2  0.000   
Obs.  2045      
114 
 
Table 10 Propensity score matching 
The table displays the results of using propensity score matching to investigate the impact of geographic 
dispersion of firms on the probability of post-IPO failure. We divide the sample into low- and high-
concentration business groups: firms belong to the high-concentration group if their HHI-based 
geographic-dispersion measure is above the median value; otherwise, they belong to the low-
concentration group. The variables used for the matching process include Firm age, Initial return, 
Proceeds, Venture capital, Underwriter, Auditor, Sales, Leverage, Profitability, Market-to-book, 
Intl.SEG, IndustrySEG, year and industry dummies. Surviving firms are defined as those continuing to 
trade at the end of our tracking period (CRSP delisting code 100); acquired firms are those delisted for 
reasons such as M&A (CRSP delisting codes between 200 and 299); failed firms are those delisted for 
negative reasons, such as bankruptcy and liquidation (CRSP delisting codes equal to or above 300). Z-
statistics are presented in parentheses below coefficients. One, two and three asterisks denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
ATET       
High-concentration vs. Low-concentration firms      -0.074** 
(1 vs. 0)      (-2.27) 
Observations      2039 
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Table 11 Geographic dispersion and firm survival: Alternative dispersion measures 
The table displays the results of using a Cox proportional-hazards (CPH) model to investigate the impact of a firm’s geographic dispersion on the probability of post-IPO failure using 
alternative measures. The sample includes newly listed firms in the US stock market from 1993 to 2012. NState is the number of states in which an IPO firm has geographically dispersed 
business interests as mentioned in the Form 10-K. Region is a count variable indicating the number of different regions in which the firm has dispersed business interests. Local takes a value 
of 1 if a firm’s business interests are in one or two states only, otherwise 0. Concentration(GDP) is a GDP-weighted normalized HHI. Concentration(Subs) is the HHI index calculated using 
firm’s subsidiaries as reported in Exhibit 21 of Form 10-K. All regressions are controlled for year and industry effects, whose coefficients are suppressed for brevity. Z-statistics are presented 
in parentheses below coefficients and a hazard ratio is reported for each variable. One, two and three asterisks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. All 
variables are defined in Appendix A. 






















NState  0.034***  1.034                 
  (5.29)                   
Region      0.091***  1.095             
      (4.67)               
Local          -0.176*  0.839         
          (-1.93)           
Concentration (GDP)              -0.0002**  0.999     
              (-2.17)       
Concentration (Subs)                  -0.351*    0.704 
                  (-1.68)                  
Firm age  -0.237***  0.789  -0.239***  0.787  -0.248***  0.780  -0.252***  0.777  -0.300***  0.740 
  (-4.90)    (-4.96)    (-5.11)    (-5.19)    (-4.06)                  
Initial return  -0.000  1.000  -0.000  1.000  -0.000  1.000  -0.000  1.000  -0.001     0.999 
  (-0.28)    (-0.36)    (-0.29)    (-0.23)    (-0.64)                  
Proceeds  -0.201***  0.818  -0.189***  0.827  -0.170**  0.843  -0.174**  0.840  -0.062     0.940 
  (-3.50)    (-3.32)    (-2.99)    (-3.06)    (-0.68)                  
Underwriter  -0.197*  0.821  -0.206**  0.814  -0.210**  0.811  -0.202**  0.817  -0.098     0.907 
  (-1.94)    (-2.04)    (-2.07)    (-2.00)    (-0.62)                  
Venture capital  -0.267**  0.766  -0.269**  0.764  -0.268**  0.765  -0.257**  0.773  -0.123     0.884 
  (-3.04)    (-3.06)    (-3.04)    (-2.91)    (-0.84)                  
Auditor  -0.041  0.960  -0.043  0.958  -0.036  0.964  -0.020  0.980  0.172     1.188 
  (-0.49)    (-0.52)    (-0.44)    (-0.24)    (1.25)                  
Sales  -0.222***  0.801  -0.221***  0.802  -0.212***  0.809  -0.208***  0.813  -0.224***  0.799 
  (-6.48)    (-6.47)    (-6.23)    (-6.12)    (-3.99)                  




  (7.59)    (7.58)    (7.72)    (7.66)    (4.13)                  
Profitability  -0.543***  0.581  -0.533***  0.587  -0.518***  0.596  -0.528***  0.590  -0.585**   0.557 
  (-4.97)    (-4.87)    (-4.74)    (-4.85)    (-3.14)                  
Market-to-book  -0.002**  0.998  -0.002**  0.998  -0.002**  0.998  -0.002**  0.998  -0.005*    0.995 
  (-2.32)    (-2.36)    (-2.39)    (-2.02)    (-1.72)      
Chi-square  467.508    464.239    446.934    448.209    187.503      
Wald Chi-square Test Prob>x2  0.000 
   0.000    0.000    0.000    0.000   
Obs.  2432    2432    2432    2432    1087      
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Appendix A: Variable definitions 
Panel A: Geographic dispersion 
Concentration  Following Platikanova and Mattei (2016), we measure the degree of a firm's geographic dispersion using a normalized Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) based on 
the state citations. The variable ranges from zero to one, where the lower values indicate higher levels of geographic dispersion across different states. The value takes 
value 1 if the firm’s business is concentrated solely at the headquarters location.  
High CONC A dummy variable taking value 1 if a firm is highly concentrated, otherwise 0. We define a firm as being in the high-concentration group if its HHI index is above the 
sample median; otherwise, it is in the low-concentration group. 
GEOSIMILAR Following Platikanova and Matter (2016), the variable measures the degree of similarity of a firm’s geographic dispersion within its specific industry at 3-digit SIC 
level. 
GEOCORR Following Platikanova and Matter (2016), the variable measures to what extent a firm’s economic activities are correlated with local economic shocks.  
 
Soft information 
A dummy variable taking value 1 if the firm operates in a soft information environment, otherwise 0. Following Landier et al. (2009), we classify an industry as 
belonging to a soft information environment if the mean change of distance between primary lenders and borrowers is below the median value, and in a hard 
information environment if it is above. 
Community A dummy variable taking value 1 if the firm is located in a large community, otherwise 0. We define a firm as located in a large community if the county population 
of its headquarters is above the sample median; otherwise, it is in a small community. 
HQ% The ratio of a firm’s HQ state counts to all state citations in the Form 10-K filing, which measures the extent to which an IPO firm operates its business around its 
headquarters location.  
IndustrySEG The number of industries in which a firm is involved.  
Intl.SEG The number of a firm’s international geographic segments. 
NState The number of different states mentioned in the Form 10-K for an IPO firm. 
Region A count variable indicating in how many different regions a firm has businesses.  
Local A dummy variable taking value 1 if a firm has two or fewer states mentioned in its Form 10-K filing, otherwise 0. 
Concentration (GDP) GDP-weighted normalized Herfindahl–Hirschman Index. 
Concentration (Subs) A normalized Herfindahl–Hirschman Index using distribution of IPO firm’s subsidiaries across different states. The data is hand-collected from Exhibit 21 of Form 
10-K. 
 
Panel B: Firm and offering characteristics 
Firm age Natural logarithm of one plus IPO firm age. The firm age is measured as number of years between firm’s founding year and IPO year. 
Initial return Percentage change between the stock price from the first day of trading and the offer price. 
Proceeds Natural logarithm of total proceeds that a firm raised at the time of IPO. 
Venture capital A dummy variable indicating whether the IPO firm is venture-backed.  
Underwriter A dummy variable indicating whether the IPO is supported by underwriters ranked above 8 on Jay Ritter's website.  
Auditor A dummy variable indicating whether the IPO uses a Big Four auditing firm. 
Sales Natural logarithm of sales in the IPO year. 
Leverage The ratio of total debts to total assets in the IPO year. 
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Profitability The ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) to total assets in the IPO year. 
Market-to-book The ratio of a firm's market value to its book value in the IPO year. 
Operating return on assets The ratio of operating income before depreciation to total assets. 
IPO failure A dummy variable taking value 1 if a firm is delisted due to negative reaons within five years after lisiting, otherwise 0. 
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Appendix B Correlation matrix 
The table displays the correlation matrix for the variables used in our analysis. 
 Concentration Firm Age Initial return Proceeds Underwriter Venture capital Auditor Sale Leverage Profitability Market-to-Book 
Concentration 1           
Firm Age -0.081 1          
Initial return -0.026 -0.136 1         
Proceeds -0.236 0.250 0.073 1        
Underwriter -0.094 0.066 0.161 0.441 1       
Venture capital 0.100 -0.220 0.125 0.036 0.108 1      
Auditor -0.050 0.031 0.047 0.267 0.183 0.198 1     
Sale -0.269 0.455 -0.021 0.616 0.301 -0.277 0.112 1    
Leverage -0.139 0.251 -0.138 0.185 0.075 -0.249 -0.020 0.398 1   
Profitability -0.100 0.315 -0.053 0.245 0.071 -0.269 0.009 0.542 -0.042 1  
Market-to-Book -0.023 -0.051 0.115 -0.0003 0.050 0.031 0.022 -0.014 0.0008 -0.107 1 
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Appendix C Geographic dispersion and firm survival: Redefined firm failure 
The table displays the results of using a Cox proportional-hazards (CPH) model to investigate the 
impact of a firm’s geographic dispersion on the probability of post-IPO failure. The sample includes 
newly listed firms in the U.S. stock market from 1994 to 2012. Business Concentration is calculated 
using a normalized Herfindahl–Hirschman Index. In specification (1), failed firms are redefined to 
include those firms delisted due to M&As (with CRSP delisting codes between 200 and 299, or equal 
to or above 300); in specification (2), M&As are excluded from the sample. Surviving firms are 
defined as those continuing to trade at the end of our tracking period (i.e. the end of 2017) (CRSP 
delisting code 100). All regressions are controlled for year and industry effects, whose coefficients are 
suppressed for brevity. Z-statistics are presented in parentheses below coefficients and a hazard ratio 
is reported for each variable. One, two and three asterisks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 
5% and 1% levels, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
  (1)  (2) 
 








Concentration  -0.326**  0.722  -0.426***  0.653 
  (-3.25)    (-3.50)                  
Firm age  -0.146***  0.864  -0.184***  0.832 
  (-4.85)    (-5.04)                  
Initial return  -0.000  1.000  0.000     1.000 
  (-0.15)    (1.00)                  
Proceeds  -0.047  0.954  -0.105**   0.901 
  (-1.35)    (-2.45)                  
Underwriter  -0.097*  0.908  -0.100     0.905 
  (-1.73)    (-1.45)                  
Venture capital  -0.006  0.994  -0.084     0.919 
  (-0.10)    (-1.31)                  
Auditor  0.020  1.020  0.006     1.006 
  (0.38)    (0.09)                  
Sales  -0.055**  0.946  -0.104***  0.901 
  (-2.49)    (-3.91)                  
Leverage  0.416***  1.516  0.591***  1.806 
  (4.63)    (5.07)                  
Profitability  -0.223**  0.800  -0.264**   0.768 
  (-2.51)    (-2.51)                  
Market-to-book  -0.001*  0.999  -0.002**   0.998 
  (-1.66)    (-1.98)      
Chi-square  208.864    252.985      
Wald Chi-square Test 
Prob>x2  
0.000 
   
0.000 
  
Obs.  2432    1825   
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Appendix D Geographic dispersion and firm survival: AFT and Logit models 
The table displays the results of using Accelerated Failure Time (AFT) and logit models to investigate 
the impact of a firm’s geographic dispersion on the probability of post-IPO failure. The sample includes 
newly listed firms in the U.S. stock market from 1994 to 2012. Business Concentration is calculated 
using a normalized Herfindahl–Hirschman Index. Surviving firms are defined as those continuing to 
trade at the end of our tracking period (i.e. the end of 2017) (CRSP delisting code 100); acquired firms 
are those delisted for reasons such as M&A (CRSP delisting codes between 200 and 299); failed firms 
are those delisted for negative reasons, such as bankruptcy and liquidation (CRSP delisting codes equal 
to or above 300). All regressions are controlled for year and industry effects, whose coefficients are 
suppressed for brevity. Z-statistics are presented in parentheses below coefficients, and a time ratio is 
reported for each variable (for the AFT model only). One, two and three asterisks denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
  (1)  (2) 
  AFT model  Logit model 
  Coefficient  Time ratio  Coefficient 
Concentration  0.498***  1.645  -0.529**  
  (3.72)    (-2.44)    
Firm age  0.232***  1.261  -0.197**  
  (5.80)    (-3.05)    
Initial return  0.001  1.001  -0.000    
  (1.06)    (-0.37)    
Proceeds  0.151**  1.163  -0.290*** 
  (3.28)    (-3.70)    
Underwriter  0.158**  1.171  -0.174    
  (1.98)    (-1.45)    
Venture capital  0.212**  1.236  -0.438*** 
  (2.96)    (-3.72)    
Auditor  0.059  1.061  -0.079    
  (0.86)    (-0.72)    
Sales  0.150***  1.162  -0.270*** 
  (5.08)    (-5.54)    
Leverage  -0.919***  0.399  1.223*** 
  (-6.75)    (5.58)    
Profitability  0.555***  1.742  -0.893*** 
  (4.68)    (-3.34)    
Market-to-book  0.942*  1.002  -0.001    
  (1.80)    (-0.51)    
Intercept  0.984    2.996*** 
  (1.42)    (3.49)    
Chi-square  450.501    - 
Wald Chi-square Test Prob>x2  0.000 
 
  - 
Pseudo R-squared  - 
 
  0.154 
Obs.  2432    2432    
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Appendix E Geographic dispersion and firm survival: Failures within five years after listing 
The table displays the results of using CPH, Accelerated Failure Time (AFT) and logit models to investigate 
the impact of a firm’s geographic dispersion on the probability of post-IPO failure within five years of 
listing. The sample includes newly listed firms in the U.S. stock market from 1994 to 2012. Business 
Concentration is calculated using a normalized Herfindahl–Hirschman Index. Surviving firms are defined 
as those continuing to trade up to five years after listing (CRSP delisting code 100); acquired firms are those 
delisted for reasons such as M&A (CRSP delisting codes between 200 and 299); failed firms are those 
delisted for negative reasons, such as bankruptcy and liquidation (CRSP delisting codes equal to or above 
300). All regressions are controlled for year and industry effects, whose coefficients are suppressed for 
brevity. Z-statistics are presented in parentheses below coefficients. A hazard ratio (or time ratio for the AFT 
model) is reported for each variable for the CPH (AFT) model. One, two and three asterisks denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 









ratio  Coefficient 
Concentration  -0.717***  0.488  0.827***  2.286  -0.927*** 
  (-3.47)    (4.00)    (-3.46)    
Firm age  -0.369***  0.691  0.409***  1.505  -0.420*** 
  (-6.14)    (6.63)    (-5.55)    
Initial return  -0.001  0.999  0.001  1.001  -0.000    
  (-0.79)    (0.87)    (-0.28)    
Proceeds  -0.186**  0.830  0.208**  1.232  -0.297*** 
  (-2.68)    (2.95)    (-3.32)    
Underwriter  -0.147  0.863  0.155  1.167  -0.119    
  (-1.14)    (1.26)    (-0.85)    
Venture capital  -0.327**  0.721  0.298**  1.347  -0.418**  
  (-2.95)    (2.74)    (-2.99)    
Auditor  -0.102  0.903  0.093  1.097  -0.137    
  (-0.99)    (0.89)    (-1.09)    
Sales  -0.226***  0.798  0.195***  1.216  -0.256*** 
  (-5.41)    (4.40)    (-4.56)    
Leverage  1.233***  3.430  -1.279***  0.278  1.449*** 
  (7.34)    (-6.31)    (6.06)    
Profitability  -0.555***  0.574  0.748***  2.113  -0.839**  
  (-4.50)    (4.32)    (-2.93)    
Market-to-book  -0.003**  0.997  0.004**  1.004  -0.004    
  (-2.42)    (2.03)    (-1.50)    
Intercept  -    0.984    1.932** 
  -    (1.23)    (2.06) 
Chi-square  425.891    407.009    - 
Wald Chi-square Test 
Prob>x2  0.000    0.000    - 
Pseudo R-square  -    -    0.170 
Obs.  2432    2432    2424    
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Appendix F Geographic dispersion and firm survival: consider state fix effect 
The table displays the results of using CPH, Accelerated Failure Time (AFT) and logit models to investigate 
the impact of a firm’s geographic dispersion on the probability of post-IPO failure by specifically 
considering state fix effect. The sample includes newly listed firms in the U.S. stock market from 1994 to 
2012. Business Concentration is calculated using a normalized Herfindahl–Hirschman Index. Surviving 
firms are defined as those continuing to trade up to five years after listing (CRSP delisting code 100); 
acquired firms are those delisted for reasons such as M&A (CRSP delisting codes between 200 and 299); 
failed firms are those delisted for negative reasons, such as bankruptcy and liquidation (CRSP delisting 
codes equal to or above 300). All regressions are controlled for year, industry and state effects, whose 
coefficients are suppressed for brevity. Z-statistics are presented in parentheses below coefficients. A 
hazard ratio (or time ratio for the AFT model) is reported for each variable for the CPH (AFT) model. One, 
two and three asterisks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. All 

















Concentration  -0.548**  0.578  0.475***  1.609  -0.477** 
  (-3.26)    (3.50)    (-2.13) 
Firm Age  -0.229***  0.795  0.218***  1.243  -0.179** 
  (-4.65)    (5.39)    (-2.71) 
Initial return  -0.000  1.000  0.001  1.001  -0.000 
  (-0.50)    (1.18)    (-0.30) 
Proceeds  -0.183**  0.832  0.154**  1.167  -0.331*** 
  (-3.09)    (3.29)    (-4.04) 
Underwriter  -0.202**  0.817  0.141*  1.151  -0.152 
  (-1.96)    (1.76)    (-1.23) 
Venture capital  -0.230**  0.795  0.181**  1.199  -0.359** 
  (-2.50)    (2.45)    (-2.89) 
Auditor  -0.026  0.975  0.048  1.049  -0.054 
  (-0.30)    (0.69)    (-0.47) 
Sale  -0.228***  0.796  0.153***  1.165  -0.269*** 
  (-6.53)    (5.14)    (-5.36) 
Leverage  1.152***  3.166  -0.927***  0.396  1.209*** 
  (7.51)    (-6.79)    (5.49) 
Profitability  -0.494***  0.610  0.547***  1.728  -0.945*** 
  (-4.46)    (4.62)    (-3.33) 
Market-to-Book  -0.002*  0.998  0.002*  1.002  -0.001 
  (-1.96)    (1.67)    (-0.65) 
Intercept      1.265    2.519 
      (1.41)    (1.47) 
Chi-square  505.367    495.755    - 
Wald Chi-square Test 
Prob>x2  0.000    0.000    - 
Pseudo R-square  -    -    0.168 





Appendix G Distribution of state citations for sample firms 
The table displays the frequency of each state citation in the Form 10-Ks of our sample. 
State  Frequency  Percentage 
California  1457  9.71 
Delaware  1261  8.40 
New York  899  5.99 
Texas  847  5.65 
Washington  704  4.69 
Massachusetts  566  3.77 
Illinois  552  3.68 
Florida  527  3.51 
Georgia  437  2.91 
Pennsylvania  430  2.87 
New Jersey  421  2.81 
Virginia  418  2.79 
Colorado  410  2.73 
North Carolina  348  2.32 
Michigan  329  2.19 
Ohio  310  2.07 
Arizona  306  2.04 
Maryland  299  1.99 
Connecticut  261  1.74 
Oregon  238  1.59 
Minnesota  237  1.58 
Indiana  230  1.53 
Tennessee  228  1.52 
Kansas  203  1.35 
Nevada  200  1.33 
Missouri  196  1.31 
Wisconsin  191  1.27 
Louisiana  186  1.24 
Oklahoma  181  1.21 
Utah  165  1.10 
Kentucky  157  1.05 
Maine  157  1.05 
South Carolina  153  1.02 
Alabama  149  0.99 
New Mexico  147  0.98 
Mississippi  125  0.83 
Iowa  122  0.81 
Arkansas  116  0.77 
New Hampshire  108  0.72 
Nebraska  101  0.67 
Idaho  88  0.59 
Hawaii  72  0.48 
Rhode Island  67  0.45 
Montana  66  0.44 
West Virginia  66  0.44 
Alaska  63  0.42 
Wyoming  61  0.41 
Vermont  51  0.34 
South Dakota  50  0.33 









Chapter 4 The costs of monitoring failures: Discredited venture 




Initial public offerings (IPO) is the most attractive way for venture capitalists (VC) 
to cash out from their portfolio firms, as returns from IPO are much higher than other exit 
routes (e.g., M&As) (Lopez-de-Silanes, Phalippou and Gottschalg, 2015). Previous 
studies suggest that VCs are value adding financial intermediary through their reputation 
and expertise (Gorman and Sahlman (1989); Lerner (1995); Hellmann and Puri (2002); 
Bottazzi, Da Rin and Hellmann (2008)), thereby helping IPO firms to achieve better 
corporate performance (e.g., Loughran and Ritter (1995); Brav and Gompers (1997); 
Bottazzi and Da Rin (2002); Krishnan et al. (2011)).  
 
Nevertheless, some studies also argue that VCs’ reputation can be destroyed 
through which they make mistakes, such as failing to monitor the portfolio firms. Tian, 
Udell and Yu (2016) use VCs who failed to prevent IPO frauds and subsequently was 
sued as a proxy for inefficient monitors and find that those VCs are less likely to bring 
investee firms to the public capital market. Other studies, such as Atanasov, Ivanov and 
Litvak (2012), also present a similar argument that litigation can affect either VCs’ or 
investees’ performance, thereby reducing the likelihood to conduct the IPO. However, 
these studies do not focus on IPO performance when VCs are recognized as inefficient 
monitors. Thus, this study fills the gap by showing how reputation damaged VCs affect 
the IPO performance of their backed portfolio firms.  
 
We use a sample of VC-backed IPOs between 1993 and 2015, and measure 
detected IPO fraud as the lawsuits occurred within two years after going public. We 
defined discredited VCs as those who failed to prevent their backed IPOs from being sued 
due to IPO frauds, which subsequently results in the reputation damage for them. This 
approach is similar to that of Tian, Udell and Yu (2016). We find evidence that discredited 
VC-backed IPOs experience interior performance around and after the initial public 




Information asymmetry is the most prominent characteristic of the IPO market. 
When there is more significant information disparity between issuers and investors, 
underwriters leave higher returns to investors as the compensation for collecting the 
information in the market, known as “money left on the table”. However, issuers suffer 
losses because they can potentially raise more capital. In this regard, we reveal that the 
participation of discredited VCs in IPO firms increases information asymmetry and 
lowers investors’ confidence about the new issue, resulting in higher IPO underpricing. 
This translates a US $16.3 million potential loss compared to their counterparts without 
any discredited VCs.  Further, we find a positive relationship between discredited VC-
backed IPOs and offer price revisions, which implies that there is a high demand for 
information extraction from investors for discredited VC-backed IPOs. The evidence is 
aligned with previous studies which argue that underwriters partially adjust offer price 
revisions in order to induce private information from the informed investors (e.g., Hanley 
(1993)).  
 
Apart from reputation damage concerns, we further question the managerial 
ability of discredited VCs. Tian, Udell and Yu (2016) argue that limited partners distribute 
less funding to VCs who had monitoring failure experience. Because discredited VCs 
failed to detect and prevent IPO fraud in their supported firms, which may suggest that 
these VCs do not possess enough ability to manage the firm. First, we find the ability for 
discredited VC-backed firms to generate profits based on the investments is worse than 
their counterparts without any discredited VCs in the post-IPO periods. Second, investors 
do not benefit from the shares they held in IPOs with discredited VCs, as the buy and 
hold abnormal returns (BHARs) are much lower for those stocks. Finally, we employ a 
Cox proportional hazard model to explore failure risks. We find that IPO firms with 
discredited VCs invested makes it 1.431 times more likely that such firms will fail 
compared to firms without discredited VCs.  
 
We also investigate why discredited VCs can tolerate higher underpricing. Our 
evidence firstly reveals that discredited VC-backed IPOs are more likely to be involved 
in lawsuits within two years after the offering.  This is consistent with the argument of 
the lack of managerial ability of those VCs. Further, we find that this litigation-effect can 
be mitigated by the higher underpricing incurred around the IPO, which suggests that 
discredited VCs take advantage of high underpricing to avoid further lawsuits.  
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Our study makes several contributions to the related literature. Previous studies 
which have examined the behavior of reputation damaged VCs only focus on the outcome 
of exit possibility (e.g., whether can cash out through the IPO successfully) (e.g., see, 
Atanasov, Ivanov and Litvak (2012); Tian, Udell and Yu (2016)). However, it is unclear 
how those VCs affect the performance of IPO firms. To our best knowledge, we are the 
first to investigate the relationship between the discredited VCs and IPO performance. 
Moreover, many studies suggest that VCs provide value adding service to their portfolio 
firms, especially in IPOs (e.g., Hellmann and Puri (2002); Bottazzi, Da Rin and Hellmann 
(2008)). Our study suggests that not all VCs are able to add values to IPO firms. In this 
regard, we reveal that both the reputation and managerial ability matter for discredited 
VCs, as their backed IPOs incur high underpricing and experience declined performance 
in the post-offering periods, which ultimately result in IPO failures. 
 
Our study is also related to another stream of literature which suggests the use of 
IPO underpricing as issuance channel to avoid future lawsuits. Lowry and Shu (2002) 
document that underpricing is an efficient hedge for newly listed firms to mitigate 
litigation risks. Hanley and Hoberg (2012) argue that underwriters use offer price 
revisions to satisfy investors in order to avoid post-IPO lawsuits. Our study, therefore, 
adds additional evidence to this stream of literature that discredited VC-backed IPOs with 
more “money left on the table” are less likely to be sued by investors after going public.  
 
The rest of the study is arranged as follows. Section 2 summarizes related 
literature in IPO litigation and firm performance, including the aspect of VCs. Section 3 
develops our main hypothesis. Section 4 shows our sample construction and descriptive 
statistics. We present our empirical analysis results in section 4. Finally, section 5 
provides a conclusion for the study. 
 
4.2 Related Literature 
 
Previous studies have examined the impact of litigation which is directly or 
indirectly faced by firms on corporate performance. Bhagat, Bizjak and Coles (1998) 
document that firms experience economically meaningful losses when they are litigated 
and the litigation filling is announced. However, they find that firm size is negatively 
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associated with such defendant wealth loss effect, which may indicate a stronger 
bargaining power for larger firms.  
 
Previous literature also focuses on the relationship between litigation and VCs 
from different research angles. Atanasov, Ivanov and Litvak (2012) find a negative 
relationship between the reputation of VCs and the probability of those VCs to face 
litigations. Moreover, they document that defendant VCs face difficulties to raise capital 
and invest in deals with much lower quality. Tian, Udell and Yu (2016) investigate the 
consequence of the failure of monitoring for VCs. Specifically, they document that VCs 
who failed to prevent accounting fraud in their backed IPO firms receive pressures from 
limited partners (LPs) by attracting less funding and making more concentrated 
investments (e.g., in the same industry, or invest locally). Moreover, those VCs’ future 
investments are less likely to make a successful exit, including cashing out through IPOs 
or M&As. They conclude that the failure of monitoring makes VCs suffer reputation 
damages in the financial market. Apart from these two studies which focus on the 
defendant VCs, Cumming, Haslem and Knill (2017) investigate how the firm’s litigation 
affect VC financing. They find that VCs are more (less) likely to invest in firms that 
litigate after (before) obtaining investments from venture capital. Moreover, their study 
reveals that VCs deem firms which filed litigations as risky ones because they tend to 
invest with more financing rounds in those firms. 
 
Furthermore, some studies also explore the relation between IPO performance 
and another important financial intermediary in the market, which is underwriters. In 
general, underwriters are usually repeated market participates which have accumulated 
abundant experience in marketing and pricing new shares (e.g., Welch (1992); Cook, 
Kieschnick and Van Ness (2006)). In this regard, newly listed firms prefer to select 
premium service from top-ranked underwriters. Beatty and Ritter (1986) argue that 
underwriters have reputation capital at stake, which affect their decision to balance the 
level of IPO initial returns. In a later study, Carter, Dark and Singh (1998) find that IPO 
firms managed by prestigious underwriters experience better long-run performance and 
less initial returns. However, Beatty, Bunsis and Hand (1998) document that when 
underwaters are involved in SEC investigations, the stock performance of their past 
clients is significantly negatively affected. The evidence suggests that the underwriter’s 
reputation is not stationary. Overall, the extant literature reveals the importance of the 
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reputation of financial intermediaries in the market, such as venture capitalist and 
underwriters. In the following section, we develop hypothesis that relate to how 
reputation damaged VCs affect IPO performance.  
 
4.3 Hypothesis development 
 
4.3.1 Reputation caused information asymmetry 
 
Reputation stake is critically important for VCs. Hsu (2004) finds that start-ups 
are willing to take a valuation discount on their firms for the exchange of financing from 
reputable VCs. Nahata (2008) reveals that VC’s reputation provides entrepreneurs with a 
fast track to the initial public offerings and have higher productivity at the time of going 
public. However, VC’s reputation can also be destroyed through different means, such as 
failing to play the certification and monitor roles in their portfolio firms (e.g., Tian, Udell 
and Yu (2016)).  If investors find an IPO firm of which they are interested in investing 
has VCs who failed to monitor their portfolio firms in the past, this will undoubtedly 
increase the valuation uncertainty of the new issue. Investors may not feel confident about 
the quality of the IPO because they could raise doubt about the ability of reputation-
damaged VCs.  
 
The IPO market is characterized by high information disparity. Insiders always 
possess sufficient internal information regarding new issues over investors. When the 
market information asymmetry is high, investors are eager for the private information of 
the offering. They may use different means to collect information from the market at a 
higher cost. Thus, the result of high IPO underpricing is deemed as the compensation to 
investors for the information collection (e.g., Benveniste and Spindt (1989); Benveniste, 
Busaba and Wilhelm Jr (2002); Benveniste et al. (2003)). Therefore, investors may 
require a higher premium from discredited VC-backed IPO firms. Based on the argument 
above, we develop our first hypothesis: 
 
H 1: IPO firms with discredited VC invested incur higher underpricing on the first 




During the bookbuilding process, underwriters rely on adjusting offer price 
revisions to induce private information from investors (Hanley, 1993). To the extent that 
reputation-damaged VCs increases information asymmetry between issuers and investors, 
underwriters are more likely to be motivated to take advantage of revisions to extract 
useful information during road shows. Moreover, Tian, Udell and Yu (2016) document 
that prestigious underwriters are less likely to cooperate with VCs who failed to present 
their backed IPOs from being sued. This evidence implies that underwriters may not know 
very well about discredited VCs and they prefer to stay away from their backed IPOs. 
Thus, extracting private information from informed investors becomes vitally important 
for underwriters during the bookbuilding process. We develop our second hypothesis: 
 
H 2: Due to high information asymmetry and the incentive for underwriters to 
extract information, the degree of offer price revision is higher for discredited VC-
backed IPOs. 
4.3.2 Managerial ability concerns 
 
VCs are recognized as value-adding intermediaries in the financial market. They 
add values to portfolio firms in different ways. For instance, VCs often send their 
representatives to take board positions as an independent director in order to control and 
manage the portfolio firm (e.g., Gorman and Sahlman (1989); Hochberg (2011)). 
Hellmann and Puri (2002) find that VCs are more likely to replace a founder with a 
professional CEO in their invested firms. If VCs failed to prevent IPO frauds in their 
backed firms, this does not only translate reputation damages to VCs but also may 
represent a problem with VC’s managerial ability. In other words, they may not have 
sufficient knowledge to manage the firm. Because VCs generally participate portfolio 
firms’ operating activities (e.g., Sahlman (1990); Fulghieri and Sevilir (2009)), 
discredited VCs may not be able to add enough values to help investee firms to grow well 
in post-IPO periods. For example, they may make the wrong decisions when making 
investment decisions, which result in financial distress for the firm. Thus, our third 
hypothesis is: 
 
H 3: VCs who failed to prevent IPO fraud cannot add sufficient values to IPO firms, 





4.4 Data and Methodology 
 
4.4.1 research design: identify discredited VCs  
 
The key point in our study is to investigate the impact of the participation of VCs 
who failed to prevent their supported firms from being sued in the past on the performance 
of their future backed IPOs. Thus, it is important to identify the newly listed firms with 
discredited VCs.   
 
To begin with, we have to control for the timing of the litigation event relating to 
VC’s monitoring function. In general, VCs do not cash out immediately after the firm 
finished initial public offering. On the contrary, they stay and continue to provide value 
adding service in the portfolio firms through their expertise (e.g., sitting on the board) 
(e.g., Hellmann and Puri (2002)). Paul Gompers and Lerner (1998) find that VCs cash 
out about 70% of their investment at the end of the second year after the IPO. Thus, we 
define that VCs failed to monitor portfolio firms if the IPO litigation was committed 
within two years after going public. This approach is similar to that of Tian, Udell and 
Yu (2016).  
 
4.4.2 The VC-backed IPO sample 
 
Our data sample covers Initial Public Offerings from 1993 to 2015 in the US 
market. Following previous literature, we apply restrictions on the IPOs and exclude the 
firms with a share price below $5 when offering to the market, American depositary 
receipts (ADRs), closed-end funds, real investment trusts (REITs) and unit offerings. The 
data is downloaded from Thomson One along with other offering information, such as 
underwriter’s name and the number of bookrunners at the time of IPO. This leaves us 
with 5963 IPO samples.           
 
We then obtain VC-backed IPOs from VentureXpert database during the same 
period. We require that each IPO has full detailed venture capital investment information, 
including the name of VC firms. Finally, we match the samples with the IPO data from 
Thomson One by the offering information. We further eliminate the number of IPOs that 
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are classified as VC-backed in Thomson One but cannot be found in VentureXpert. 
However, we notice that there are 44 IPO firms received their first investment from VCs 
in the post-IPO period. We exclude those observations since the study aims to focus on 
the impact of discredited VCs in pre-IPO periods on the corporate performance around or 
after the offering. 
 
Further, there are 2742 undisclosed VC firms in our sample from VentureXpert 
database, which cause difficulty in recognizing their names and distinguishing each 
investment in our sample. Therefore, we do not include those VCs in our analysis. Our 




4.4.3 IPO litigation data 
 
Our sued IPO data is from Stanford’s Securities Class Action Clearinghouse 
(SCAC). We search SCAC for all recorded sued public companies with case filings 
between 1996 and 2015. There are 4313 total lawsuits from the database and 1016 
litigations can be matched with our initial IPO samples. We then read each law action and 
identify whether the case was filed against the company’s initial public offering 
misbehaviours (e.g., share allocation wrongdoings, accounting fraud), which leaves us 
with 539 IPO related litigations. Because the average time to detect the fraud is two years 
(Tracy Yue Wang, 2011), the litigation case in our sample was committed from 1993. 
Finally, we obtain 164 VC-backed newly listed firm which was committed to IPO 
litigation between 1993 and 2015.  
 
Since we have obtained each VC firm’s name for all VC-backed IPOs in our 
sample, we match VC firms which committed to IPO litigations with their supported IPOs 
in the years after the fraud was discovered. Thus, we construct a dummy variable DVC 
taking the value of one if an IPO firm has any discredited VC invested, otherwise is zero. 
To better understand this approach, suppose there is a VC syndicate consisting of three 
independent VC firms in an investee which conducted an IPO in 2000, and the IPO was 
found to commit to the accounting fraud in one year after going public. In the years after 
2001, any of those three VCs backed IPOs will be deemed as firms with discredited VCs. 
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Finally, our sample of 1658 observations consists of 691 IPO firms with discredited VCs 
and 967 IPO firms without any discredited VCs.  
 
4.4.4 Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 1 reports VC-backed IPOs that were committed to law cases by the calendar 
year between 1993 and 2015. We observe that IPOs were found to be fraudulent reach 
the most around the bubble period. Specifically, there are 27 firms that went public in 
1999 were litigated out of 170 backed IPOs in the cohort year. However, the number of 
sued IPOs are increased to 35 out of 169 total firms in 2000.  
 
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of control variables we used in our analysis, 
as well as our variable of interests (e.g., DVC). On average, discredited VC-backed firms 
have 2.63 VCs who experience monitoring failures in the past, which accounts for 36.2% 
of whole VC syndicate. The average age for IPO firms is 11.011 years, with a mean total 
proceed of $ 101.261 million. The average total assets (sales) for our sample is $ 284.278 
($181.14) millions. 40.3% of issuers have hired top underwriters, and 77.3% of firms 
have used big-4 auditing firms in our sample. On average, insiders retained 6.377% of 
shares during the process of going public (Overhang). The average number of 
bookrunners in IPO firms is 1.458. 40% of firms operate in high-tech industries, and 20.7% 
of firms went public during the bubble period. The mean leverage ratio for issuers is 0.33. 
Finally, IPO firms show average profitability of -0.089 when going public. Nevertheless, 
this is consistent with Jain, Jayaraman and Kini (2008) which argue that firms decide to 
go public even if they do not make a positive profit.  
 
IPO firms backed by discredited VCs are younger than their counterparts that are 
without any discredited VCs (10.635 years vs 11.280 years). Moreover, issuers with VCs 
who failed to monitor previous investments tend to raise more proceeds during the IPO 
than issuers without any discredited VCs invested in the firm. Also, discredited VCs more 
likely to invest in IPO firms with higher total assets and sales than normal VCs ($314.977 
million vs $261.737 million; $229.91 million vs $146.344 million, respectively). 
Discredited VC-backed IPO firms are more likely to hire reputable underwriters and big-
4 auditors (50.1% vs 88.1%) than IPO firms without any discredited VCs (33.3% vs 
69.6%). Moreover, insiders in firms with discredited VCs tend to retain more shares than 
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in firms without any discredited VCs (6.756 vs 6.106). Firms with VCs who had backed 
litigated IPOs have more bookrunners than firms without any such VCs (1.88 vs 1.156). 
Discredited VCs are less likely to invest in high-tech firms compared to typical VCs (48.8% 
vs 49.2%). IPO firms with the participation of discredited VCs are less likely to go public 
in bubble period than their counterparts without investment from the discredited VCs 
(20.1% vs 21.1%). The average leverage ratio for discredited VC backed IPO firms is 
lower than firms without discredited VCs (0.321 vs 0.336). Finally, we find that IPO firms 
with discredited VC invested are less profitable than IPO firms without any discredited 
VCs (-0.132 vs -0.059).  
 
Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics for the measures of IPO performance. 
Firstly, we observe an average IPO underpricing of 27.96% for all sample firms, with a 
mean revision of 0.851%. Further, regarding the growth of operating return on assets in 
post-offering years, we find a steady positive growth rate from IPO year to three years 
after the IPO. In Panel C, investors earn positive buy and holder abnormal returns in 
different periods, except in month 4 to month 6 after the offering. The average delisting 
rate for the full sample of VC-backed IPO firms is 26.2%. 
 
A majority of IPO performance measure display significant differences between 
discredited and non-discredited VC-backed firms. Specifically, we observe that the 
average IPO underpricing is higher for firms with discredited VCs than firms without 
discredited VCs (33.271% vs 24.164%), and the mean difference is statistically 
significant at the 1% level. This suggests a pattern that discredited VCs potentially raise 
less capital than they could be, because of more “money left on the table”. The average 
offer price revision for discredited VC-backed IPO firms is also higher than non-
discredited VC backed firms (0.901% vs 0.815%). In addition, we newly listed firms with 
discredited VCs experience negative growth of operating return on assets in post-offering 
years; while firms without discredited VCs exhibit positive growth rates. Further, the buy 
and hold abnormal returns for investors in discredited VC-backed IPO firms are generally 
lower than in non-discredited VC-backed IPO firms across different holding periods. For 
instance, at the end of month 6 after the offering, the BHARs for the investor in 
discredited VC backed IPO firms is -0.015, which is significantly lower than 0.043 in IPO 
firms without any discredited VCs. Finally, we find a significantly higher delisting rate 
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for newly listed firms with discredited VCs than those who do not have any (29.8% vs 
18.6%).  
 
Overall, our univariate analysis has suggested that discredited VC-backed IPO 
firms underperform their counterparts that are without any discredited VCs. In the next 







4.5 Empirical results 
 
4.5.1 IPO underpricing  
 
We first estimate the effect of having discredited VCs in a newly listed firm on 
IPO underpricing. We use the ordinary least squares regressions and include a rich set of 
control variables that have been found to have an impact on underpricing. We further 
control for an unobservable different year and industry effects by incorporating year and 
industry dummies in all regression analyses. The results are displayed in Table 4.  
 
In specification (1), we only include the variable of interest DVC which indicates 
whether the IPO firm is supported by VCs who had backed fraudulent IPOs in the past or 
not. We only control for year effect in this model. As seen, the coefficient on DVC is 
positive and highly significant at the 1% level, which provides initial evidence that IPO 
firms backed by discredited VCs incur greater underpricing, and thus “left money on the 
table” during the process of going public. In specification (2), we incorporate other 
control variables. As expected, the sign on DVC is still positive and statistically 
significant at the 1% level. We use DVC(%) as the variable of interest in the specification 
(3). The variable is measured as the ratio of discredited VCs to all VCs in an investment 
syndicate in the IPO firm. We continue to find a positive and significant coefficient on 
DVC(%) in the specification (3). Taking specification (2) as an example, on average, 
137 
 
newly listed firms with discredited VCs experience a US $16.3 million potential loss 
compared to their counterparts without any discredited VCs participated.  
 
Majority of control variables show expected signs and statistically significant at 
the conventional levels, which are generally in line with previous literature. Specifically, 
a firm with longer operating history reduces information asymmetry and uncertainty, 
because information for those firms tends to be richer than young firms (e.g., reputation) 
(e.g., Nielsson and Wójcik (2016)). We find a positive association between IPO proceeds 
and underpricing as per Gounopoulos et al. (2017).  Large firms proxied by total assets 
also contribute to the reduction of information asymmetry, and therefore reduce IPO 
underpricing. The sign on Ln (total assets) is negative and significant at the 1% level, 
which supports the finding in Suman Banerjee, Dai and Shrestha (2011). Gounopoulos et 
al. (2017) report a negative association between the level of firm leverage and 
underpricing because firms rely more on debt financing release a positive signal and 
therefore lowers asymmetric information in the market. Thus, our finding is also aligned 
with their argument.  
 
Moreover, we report a positive relationship between the top-tier underwriter and 
IPO underpricing, which is a contrast to Carter, Dark and Singh (1998) and Megginson 
and Weiss (1991), though it support findings from most recent studies, such as Loughran 
and Ritter (2004) and Marcato, Milcheva and Zheng (2018). The sign on Share overhang 
is consistent with Bradley and Jordan (2002) that greater insider holdings implies lower 
dilution costs and cause greater underpricing. In addition, we report a positive coefficient 
on Ln(no of bookrunners), which support the argument that more bookrunners indicate 
more effort made during the IPO (e.g., Suman Banerjee, Dai and Shrestha (2011)). Finally, 
we do not find evidence between big-4 auditing firms and IPO underpricing. 
 
Overall, the results so far are consistent with our prediction that discredited VCs 
enlarge information asymmetry in the pre-IPO period, and therefore increase IPO 
underpricing. Nevertheless, we attempt to provide a more meaningful interpretation of 
the relation between the participation of discredited VCs and IPO underpricing by 
conditioning the discredited VC effect on the severity of the information asymmetry issue. 
Particularly, we adopt two measures to characterize the extent of information asymmetry 
problem in the firms: firm age and total assets. Previous studies have recognized that 
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young and small firms are usually characterized by high information asymmetry between 
insiders and outsiders (e.g., firms and investors) (e.g., Wei Wang and Yung (2011); 
Garrett, Hoitash and Prawitt (2014); Pevzner, Xie and Xin (2015); Li, Wang and Wang 
(2019)). Inexperienced firms with discredited VCs or small-sized firms are expected to 
face greater information asymmetry, holding other factors constant. In other words, those 
two firm characteristics are expected to amplify the effect of information asymmetry in 
the presence of discredited VCs. Thus, if our proposed explanation of damaged reputation 
of VCs with fraudulent IPOs backed in the past enlarges information asymmetry in newly 
listed firms holds, we should find a larger effect of discredited VCs in young and small 
firms on IPO underpricing. If we do not find such evidence, then our explanation of 
discredited VCs on IPO underpricing may be driven by the asymmetric information. We 
present the results in Table 5. 
First of all, in the specification (1), we use an interaction term between DVC and 
Ln(total assets), the coefficient is negative and significant at the conventional level. In 
specification (2), we observe that the coefficient on DVC*Firm age is also negative and 
statistically significant at the 5% level. Importantly, the variable of interest DVC displays 
consistent positive signs and are highly significant (at 1%), suggesting that information 
asymmetry proxied by firm age and size have an impact on IPO underpricing in firms 
with the participation of discredited VCs. Indeed, all else equal, newly listed firms with 
high information asymmetry issue are expected to increase IPO underpricing, particular 
if the firm is supported by VCs whose backed IPOs were litigated in the past, as the 
litigation experience significantly decreases VC’s reputation which affects investor’s 
confidence about the new issue. Moreover, we find similar evidence in specifications (3) 
and (4), where we interact DVC(%) with Ln(total assets) and Firm age separately.  
 
In this section, the evidence suggests that reputation damaged VCs enlarges 
information asymmetry in their supported firms when going public, in turn, resulting in 
higher IPO underpricing. As a result, issuers raise less capital as they potentially could 
do as more excessive money “left on the table”. The results support our first hypothesis. 
 
4.5.2 Offer price revision 
 
In this section, we test how the participation of discredited VCs affect IPO offer 
price revision. We measure revision as the percentage change from the midpoint of the 
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filing price range to the final offer price of the new share (e.g., Loughran and McDonald 
(2013)). We incorporate the same set of control variables from Table 4 as those controls 
are also found to have an impact on the revision (e.g., Loughran and McDonald (2013); 
Cooney et al. (2015); Gounopoulos et al. (2017)). We also control for year and industry 
fix effects in the analysis. The results are presented in Table 6. 
 
In specification (1), the coefficient on the variable DVC is positive and significant 
at the 1% level, suggesting a positive relation between discredited VCs and offer price 
revision. We find similar results in the specification (2), where we use DVC(%) as the 
variable of interest. Therefore, the results are consistent with our second hypothesis that 
greater information asymmetry caused by the discredited VCs drives underwriter to 
frequently revise the offer price to induce private information from investors. The result 
also supports the argument that IPOs with substantial uncertainty, on average, generate 
lower preliminary offer prices and greater IPO underpricing, as well as higher revisions, 
because underwriters need to compensate investors for the information exchange (e.g., 
Loughran and McDonald (2013)). 
 
Overall, the results in this section are consistent with our hypothesis that there is 
a high demand of information collection in the presence of discredited VC-backed IPO 
firms, resulting in greater number of up revisions from underwriters. 
 
4.5.3 Post-IPO performance 
 
Apart from our hypothesis that VCs who have backed fraudulent IPOs in the 
experience declines in reputation, we should also question discredited VC’s managerial 
ability in investee firms. Our promise is that the litigation faced by IPO firms that VCs 
backed may not be an accidental event. On the contrary, it might be due to the insufficient 
managerial capacity of VCs. If this is true, then we should expect that IPO firms backed 
by discredited VCs experience declined corporate performance in the post-offering period. 
In this section, we explore this effect from different aspects of corporate performance, 
including post-IPO operating performance, buy and hold abnormal returns (BHAR), and 




4.5.3.1 Operating return on assets  
 
We now explore the relationship between the participation of discredited VCs in 
an IPO firm and its post-IPO operating performance. Our measure of operating 
performance is the operating return on assets, which is the operating income before 
depreciation scaled by total assets (e.g., Jain and Kini (1994); Espenlaub et al. (2016)). 
The measure represents a firm’s ability to make profits from the investments they made. 
A high value indicates that firms can receive greater returns from fewer investments.  
 
We use an industry comparable matched firm approach to calculate the operating 
return on assets for our sample (e.g., Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004)). We first 
draw all firms with ordinary common shares with financial information from Compustat 
between 1993 and 2015. We exclude special instruments, such as REITs, closed-end 
funds, ADRs. We then match our sample with the matching firm based on the size decile 
in the year that proceeds the IPO at the 3-digit SIC level. Nevertheless, we restrict the 
firms that did not go public in the past three years and have the stock price more than $ 5 
in the year that the sample firm conduct the IPO. Thus, a firm’s post-IPO operating 
performance is measured as the change of the firm’s operating return on assets from IPO 
year to year y in the post-offering period minus the corresponding change of matching 
firm. We use a set of controls as previous literature suggests an impact on post-IPO 
financial performance (e.g., Shantanu Banerjee, Güçbilmez and Pawlina (2016); Boulton 
and Campbell (2016)). Due to financial information available in the database, firm’s 
listing status (e.g., M&A), and matching firm restriction, the number of observations in 
our sample vary from year one after listing to year three after listing. The results are 
presented in Table 7. 
 
First of all, firms with discredited VCs backed exhibit negative growth rate of 
operating return on assets in one year after listing compared to firms without the 
participation of discrete VCs, as the coefficient on DVC is -2.280 and statically significant 
at the 10% level. However, we observe that the difference is getting larger over the second 
and third post-IPO year. Specifically, by the end of the second year after listing, we see a 
negative coefficient on DVC with a larger magnitude (e.g., -5.677) with a high 
significance of 1%. By the end of year 3, the coefficient is -6.442 and significant at the 
5% level. Thus, we conclude that the post-offering operating performance of discredited 
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VC-backed IPO firms significantly underperforms non-discredited VC-backed 
counterparts, which is attributed to discredited VCs’ defective managerial abilities. 
 
4.5.3.2 Buy and hold abnormal returns (BHAR) 
 
In this section, we particularly explore discredited VC-backed IPO firm’s buy and 
hold abnormal returns (BHAR) in the post-offering period. Using BHAR is an appropriate 
measure for an IPO’s performance as it captures an investor’s stock returns over a period 
of time. We calculate the BHAR as the following: 
 






Where 𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the daily return of IPO firm i on date t; 𝑅𝑏𝑡 is the corresponding return for 
the benchmark on the same date. Our benchmark is measured as the value weighted 
market index. The stock price is obtained from the Centre for Research in Security prices 
(CRSP) database. The stock holding period for an investor begins from date 𝑡1 which 
represents the first day after the IPO and end at date 𝑡2. We measure BHAR for five 
different time windows after the offering, which are week 1, week 2 to week 4, month 2 
to month 3, month 4 to month 6, and from the date after listing until the end of the 6th 
month. We incorporate the same set of control variables from Table 7. The results of 
estimating the effect of discredited VCs on IPO firm’s BHARs are presented in Table 9. 
 
The coefficients on the variable of interest DVC displays consistently negative 
coefficients and statistically significant at the conventional level, except in specification 
(3), where the BHAR is measured between month 2 and month 3. The results imply that 
IPO firms supported with discredited VCs experience lower market-adjusted returns over 
different time windows after the offering. The control variables only partially show 
statistical significance in some specifications. Firm age appears to have a negative impact 
on the long-run abnormal returns in the specification (5). Consistent with previous studies 
(e.g., Carter, Dark and Singh (1998); Ritter (2011); Cao, Jiang and Ritter (2013)), we find 
larger firms ( proxied by total assets) exhibit significantly better stock performance; while 




Overall, the above evidence also corresponds to the results in Table 7, which 
shows a negative relationship between discredited VCs and post-IPO operating 
performance.  
 
4.5.3.3 IPO failure risks 
 
Several studies have revealed that the participation of VCs in IPO firms adds 
values during the process of going public (e.g., Barry et al. (1990); Megginson and Weiss 
(1991) Hellmann and Puri (2002)). In this regard, Jain and Kini (2000) document that 
VC-backed firms significantly reduce failure risks for newly listed firms in the post-
offering period. However, our results from previous sections suggest that discredited VCs 
do not necessarily add values to IPOs, as their backed firms experience negative operating 
growth and buy-and-hold abnormal returns in the periods subsequent to the offering. 
Therefore, in this section, we question whether the participation of discredited VCs 
implies future delisting risks.  
 
We first need to identify IPO’s listing status for each of our sample firms. 
Because we need to leave at least five years for tracking each IPO’s status, we reduce our 
sample period from 2015 to 2010. Thus, each IPO firm is tracked from the offering year 
to the end of 2015. We then obtain the firm’s status code from CRSP. Following previous 
studies, such as  Gounopoulos and Pham (2018), we categorize failed firms as those were 
delisted due to any negative reasons (e.g., bankruptcy, liquidation). Thus, failed firms are 
assigned with the CRSP code equal to or above 300. We identify firms as survived if the 
firm is continuing to trade at the end of tracking period (e.g., end of 2015) (CRSP-code 
is 100) or it was either merged or acquired (CRSP-code between 200 and 299). 
 
To evaluate the impact of discredited VCs on post-IPO failures, we employ the 
Cox proportional-hazard model. The COX model is a wildly adopted approach to analyze 
firm failure risks (e.g., Jain and Kini (2008); Espenlaub, Khurshed and Mohamed (2012); 
Gounopoulos and Pham (2018); Helbing, Lucey and Vigne (2019)). Compared to other 
approaches (e.g., logistic regression, which only predicts the occurrence of an event), the 
COX model takes consideration of time factors before the event date, as well as censored 
units. The data is deemed as censored if the event has not yet been conducted during the 
tracking periods. In this case, the observations in our sample are right censored because 
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many IPO firms do not encounter failure by the end of the tracking period (e.g., 31 
December 2015). Further advantages of using COX model is that it does not require pre-
determined hazard function and can take any functioning form (e.g., see, Allison (2010)). 
We estimate the COX model as follows: 
 
ℎ(𝑡) = ℎ0(𝑡)exp [𝛽1𝐷𝑉𝐶 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑓𝑖𝑥 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡
+ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑓𝑖𝑥 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡] 
 
Where ℎ0(𝑡) is the hazard function, and the left side of the equation is the hazard ratio 
regarding the IPO firm delisting risks. A positive (negative) coefficient suggests a higher 
(lower) IPO delisting risk. The hazard ratio is calculated as an exponentiated coefficient. 
For binary variables, the hazard ratio indicates the ratio of the hazard for those with value 
one to that of those with value zero. An IPO firm is more (less) likely to be delisted if the 
hazard ratio is greater (less) than one. We include control variables that are related to the 
probability of newly listed firm failures in our regression models. The results are 
presented in Table 9.  
 
In specification (1), we classify failed firms as those are delisted due to any 
negative reasons. The coefficient on the variables of interest DVC is 0.293 and statistically 
significant at the 10% level, suggesting that discredited VC backed IPO firms are more 
likely to experience failures in the periods subsequent to the offering. A hazard ratio of 
1.341 indicates that IPO firms with discredited VCs invested makes it 1.431 times more 
likely that such firms will fail compared to firms without discredited VCs. Moreover, 
because Welbourne and Andrews (1996) document that merges and acquisitions result in 
decreased stock prices, which lead to financial distress for acquired firms. Therefore, we 
further identify failed IPO firms by including those who are delisted due to M&As (e.g., 
CRSP delisting code between 200 and 299). In specification (2), the coefficient on DVC 
is also positive and statistically significant, suggesting a higher failure risks for 
discredited VC backed IPO firms.  
 
Regarding control variables, Underpricing appears to be negatively associated 
with IPO failures, which is consistent with the finding from Demers and Joos (2007). 
Consistent with the argument that the reputation stake of financial intermediaries plays a 
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certification role in going public, thereby adding value to the firm, we find a significant 
and negative coefficient on Underwriter. However, we do not reveal such evidence on 
Auditor. Moreover, firms in high-tech industries are more like to be delisted in post-IPO 
periods, which is aligned with the view that those firms are usually young and risky (e.g., 
Alexander Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003)). Moreover, the coefficient on Ln(sales) is 
negative and significant at the 1% level, suggesting that IPO firms with larger size are 
less like to fail. The evidence is consistent with Espenlaub et al. (2016). Finally, firms 
with higher Leverage ratio are positively related to post-IPO failures, as per Gounopoulos 
and Pham (2018). 
 
To conclude, we find evidence which is consistent with our previous findings. In 
particular, the participation of discredited VCs does not add sufficient values to newly 
listed firms, which results in IPO failures in the future.  
 
4.6 Discussion: why discredited VCs tolerate higher IPO underpricing? 
 
So far, we have revealed that discredited VC-backed experience high IPO 
underpricing, thereby leaving more “money on the table”. Although this is consistent with 
our first hypothesis that reputation damaged VCs increases information asymmetry, it is 
not clear why discredited VC would tolerate such a high underpricing. Paul A Gompers 
(1996) and Lee and Wahal (2004) argue that younger VCs bring firms to go public earlier 
than older VCs in order to build some reputation, resulting in high underpricing. Liu and 
Ritter (2011) find that VCs do not care high underpricing because they focus on the all-
star analyst coverage when shares are allocated to limited partners. Given that high 
underpricing can work as an efficient tool to lower litigation risks  (e.g., Lowry and Shu 
(2002)), in this section, we particular examine whether high IPO underpricing can help 
discredited VC-backed IPOs reduce further litigations. Our promise is that, if VCs had 
failed to prevent IPO fraud, then they may make the same mistake in the future. In this 
case, investors may be less likely to sue IPO firms if they have received enough 
compensation. We present our results using logistic models in Table 10.  
 
In specification (1), we only include variable DVC. The coefficient is 0.619 and 
significant at the 1% level, suggesting that IPO firms with discredited VCs experience a 
higher likelihood of being litigated within two years after the offering. Previous studies 
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suggest that firms using higher underpricing as a hedge of IPO litigation (e.g., Lowry and 
Shu (2002)). Thus, we add variable Underpricing in the specification (2). However, we 
find that firms with higher underpricing face greater litigation risks in post-IPO periods, 
which supports the finding of  Zhu (2009) that IPO underpricing may not act as efficient 
insurance channel to against litigations (e.g., see, Walker et al. (2015)). In specification 
(3), we incorporate a set of control variables that are related to IPO firm uncertainties. 
Particularly, we find that long-lived firms are less likely to face litigations; while a firm 
with more assets and operating in high-tech industries are more likely to be sued. The 
evidence is consistent with findings from previous studies (e.g., Lowry and Shu (2002); 
Hanley and Hoberg (2012)). In specification (4), we add two variables related to financial 
intermediaries, Underwriter and Auditor. Surprisingly, we find a positive relationship 
between the quality of underwriters and post-IPO litigation risks for VC-backed firms. 
This finding is on the contrary to previous studies which arguing that underwriters certify 
the issuing firm, thereby lowering the likelihood of being sued for the IPO. We do not 
report any evidence of the effect of top-4 auditors on IPO litigations.  
 
In specification (4), we introduce an interaction term between DVC and 
Underpricing. The resulting coefficient is -0.008 and highly significant at the 1% level, 
suggesting that greater IPO underpricing can help discredited VC-backed firms avoid 
post-offering litigations. Hanley and Hoberg (2012) document that underwriters partially 
adjust revisions because they are motivated to minimize IPO litigation risks. Under this 
circumstance, we hypothesize that because of the past monitoring failures of discredited 
VCs, underwriters have more incentive to use higher revisions to avoid future IPO 
litigations. Nevertheless, underwriters may choose not to fully revise the offer price 
because of the need for positive information from investors (e.g., see, Loughran and 
McDonald (2013)). Indeed, since discredited VCs increase information asymmetry and 
reduce investor’s confidence, underwriters need to carefully consider the level of offer 
price revision, in order to reach a balance between issuers and investors. Finally, investors 
are less likely to sue discredited VC-backed IPO firms if they have received enough 
compensation (e.g., greater underpricing).  
 
Overall, in this section, the results are consistent with our previous argument that 
VCs who failed to prevent litigations in the past indicate an insufficient managerial ability, 






In this study, we investigate the performance of discredited VC-backed IPO firms. 
We use IPO litigation for VC-backed firms and define discredited VCs as whose backed 
IPOs were involved in the lawsuits within two years after the offering. We find that 
reputation and managerial ability concerns matter for those VCs. 
 
First, we reveal that discredited VC-backed IPOs are associated with greater IPO 
underpricing. This finding is aligned with the fundamental argument that information 
asymmetry leads to high underpricing and result in potential losses for issuers, which 
indicates that reputation damaged VCs enlarge information asymmetry around the initial 
public offering. We further reveal that there is a greater number of upper offer price 
revisions in discredited VC backed IPOs, confirming that a higher information asymmetry 
around those issues and underwriters take advantage of revising the offer price to induce 
private information from investors.  
 
Furthermore, we also find evidence of the inferior post-IPO performance of 
discredited VC-backed IPO firms, which implies that discredited VCs do not necessarily 
add values to IPO firms because of the reduced managerial ability. Specifically, IPO firms 
with discredited VCs experience declined operating return on assets and BHARs 
compared to their non-discredited VC-backed counterparts. Moreover, evidence shows 
that discredited VC-backed firms are more likely to fail in post-IPO periods. Finally, we 
find that those discredited VC-backed IPOs are associated with a higher likelihood of 
being sued again; but this effect can be mitigated along with greater underpricing, 
suggesting an issuance channel of the use of underpricing to avoid litigations.   
 
To conclude, our study provides new evidence on how reputation damaged VCs 
affect the performance of IPO firms. This may challenge the previous argument that VCs 
are value adding intermediaries and bring further attention to investors when evaluating 




Table 1 Distribution of IPO litigations 
The table displays the distribution of the committed IPO frauds from 1993 to 2015. Our IPO litigation 
data is from Stanford’s Securities Class Action Clearinghouse (SCAC). 
IPO year  No. of IPO litigations  Total 
1993  2  121 
1994  6  82 
1995  2  126 
1996  5  179 
1997  3  90 
1998  5  56 
1999  27  170 
2000  35  169 
2001  5  28 
2002  8  23 
2003  9  18 
2004  4  53 
2005  13  43 
2006  5  55 
2007  7  75 
2008  2  7 
2009  2  11 
2010  3  40 
2011  5  40 
2012  4  44 
2013  5  71 
2014  3  97 
2015  4  60 
Total  164  1,658 
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics for control variables 
The table displays descriptive statistics of control variables used in the analysis. We define discredited VC-backed IPO as if the new issuing firms have any VCs 
who failed to prevent IPO fraud and lead to post-offering litigations in the past. No of DVC is the number if discredited VCs in the IPO firm. DVC(%) is the 
percentage of discredited VCs in the total VC syndicate. All variables are defined in the appendix. 
  
Full sample  
IPOs without 
discredited VCs  
IPOs with 
discredited VC  Diff. in means(p-
value) 
  
N Mean p25 p50 p75 sd  N Mean  N Mean  







DVC(%)  - - - - - -  - -  691 0.362 
 
- 
Firm age  1658 11.011 5.000 8.000 12.000 11.687  967 11.280  691 10.635  0.170 
Proceeds  1658 101.261 33.000 55.000 94.500 425.696  967 73.764  691 139.741  0.001 
Total assets  1658 284.278 45.779 91.353 183.441 1207.335  967 261.737  691 314.977  0.808 
Underwriter  1658 0.403 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.491  967 0.333  691 0.501  0.000 
Auditor  1658 0.773 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.419  967 0.696  691 0.881  0.000 
Overhang  1658 6.377 2.100 3.023 4.750 19.459  967 6.106  691 6.756  0.251 
No of bookrunners  1658 1.458 1.000 1.000 2.000 1.008  967 1.156  691 1.880  0.000 
High tech  1658 0.490 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.500  967 0.492  691 0.488  0.428 
Bubble period  1658 0.207 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.405  967 0.211  691 0.201  0.314 
Sale  1650 181.14 10.172 37.339 103.048 721.232  963 146.344  687 229.91  0.010 
Leverage  1658 0.330 0.129 0.232 0.432 0.431  967 0.336  691 0.321  0.761 
Profitability  1644 -0.089 -0.241 -0.017 0.115 0.344  959 -0.059  685 -0.132  0.000 
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Table 3 Descriptive statistics for IPO performance measures 
The table displays descriptive statistics of IPO performance measures. Panel A includes IPO short-run performance measures, such as IPO underpricing and offers price 
revision. Panels B, C, and D include short-run performance measures, such as operating return on assets, buy and hold abnormal returns (BHARs), and post-offering failure 
risks. All variables are defined in the appendix. 
  Full sample  
IPOs without 
discredited VCs  
IPOs with 
discredited VC  
Diff. in 
means(p-
value)   N Mean p25 p50 p75 sd  N Mean  N Mean  
Panel A               
 
Underpricing  1658 27.960 0.000 10.00 33.33 54.337  967 24.164  691 33.271  0.000 
Revision  1658 0.851 -9.09 0.000 11.11 19.200  967 0.815  691 0.901  0.464 
Panel B: Operating return on assets 
Operating ROA 
Year1  1362 0.528 -0.573 0.165 1.117 35.227  802 1.401  560 -0.723  0.137 
Operating ROA 
Year2  1139 1.582 -0.880 0.111 1.383 53.714  681 2.996  458 -0.521  0.139 
Operating ROA 
Year3  945 1.878 -0.882 0.064 1.423 54.659  559 4.446  386 -1.840  0.041 
Panel C: Buy and hold abnormal returns 
BHAR[week 1]  1572 0.002 -0.063 -0.009 0.046 0.143  920 0.006  652 -0.005  0.052 
BHAR[week 2-4]  1572 0.039 -0.081 0.006 0.119 0.247  920 0.042  652 0.035  0.304 
BHAR[month 2-3]  1572 0.016 -0.201 -0.027 0.155 0.398  920 0.009  652 0.027  0.189 
BHAR[month 4-6]  1572 -0.055 -0.292 -0.107 0.108 0.411  920 -0.038  652 -0.079  0.025 
BHAR[month 0-6]  1572 0.019 -0.419 -0.123 0.217 0.811  920 0.043  652 -0.015  0.080 
Panel D: Failure risks             




Table 4 The impact of discredited VCs on IPO underpricing 
The table display results using ordinary least square regressions to investigate the impact of the 
participation of discredited VCs in IPO firms on underpricing. The dependent variable is IPO 
underpricing, which is measured as the percentage change from the share price of the first day of trading 
to the offer price. We define discredited VC-backed IPO as if the new issuing firms have any VCs who 
failed to prevent IPO fraud and lead to post-offering litigations in the past. No of DVC is the number if 
discredited VCs in the IPO firm. DVC(%) is the percentage of discredited VCs in the total VC syndicate. 
All variables are defined in the appendix. All regressions include year and industry controls. One, two 
and three asterisks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. The t-statistics are 
included in the parentheses and are reported for heteroscedasticity robust standard errors. All variables 
are defined in Appendix A. 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
DVC  19.274***  16.097***   
  (4.27)  (3.63)   
%of DVC in IPO      8.672* 
      (1.73) 
Firm age    -1.510  -2.041 
    (-0.99)  (-1.30) 
Ln (proceeds)    17.776***  17.618*** 
    (6.70)  (6.60) 
Ln(total assets)    -5.795***  -5.702*** 
    (-3.94)  (-3.86) 
Leverage    -6.032**  -6.828** 
    (-2.07)  (-2.36) 
Underwriter    7.936***  8.769*** 
    (2.98)  (3.25) 
Auditor    1.404  2.251 
    (0.44)  (0.70) 
Share overhang    0.226*  0.240** 
    (1.93)  (2.00) 
Ln (no of bookrunners)    -8.956**  -9.523** 
    (-2.28)  (-2.42) 
Intercept  6.902  -36.311***  -37.930*** 
  (1.15)  (-3.70)  (-3.82) 
R-squared  0.2303  0.2818  0.2721 





Table 5 The impact of discredited VCs on IPO underpricing with interactive effects 
The table display results using ordinary least square regressions to investigate the interactive effects of 
the participation of discredited VCs in IPO firms with other factors on underpricing. The dependent 
variable is IPO underpricing, which is measured as the percentage change from the share price of the 
first day of trading to the offer price. We define discredited VC-backed IPO as if the new issuing firms 
have any VCs who failed to prevent IPO fraud and lead to post-offering litigations in the past. Thus, 
DVC is a dummy taking the value of one if the IPO firms have any discredited VCs, otherwise is zero. 
DVC(%) is the percentage of discredited VCs in the total VC syndicate. All variables are defined in the 
appendix. All regressions include year and industry controls. One, two and three asterisks denote 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. The t-statistics are included in the parentheses and 
are reported for heteroscedasticity robust standard errors. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
  (1) 
 (2)  (3)  (4) 
DVC  24.769*** 
 35.443***                    
  (2.78)    
 (3.10)                    
DVC*Ln(total assets)  -2.700*   
                     
  (-1.66)    
                     
DVC* Firm age  
  -9.221**                    
  
  (-2.34)                    
DVC(%)  
    31.076**  40.086**  
  
    (2.18)  (2.51)    
DVC(%)*Ln(total assets)  
    -4.971**                  
  
    (-2.03)                  
DVC(%)*Firm age  
      -12.336**  
  
      (-2.42)    
Firm age  -2.143    
 1.195  -2.028  -0.541    
  (-1.41)    
 (0.75)  (-1.30)  (-0.34)    
Ln(proceeds)  17.399*** 
 17.547***  17.707***  17.623*** 
  (6.63)    
 (6.73)  (6.64)  (6.60)    
Ln(total assets)  -4.540*** 
 -5.808***  -5.091***  -5.703*** 
  (-2.99)    
 (-3.97)  (-3.34)  (-3.88)    
Leverage  -5.775**  
 -6.076**  -6.803**  -6.699**  
  (-2.01)    
 (-2.10)  (-2.28)  (-2.31)    
Underwriter  8.010*** 
 7.644***  8.571***  8.533*** 
  (3.09)    
 (2.87)  (3.19)  (3.17)    
Auditor  0.688    
 1.257  2.129  2.027    
  (0.22)    
 (0.39)  (0.66)  (0.63)    
Share overhang  0.223**  
 0.228**  0.242**  0.244**  
  (1.97)    
 (1.99)  (2.03)  (2.05)    
Ln(no of bookrunners)  -7.959*   
 -7.969**  -7.370*  -8.780**  
  (-1.87)    
 (-2.00)  (-1.77)  (-2.19)    
Intercept  -26.107*** 
 -43.705***  -40.285***  -42.349*** 
  (-2.72)    
 (-4.19)  (-4.01)  (-4.13)    
R-squared  0.2902    
 0.2851  0.2733  0.2738    
Obs.  1658    




Table 6 The impact of discredited VCs on offer price revisions 
The table display results using ordinary least square regressions to investigate the impact of the 
participation of discredited VCs in IPO firms on offer price revisions. The dependent variable is a 
revision, which is measured as the percentage change from the offer price to the mid of filing price range. 
We define discredited VC-backed IPO as if the new issuing firms have any VCs who failed to prevent 
IPO fraud and lead to post-offering litigations in the past. Thus, DVC is a dummy taking the value of 
one if the IPO firms have any discredited VCs, otherwise is zero. DVC(%) is the percentage of discredited 
VCs in the total VC syndicate. All variables are defined in the appendix. All regressions include year 
and industry controls. One, two and three asterisks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
level. The t-statistics are included in the parentheses and are reported for heteroscedasticity robust 
standard errors. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
  (1) 
 (2) 
DVC  3.624*** 
                 
  (3.13)    
                 
DVC(%)  
  4.113**  
  
  (2.10)    
Firm age  -0.083    
 -0.226    
  (-0.13)    
 (-0.37)    
Ln(proceeds)  13.739*** 
 13.708*** 
  (15.25)    
 (15.28)    
Ln(total assets)  -4.091*** 
 -4.082*** 
  (-7.52)    
 (-7.47)    
Leverage  -1.769    
 -1.950    
  (-0.69)    
 (-0.76)    
Underwriter  0.241    
 0.352    
  (0.24)    
 (0.35)    
Auditor  0.396    
 0.528    
  (0.37)    
 (0.49)    
Share overhang  -0.018    
 -0.016    
  (-0.71)    
 (-0.59)    
Ln(no of bookrunners)  -6.032*** 
 -6.349*** 
  (-4.28)    
 (-4.45)    
Intercept  -29.575*** 
 -29.571*** 
  (-5.17)    
 (-5.15)    
R-squared  0.2339    
 0.2311    
Obs.  1658    





Table 7 The impact of discredited VCs on post-IPO operating return on assets 
The table display results using ordinary least square regressions to investigate the impact of the 
participation of discredited VCs in IPO firms on operating return on assets in post-offering periods. The 
dependent variable is the percentage change of operating return on assets from year y to IPO year. We 
measure operating return on assets as the ratio of operating income to total assets. We define discredited 
VC-backed IPO as if the new issuing firms have any VCs who failed to prevent IPO fraud and lead to 
post-offering litigations in the past. Thus, DVC is a dummy taking the value of one if the IPO firms have 
any discredited VCs, otherwise is zero. All variables are defined in the appendix. All regressions include 
year and industry controls. One, two and three asterisks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% level. The t-statistics are included in the parentheses and are reported for heteroscedasticity 
robust standard errors. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
  0-1  0-2  0-3 
DVC  -2.280*  -5.677***  -6.442**  
  (-1.90)  (-3.31)  (-2.39)    
Firm age  0.488  -0.359  -0.155    
  (0.42)  (-0.69)  (-0.05)    
Ln(proceeds)  -0.366  -1.706*  0.567    
  (-0.35)  (-2.08)  (0.31)    
Ln(total assets)  -0.200  0.626  -0.661    
  (-0.27)  (0.99)  (-0.43)    
Underwriter  -0.565  -0.058  -1.829    
  (-0.41)  (-0.10)  (-0.50)    
High tech  4.457*  4.142***  1.944    
  (1.73)  (3.62)  (0.37)    
Bubble period  -1.320  5.257  10.256    
  (-0.25)  (1.34)  (1.17)    
Underpricing  -0.005  -0.031**  -0.021    
  (-0.39)  (-2.66)  (-1.42)    
Revision  -0.075  -0.010  0.033    
  (-1.61)  (-0.33)  (0.36)    
Intercept  10.915**  14.478**  12.610*   
  (2.26)  (2.36)  (1.72)    
R-squared  0.0164  0.0185  0.0252    






Table 8 The impact of discredited VCs on buy and hold abnormal returns 
The table display results using ordinary least square regressions to investigate the impact of the 
participation of discredited VCs in IPO firms on buy and hold abnormal returns (BHARs). The dependent 
variable is BHAR in different periods after the offering. We define discredited VC-backed IPO as if the 
new issuing firms have any VCs who failed to prevent IPO fraud and lead to post-offering litigations in 
the past. Thus, DVC is a dummy taking the value of one if the IPO firms have any discredited VCs, 
otherwise is zero. All variables are defined in the appendix. All regressions include year and industry 
controls. One, two and three asterisks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. The t-
statistics are included in the parentheses and are reported for heteroscedasticity robust standard errors. All 
variables are defined in Appendix A. 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
  Week 1  Week 2-4  Month 2-3  Month 4-6  Month 0-6 
DVC  -0.020**  -0.022*  -0.001  -0.048*  -0.071*   
  (-2.09)  (-1.80)  (-0.06)  (-1.88)  (-1.77)    
Firm age  -0.004  -0.004  -0.014  -0.007  -0.050*   
  (-0.68)  (-1.42)  (-1.08)  (-0.48)  (-1.67)    
Ln(proceeds)  -0.009  -0.012  -0.008  -0.010  -0.050    
  (-1.46)  (-1.09)  (-0.40)  (-0.49)  (-1.41)    
Ln(total assets)  0.006**  0.006**  -0.002  0.013  0.037    
  (2.07)  (2.15)  (-0.14)  (1.01)  (1.58)    
Underwriter  0.008  0.013**  0.052  0.018  0.080*   
  (1.29)  (2.63)  (1.47)  (0.85)  (1.89)    
High tech  -0.008  0.028**  -0.029  -0.039  -0.022    
  (-1.16)  (2.63)  (-0.80)  (-1.16)  (-0.29)    
Bubble period  -0.028  -0.030  -0.145  -0.214  -0.316    
  (-0.49)  (-0.77)  (-0.98)  (-1.17)  (-1.53)    
Underpricing  0.000  -0.000**  -0.000  0.000  -0.000    
  (1.29)  (-2.33)  (-0.17)  (0.15)  (-0.35)    
Revision  -0.000**  0.000  -0.001  -0.001  -0.003*** 
  (-2.00)  (0.47)  (-1.01)  (-1.34)  (-3.64)    
Intercept  0.019  -0.026  -0.011  -0.074  -0.033    
  (0.61)  (-1.33)  (-0.14)  (-0.90)  (-0.20)    
R-squared  0.0342  0.0734  0.0447  0.0803  0.1062    




Table9 The impact of discredited VCs on post-IPO survival 
The table display results using Cox hazard proportional models to investigate the impact of the 
participation of discredited VCs in IPO firms on post-offering survival. In specification (1), we define 
failed firms as those were delisted during negative reasons. In specification (2), we include failed firms 
as those were either delisted due to negative reasons or acquired by other firms. We define discredited 
VC-backed IPO as if the new issuing firms have any VCs who failed to prevent IPO fraud and lead to 
post-offering litigations in the past. Thus, DVC is a dummy taking the value of one if the IPO firms have 
any discredited VCs, otherwise is zero. All variables are defined in the appendix. All regressions include 
year and industry controls. One, two and three asterisks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% level. The Z-statistics are included in the parentheses and hazards ratios are displayed on the left. 
All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
  (1)  (2) 
  Exclude M&A  Include M&A 
  Coeff.  HR  Coeff.  HR 
DVC  0.293*  1.341  0.347***  1.415 
  (1.69)    (3.52)                  
Firm age  -0.095  0.909  -0.061     0.941 
  (-1.11)    (-1.21)                  
Ln(proceeds)  0.143  1.153  0.099*    1.104 
  (1.49)    (1.74)                  
Underpricing  -0.006***  0.994  -0.003***  0.997 
  (-4.04)    (-4.35)                  
Underwriter  -0.322**  0.725  -0.163**   0.850 
  (-2.29)    (-2.06)                  
Auditor  0.172  1.188  0.108     1.114 
  (1.32)    (1.40)                  
High tech  0.098  1.103  0.250**   1.284 
  (0.72)    (3.12)                  
Ln(sales)  -0.293***  0.746  -0.067**   0.935 
  (-5.58)    (-2.13)                  
Leverage  0.927***  2.526  0.411***  1.508 
  (4.40)    (3.52)                  
Profitability  -0.255  0.775  -0.170     0.844 
  (-1.15)    (-1.26)      
Chi-square  178.566    166.347      
Chi-square  0.000    0.000   





Table 10 Discredited VCs and future litigation risks 
The table display results using logistic regression models to investigate the impact of the participation 
of discredited VCs in IPO firms on post-offering litigations. The dependent variable is a dummy 
indicating whether the firm was involved in lawsuits after going public, but not include the first time that 
the VC-backed IPOs were sued. We define discredited VC-backed IPO as if the new issuing firms have 
any VCs who failed to prevent IPO fraud and lead to post-offering litigations in the past. Thus, DVC is 
a dummy taking the value of one if the IPO firms have any discredited VCs, otherwise is zero. All 
variables are defined in the appendix. All regressions include year and industry controls. One, two and 
three asterisks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. The Z-statistics are included 
in the parentheses. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
  (1) 
 (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
DVC  0.619***  0.473***  0.337*  0.382*  0.831*** 
  (3.73)  (2.66)  (1.76)  (1.95)  (3.25) 
Underpricing    0.013***  0.012***  0.012***  0.017*** 
    (7.96)  (7.35)  (7.04)  (6.97) 
Firm age      -0.500***  -0.462***  -0.486*** 
      (-3.78)  (-3.48)  (-3.50) 
Ln(total assets)      0.258***  0.232***  0.227*** 
      (4.18)  (3.49)  (3.36) 
High tech      0.625***  0.591***  0.568*** 
      (3.24)  (3.01)  (2.92) 
Underwriter        0.724***  0.783*** 
        (2.59)  (2.74) 
Auditor        -0.164  -0.227 
        (-0.69)  (-0.93) 
DVC*Underpricing          -0.008*** 
          (-2.61) 
Intercept  -2.505***  -3.008***  -3.158***  -3.575***  -3.760*** 
  (-20.57)  (-21.01)  (-9.48)  (-9.04)  (-9.04) 
Pseudo R-squared  0.013 
 0.0134  0.165  0.174  0.183 
Obs.  1658 







Measures of discredited VC 
DVC Dummy variable taking 1 if the IPO firm is supported by any VCs who had backed fraudulent IPOs in the past, otherwise is 0. 
DVC(%) Number of discredited VCs in an IPO firm scaled by all VCs. 
 
Control variables 
Firm age Nature logarithms of one plus an IPO firm's age. The firm age is measured at the difference between the firm's IPO year and the year of establishment.  
Ln(proceeds) Nature logarithms of total proceeds that a firm raises during the process of going public.  
Ln (total assets) Nature logarithms of the firm's total assets in the IPO year.  
Leverage The ratio of total liabilities over total assets before the IPO.  
Underwriter Dummy variable taking 1 if underwriter's rank is equal to 7 or above, otherwise is 0. 
Auditor Dummy variable taking 1 if an IPO firm hired big-4 auditor, otherwise is 0. 
Share overhang 
The ratio of pre-IPO shares retained over shares filed during IPO, where pre-IPO shares retained contains shares owned by the pre-IPO shareholder that 
are not sold in the offering and share filed includes primary and secondary shares.  
Ln(no of 
bookrunners) 
Nature logarithms of the number of bookrunners working together during Initial Public Offering.  
High tech Dummy variable taking 1 if an IPO firm is in the high-tech industry, otherwise is 0. 
Bubble period Dummy variable taking 1 if a firm went public during the bubble period, otherwise is 0. 
Profitability The ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) to total assets in the IPO year. 
 
IPO performance measures 
Underpricing the percentage change from share price on the first day of trading to the offer price.  
Revision The percentage change from offer price to the mid of filling price range.  
Operating return 
on assets 
The ratio of operating income before depreciation to total assets. 
BHAR Buy and hold abnormal returns measured as : 
IPO litigation  
IPO delisting Dummy variable taking 1 if an IPO was delisted due to negative reasons, otherwise is 0. 
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Appendix B Correlation matrix 
 
Panel A Correlation matrix for IPO underpricing and revision analysis 
 Firm age Ln(proceeds) Ln(total assets) Leverage Underwriter Auditor Share overhang Ln(no of bookrunners) 
Firm age 1.000        
Ln(proceeds) 0.146 1.000       
Ln(total assets) 0.362 0.621 1.000      
Leverage 0.194 0.089 0.260 1.000     
Underwriter -0.037 0.394 0.322 0.023 1.000    
Auditor 0.024 0.182 0.137 -0.034 0.131 1.000   
Share overhang -0.101 0.028 -0.006 -0.032 0.116 0.028 1.000  
Ln(no of bookrunners) 0.205 0.516 0.472 0.108 0.091 0.185 -0.055 1.000 
 
Panel B Correlation matrix for post-IPO performance 
 Firm age Ln(proceeds) Ln(total assets) Underwriter High tech Bubble period Underpricing Revision 
Firm age 1.000        
Ln(proceeds) 0.146 1.000       
Ln(total assets) 0.362 0.621 1.000      
Underwriter -0.037 0.394 0.322 1.000     
High tech -0.079 -0.041 -0.108 0.043 1.000    
Bubble period -0.222 0.144 -0.102 0.203 0.134 1.000   
Underpricing -0.162 0.166 -0.059 0.209 0.179 0.421 1.000  
Revision -0.084 0.232 -0.012 0.116 0.204 0.155 0.376 1.000 
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Panel C Correlation matrix for survival analysis 
 Firm age Ln(proceed) Underpricing Underwriter Auditor High tech Ln(sales) Leverage Profitability 
Firm age 1.000         
Ln(proceeds) 0.104 1.000        
Underpricing -0.175 0.214 1.000       
Underwriter -0.043 0.429 0.236 1.000      
Auditor 0.014 0.136 0.052 0.111 1.000     
High tech -0.094 -0.048 0.189 0.021 0.014 1.000    
Ln(sales) 0.499 0.416 -0.114 0.152 0.025 -0.066 1.000   
Leverage 0.222 0.135 -0.126 0.070 -0.053 -0.125 0.333 1.000  








Chapter 5 Conclusion 
 
5.1 Summary and concluding remarks 
 
Since going public is a vital stage of a firm’s life circle, this study provides 
innovative evidence of how various factors affect IPO performance. In Chapter 2, we 
investigate how political corruption influence the process of a firm’s IPO and its 
underpricing. In Chapter 3, we explore the association between an IPO firm’s 
geographically dispersed business interests and its corporate failure in the periods after 
the offering. In Chapter 4, we question the impact of reputation damaged VCs on IPO 
performance.  
 
Specifically, in Chapter 2, we conjecture that political corruption aggregates 
information asymmetry in the local market and increases the value uncertainty of IPO 
firms. Consistent with this argument, we find that newly listed firms experience greater 
underpricing on the first day of trading in a corrupt environment, implying potential loess 
for those issuers. Evidence also suggests that the corruption-effect on underpricing is the 
most prominent if IPO firms have increased business concentration around the state where 
the headquarter locates. Moreover, political corruption also reduces firms’ post-IPO 
performance, as measured by the change of Tobin’s Q, capital expenditure, and 
profitability. 
 
Furthermore, we also reveal evidence that underwriters execute their certification 
roles in a corrupt environment. Particularly, prestigious underwriters make efforts to 
extract information from investors by frequently revising offer price, resulting in a greater 
number of revisions. Importantly, they help issuers reduce the level of underpricing when 
local corruption is high, but charging more commissions from those firms. Finally, we 
document that political corruption does not reduce the likelihood of achieving positive 
insider’s wealth gains, which is attributed to underwriter’s promoting efforts.  
 
In Chapter 3, we use the number of state citations as proxy for IPO firm’s 
geographically dispersed business interests. Our empirical evidence suggests that the 
level of firms’ spatially distributed operations is positively related to their post-offering 
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failure risks. Moreover, the soft operating information environment has predominated 
geographically dispersed IPO firm’s failures, as the information becomes more difficult 
to transfer in such an environment, resulting in more significant information asymmetry 
problem within the organization. Further, because the soft information mainly replies on 
personal interactions, we document that dispersed newly listed firms are more likely to 
fail in small communities (e.g., with less population) in a soft information environment 
where social concerns have a significant impact on managerial decision making, which 
deteriorate agency conflicts between managers and shareholders. We also document that 
geographically dispersed IPO firms experience declined operating performance in the 
post-offering periods. Thus, empirical findings are consistent with our hypothesis that 
geographic dispersion caused organizational information asymmetry negatively affect the 
manager’s decision making and deteriorate agency problems, which ultimately result in 
corporate failures. 
 
We also investigate how discredited VCs affect IPO performance. In Chapter 4, 
we measure discredited VCs as those who did not prevent IPO fraud and result in post-
offering lawsuits. In the empirical analysis, we find that IPOs supported by any 
discredited VCs left large amount of “money on the table” (e.g., higher underpricing). 
Moreover, we find increased offer price revisions in those firms. Thus, the results suggest 
that discredited VCs are reputation damaged and lead to great information disparity 
between issuers and investors. Further, discredited VC-backed IPOs are associated with 
declined operating returns on assets, BHARs, and are more likely to fail in the periods 
subsequent to the offering. This stream of evidence suggests that discredited VCs do not 
possess as strong managerial ability as other VCs who never experienced monitoring 
failures, as their backed IPOs are value-decreasing after going public. Finally, we 
document that discredited VCs allow higher underpricing because they have the incentive 
to avoid future IPO lawsuits. Thus, our study may enable investors to adjust their 
valuation on IPOs with VCs who committed to monitoring failures when making 
investment decisions. 
 
5.2 Research limitations 
 
We acknowledge that this thesis may subject to several research limitations. In 
our first study which examines the relationship between a politically corrupt environment 
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and IPO short-run performance (e.g., underpricing), we use observed corruption 
conviction cases from the Department of Justice in the U.S. and measure corrupt 
environment at the state level. However, it is not clear about how managers’ attitude to 
corruption is on the firm level. In this regard, we may expect firm managers who have the 
intention of using briberies can impose a significant impact on corporate performance 
(e.g., see, Mironov (2015) for such evidence in Russia; Liu (2016)). Further, previous 
studies suggest that investors enjoy local information bias (e.g., Loughran and Schultz 
(2005)). Nielsson and Wójcik (2016) distinguish IPO firms between rural and urban 
locations and find rurally located issuers incur lower underpricing. Thus, we may 
conjecture that rural investors may be more sensitive to political corruption because they 
rely on local information. However, retrieving corruption information at the city or county 
level is not possible because of the data availability.  
 
Moreover, concerning the analysis of the impact of firms’ geographic dispersion 
on post-IPO survival, our study only concentrates the research area in the public capital 
market. Because firms in private stages may experience fewer challenges compared to 
public firms, we believe that our study would provide a more comprehensive 
understanding of the effect of geographic dispersion on corporate failures by considering 
private firms. Nevertheless, we do not further explore this research question because the 
availability of such data from private firms are not available. 
 
Last but not least, for the third study, we only explore the relationship between 
discredited VCs and IPO performance. Thus, it is also interesting to examine VCs’ returns 
and how the shares are finally distributed to LPs in those IPOs. However, those data 
remain confidential to venture capitalists and not available to the public.  
 
Despite the limitations stated above, this thesis makes significant contributions to 
the extant literature in IPO performance (e.g., underpricing), post-offering survival, and 







5.3 Recommendations for future work 
 
Concerning the future, we suggest the following possible research directions. First, 
since political corruption negatively affects IPO short-run performance (e.g., 
underpricing), it is meaningful to investigate how such corruption-effect is related to the 
IPOs’ long-run performance, such as post-offering failure risks. Moreover, future work 
can also explore insiders’ share trading behaviors in post-IPO periods; because insiders 
may have the incentive to get rid of the corrupt environment, thereby selling a significant 
portion of shares they held after the firm goes public. In addition, our study is focused on 
the impact of corruption in the U.S.; future research can extend this topic to other areas 
of the world. Because the differing political backgrounds and regulations in various 
counties, corruption may have distinctive shocks to economic outcomes (e.g., Leff (1964); 
Lui (1985); Michael T Rock and Bonnett (2004)). To this end, we believe that an 
international context will provide a more insightful understanding of how political 
corruption affects IPO performance. 
 
Furthermore, corresponding to our research limitations, we encourage researchers 
to adopt different means to collect geographic dispersion data for private firms (e.g., 
interviews). We also suggest future studies to highlight the importance of managerial 
aspects related to geographically dispersed firms’ survival, such as CEOs’ management 
ability in those firms. For example, CEOs in those firms may be more opportunistic and 
increase the use of earnings management. In addition, shareholders may not monitor 
dispersed firms well because of the problem with internal information flow and severe 
agency conflicts in those firms; and later studies can investigate VCs’ investment 
preference in geographically dispersed firms. An interesting finding would be that VCs 
are less likely to invest in firms with a higher level of geographic dispersion because of 
the monitoring difficulties.  
 
Finally, for our study on the association between discredited VCs and IPO 
performance, we suggest future research studies to explore those VCs’ behaviors in newly 
listed firms. For example, due to monitoring failures in previously backed IPOs, VCs may 
adopt more rigorous staged financing approach and take more powerful board positions 
in order to monitor the IPO firms better. They may also provide follow-on capital in the 
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post-offering periods and cash out from firms later. We believe that these research 






Addoum, J.M., Kumar, A. and Law, K., 2017. Slow diffusion of state-level 
information and return predictability. Working Paper, University of Miami. 
Ades, A. and Tella, R.D., 1997. National Champions and Corruption: Some 
Unpleasant Interventionist Arithmetic. The Economic Journal, 107(443), pp. 
1023-1042. 
Alesina, A. and Angeletos, G.-M., 2005. Corruption, inequality, and fairness. 
Journal of Monetary Economics, 52(7), pp. 1227-1244. 
Alesina, A., Baqir, R. and Easterly, W., 2000. Redistributive public employment. 
Journal of Urban Economics, 48(2), pp. 219-241. 
Allison, P.D., 2010. Survival analysis using SAS: a practical guide. SAS Institute. 
Amihud, Y., Hauser, S. and Kirsh, A., 2003. Allocations, adverse selection, and 
cascades in IPOs: Evidence from the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 68(1), pp. 137-158. 
Amit, R., Brander, J. and Zott, C., 1998. Why do venture capital firms exist? 
Theory and Canadian evidence. Journal of Business Venturing, 13(6), pp. 441-466. 
Amore, M.D. and Bennedsen, M., 2013. The value of local political connections in 
a low-corruption environment. Journal of Financial Economics, 110(2), pp. 387-
402. 
An, H.H. and Chan, K.C., 2008. Credit ratings and IPO pricing. Journal of Corporate 
Finance, 14(5), pp. 584-595. 
Ang, J.S. and Brau, J.C., 2003. Concealing and confounding adverse signals: 
Insider wealth-maximizing behavior in the IPO process. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 67(1), pp. 149-172. 
Atanasov, V., Ivanov, V. and Litvak, K., 2012. Does reputation limit opportunistic 
behavior in the VC industry? Evidence from litigation against VCs. The Journal of 
Finance, 67(6), pp. 2215-2246. 
Athanasouli, D. and Goujard, A., 2015. Corruption and management practices: 
Firm level evidence. Journal of Comparative Economics, 43(4), pp. 1014-1034. 
Bai, J., Jayachandran, S., Malesky, E.J. and Olken, B.A., 2014. Does Economic 
Growth Reduce Corruption? Theory and Evidence from Vietnam. National Bureau 
of Economic Research. 
Bajo, E. and Raimondo, C., 2017. Media sentiment and IPO underpricing. Journal 
of Corporate Finance, 46, pp. 139-153. 
Banerjee, S., Dai, L. and Shrestha, K., 2011. Cross-country IPOs: What explains 
differences in underpricing? Journal of Corporate Finance, 17(5), pp. 1289-1305. 
Banerjee, S., Güçbilmez, U. and Pawlina, G., 2016. Leaders and followers in hot 
IPO markets. Journal of Corporate Finance, 37, pp. 309-334. 
166 
 
Barry, C.B., Muscarella, C.J., Peavy, J.W. and Vetsuypens, M.R., 1990. The role of 
venture capital in the creation of public companies: Evidence from the going-
public process. Journal of Financial Economics, 27(2), pp. 447-471. 
Baucus, M.S. and Baucus, D.A., 1997. Paying the piper: An empirical examination 
of longer-term financial consequences of illegal corporate behavior. Academy of 
Management Journal, 40(1), pp. 129-151. 
Beatty, R.P., Bunsis, H. and Hand, J.R., 1998. The indirect economic penalties in 
SEC investigations of underwriters. Journal of Financial Economics, 50(2), pp. 
151-186. 
Beatty, R.P. and Ritter, J.R., 1986. Investment banking, reputation, and the 
underpricing of initial public offerings. Journal of Financial Economics, 15(1), pp. 
213-232. 
Benveniste, L.M., Busaba, W.Y. and Wilhelm Jr, W.J., 2002. Information 
externalities and the role of underwriters in primary equity markets. Journal of 
Financial Intermediation, 11(1), pp. 61-86. 
Benveniste, L.M., Ljungqvist, A., Wilhelm Jr, W.J. and Yu, X., 2003. Evidence of 
information spillovers in the production of investment banking services. The 
Journal of Finance, 58(2), pp. 577-608. 
Benveniste, L.M. and Spindt, P.A., 1989. How investment bankers determine the 
offer price and allocation of new issues. Journal of Financial Economics, 24(2), pp. 
343-361. 
Berger, A.N., Miller, N.H., Petersen, M.A., Rajan, R.G. and Stein, J., 2005. Does 
function follow organizational form? Evidence from the lending practices of large 
and small banks. Journal of Financial Economics, 76(2), pp. 237-269. 
Bernile, G., Kumar, A. and Sulaeman, J., 2015. Home away from home: 
Geography of information and local investors. The Review of Financial Studies, 
28(7), pp. 2009-2049. 
Bernstein, S., 2015. Does going public affect innovation? The Journal of Finance, 
70(4), pp. 1365-1403. 
Bertrand, M. and Schoar, A., 2003. Managing with style: The effect of managers 
on firm policies. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(4), pp. 1169-1208. 
Bhagat, S., Bizjak, J. and Coles, J.L., 1998. The shareholder wealth implications of 
corporate lawsuits. Financial Management, pp. 5-27. 
Bliss, C. and Tella, R.D., 1997. Does competition kill corruption? Journal of 
Political Economy, 105(5), pp. 1001-1023. 
Bloom, N. and Van Reenen, J., 2010. Why do management practices differ across 
firms and countries? The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 24(1), pp. 203-224. 
Bottazzi, L. and Da Rin, M., 2002. Venture capital in Europe and the financing of 
innovative companies. Economic policy, 17(34), pp. 229-270. 
Bottazzi, L., Da Rin, M. and Hellmann, T., 2008. Who are the active investors?: 




Boulton, T.J. and Campbell, T.C., 2016. Managerial confidence and initial public 
offerings. Journal of Corporate Finance, 37, pp. 375-392. 
Boylan, R.T. and Long, C.X., 2003. Measuring public corruption in the American 
states: A survey of state house reporters. State Politics & Policy Quarterly, 3(4), 
pp. 420-438. 
Bradley, D.J. and Jordan, B.D., 2002. Partial adjustment to public information and 
IPO underpricing. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 37(04), pp. 595-
616. 
Brav, A. and Gompers, P.A., 1997. Myth or reality? The long‐run 
underperformance of initial public offerings: Evidence from venture and 
nonventure capital‐backed companies. The Journal of Finance, 52(5), pp. 1791-
1821. 
Butler, A.W., Fauver, L. and Mortal, S., 2009. Corruption, political connections, 
and municipal finance. Review of Financial Studies, p. hhp010. 
Cao, J., Jiang, F. and Ritter, J.R., 2013. Patent and Innovation-Driven Performance 
in Venture Capital-Backed IPOs. Available at SSRN, 2364668. 
Carter, R.B., Dark, F.H. and Singh, A.K., 1998. Underwriter reputation, initial 
returns, and the long‐run performance of IPO stocks. The Journal of Finance, 
53(1), pp. 285-311. 
Celikyurt, U., Sevilir, M. and Shivdasani, A., 2010. Going public to acquire? The 
acquisition motive in IPOs. Journal of Financial Economics, 96(3), pp. 345-363. 
Chandler, A.D., 1991. The functions of the HQ unit in the multibusiness firm. 
Strategic Management Journal, 12(S2), pp. 31-50. 
Chen, Z. and Wilhelm, W.J., 2008. A theory of the transition to secondary market 
trading of IPOs. Journal of Financial Economics, 90(3), pp. 219-236. 
Chiang, Y.-M., Qian, Y. and Sherman, A.E., 2010. Endogenous entry and partial 
adjustment in IPO auctions: Are institutional investors better informed? Review 
of Financial Studies, 23(3), pp. 1200-1230. 
Choy, S.K., Lai, T.-K. and Ng, T., 2017. Do tax havens create firm value? Journal of 
Corporate Finance, 42, pp. 198-220. 
Christoffersen, S.K., Nain, A. and Tang, Y., 2010. IPO Cycles, Firm Characteristics, 
and the Role of Underwriters. Working Paper. 
Cliff, M.T. and Denis, D.J., 2004. Do initial public offering firms purchase analyst 
coverage with underpricing? The Journal of Finance, 59(6), pp. 2871-2901. 
Çolak, G., Durnev, A. and Qian, Y., 2017. Political uncertainty and IPO activity: 
Evidence from US gubernatorial elections. Journal of Financial and Quantitative 
Analysis, pp. 1-42. 
Çolak, G. and Günay, H., 2011. Strategic waiting in the IPO markets. Journal of 
Corporate Finance, 17(3), pp. 555-583. 
Collis, D., Young, D. and Goold, M., 2007. The size, structure, and performance of 
corporate headquarters. Strategic Management Journal, 28(4), pp. 383-405. 
Cook, D.O., Kieschnick, R. and Van Ness, R.A., 2006. On the marketing of IPOs. 
Journal of Financial Economics, 82(1), pp. 35-61. 
168 
 
Cooney, J.W., Madureira, L., Singh, A.K. and Yang, K., 2015. Social ties and IPO 
outcomes. Journal of Corporate Finance, 33, pp. 129-146. 
Corwin, S.A. and Schultz, P., 2005. The role of IPO underwriting syndicates: 
Pricing, information production, and underwriter competition. The Journal of 
Finance, 60(1), pp. 443-486. 
Coval, J.D. and Moskowitz, T.J., 1999. Home bias at home: Local equity 
preference in domestic portfolios. The Journal of Finance, 54(6), pp. 2045-2073. 
Cumming, D., Haslem, B. and Knill, A., 2017. Entrepreneurial Litigation and 
Venture Capital Finance. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 52(5), pp. 
2217-2250. 
Dal Bó, E. and Rossi, M.A., 2007. Corruption and inefficiency: Theory and 
evidence from electric utilities. Journal of Public Economics, 91(5), pp. 939-962. 
David, C.R., 1972. Regression models and life tables (with discussion). Journal of 
the Royal Statistical Society, 34, pp. 187-220. 
Dechow, P.M., Sloan, R.G. and Sweeney, A.P., 1996. Causes and consequences of 
earnings manipulation: An analysis of firms subject to enforcement actions by 
the SEC. Contemporary Accounting Research, 13(1), pp. 1-36. 
Delios, A. and Beamish, P.W., 1999. Ownership strategy of Japanese firms: 
Transactional, institutional, and experience influences. Strategic Management 
Journal, pp. 915-933. 
Delios, A. and Henisz, W.I., 2000. Japanese firms' investment strategies in 
emerging economies. Academy of Management journal, 43(3), pp. 305-323. 
Demers, E. and Joos, P., 2007. IPO failure risk. Journal of Accounting Research, 
45(2), pp. 333-371. 
Denis, D.J., Denis, D.K. and Yost, K., 2002. Global diversification, industrial 
diversification, and firm value. The Journal of Finance, 57(5), pp. 1951-1979. 
Dickson, P.R. and Ginter, J.L., 1987. Market segmentation, product 
differentiation, and marketing strategy. Journal of marketing, 51(2), pp. 1-10. 
Dixit, A.K., 2015. How business community institutions can help fight corruption. 
The World Bank Economic Review, 29(suppl 1), pp. S25-S47. 
Durnev, A. and Fauver, L., 2011. Stealing from thieves: Expropriation risk, firm 
governance, and performance. University of Tennessee,Knoxville,TN. 
Duru, A. and Reeb, D.M., 2002. International diversification and analysts' forecast 
accuracy and bias. The Accounting Review, 77(2), pp. 415-433. 
Dyreng, S.D., Lindsey, B.P. and Thornock, J.R., 2013. Exploring the role Delaware 
plays as a domestic tax haven. Journal of Financial Economics, 108(3), pp. 751-
772. 
Eisenhardt, K.M., 1985. Control: Organizational and economic approaches. 
Management Science, 31(2), pp. 134-149. 
Ekkayokkaya, M. and Pengniti, T., 2012. Governance reform and IPO 
underpricing. Journal of Corporate Finance, 18(2), pp. 238-253. 
169 
 
Espenlaub, S., Khurshed, A. and Mohamed, A., 2012. IPO survival in a 
reputational market. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 39(3‐4), pp. 427-
463. 
Espenlaub, S., Khurshed, A., Mohamed, A. and Saadouni, B., 2016. Committed 
anchor investment and IPO survival–The roles of cornerstone and strategic 
investors. Journal of Corporate Finance, 41, pp. 139-155. 
Fama, E.F. and French, K.R., 2004. New lists: Fundamentals and survival rates. 
Journal of Financial Economics, 73(2), pp. 229-269. 
Faulkender, M. and Petersen, M.A., 2006. Does the source of capital affect 
capital structure? Review of Financial Studies, 19(1), pp. 45-79. 
Fisman, R. and Gatti, R., 2002. Decentralization and corruption: evidence across 
countries. Journal of Public Economics, 83(3), pp. 325-345. 
Fisman, R. and Svensson, J., 2007. Are corruption and taxation really harmful to 
growth? Firm level evidence. Journal of Development Economics, 83(1), pp. 63-
75. 
Fulghieri, P. and Sevilir, M., 2009. Size and focus of a venture capitalist's 
portfolio. Review of Financial Studies, 22(11), pp. 4643-4680. 
Gao, W., Ng, L. and Wang, Q., 2008. Does geographic dispersion affect firm 
valuation? Journal of Corporate Finance, 14(5), pp. 674-687. 
Garcia, D. and Norli, Ø ., 2012. Geographic dispersion and stock returns. Journal 
of Financial Economics, 106(3), pp. 547-565. 
Garmaise, M.J. and Moskowitz, T.J., 2003. Confronting information asymmetries: 
Evidence from real estate markets. The Review of Financial Studies, 17(2), pp. 
405-437. 
Garrett, J., Hoitash, R. and Prawitt, D., 2014. Trust and financial reporting quality. 
Journal of Accounting Research, 52(5), pp. 1087-1125. 
Gill, A. and Walz, U., 2016. Are VC-backed IPOs delayed trade sales? Journal of 
Corporate Finance, 37, pp. 356-374. 
Giroud, X., 2013. Proximity and investment: Evidence from plant-level data. The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 128(2), pp. 861-915. 
Glaeser, E.L. and Saks, R.E., 2006. Corruption in America. Journal of Public 
Economics, 90(6), pp. 1053-1072. 
Gompers, P. and Lerner, J., 1998. Venture capital distributions: Short‐run and 
long‐run reactions. The Journal of Finance, 53(6), pp. 2161-2183. 
Gompers, P.A., 1996. Grandstanding in the venture capital industry. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 42(1), pp. 133-156. 
Gorman, M. and Sahlman, W.A., 1989. What do venture capitalists do? Journal of 
Business Venturing, 4(4), pp. 231-248. 
Gounopoulos, D., Kallias, A., Kallias, K. and Tzeremes, P.G., 2017. Political money 
contributions of US IPOs. Journal of Corporate Finance, 43, pp. 19-38. 
Gounopoulos, D. and Pham, H., 2018. Specialist CEOs and IPO survival. Journal of 
Corporate Finance, 48, pp. 217-243. 
170 
 
Habib, M.A. and Ljungqvist, A.P., 2001. Underpricing and entrepreneurial wealth 
losses in IPOs: Theory and evidence. Review of Financial Studies, 14(2), pp. 433-
458. 
Hanley, K.W., 1993. The underpricing of initial public offerings and the partial 
adjustment phenomenon. Journal of Financial Economics, 34(2), pp. 231-250. 
Hanley, K.W. and Hoberg, G., 2012. Litigation risk, strategic disclosure and the 
underpricing of initial public offerings. Journal of Financial Economics, 103(2), pp. 
235-254. 
Helbing, P., Lucey, B.M. and Vigne, S.A., 2019. The determinants of IPO 
withdrawal–Evidence from Europe. Journal of Corporate Finance. 
Hellmann, T. and Puri, M., 2002. Venture capital and the professionalization of 
start‐up firms: Empirical evidence. The Journal of Finance, 57(1), pp. 169-197. 
Hensler, D.A., Rutherford, R.C. and Springer, T.M., 1997. The survival of initial 
public offerings in the aftermarket. Journal of Financial Research, 20(1), pp. 93-
110. 
Hill, C.W., Hitt, M.A. and Hoskisson, R.E., 1992. Cooperative versus competitive 
structures in related and unrelated diversified firms. Organization Science, 3(4), 
pp. 501-521. 
Himmelberg, C.P., Hubbard, R.G. and Palia, D., 1999. Understanding the 
determinants of managerial ownership and the link between ownership and 
performance. Journal of Financial Economics 
53(3), pp. 353-384. 
Hochberg, Y.V., 2011. Venture capital and corporate governance in the newly 
public firm. Review of Finance, 16(2), pp. 429-480. 
Hsu, D.H., 2004. What do entrepreneurs pay for venture capital affiliation? The 
Journal of Finance, 59(4), pp. 1805-1844. 
Jain, B.A., Jayaraman, N. and Kini, O., 2008. The path-to-profitability of Internet 
IPO firms. Journal of Business Venturing, 23(2), pp. 165-194. 
Jain, B.A. and Kini, O., 1994. The post‐issue operating performance of IPO firms. 
The Journal of Finance, 49(5), pp. 1699-1726. 
Jain, B.A. and Kini, O., 2000. Does the presence of venture capitalists improve the 
survival profile of IPO firms? Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 27(9‐10), 
pp. 1139-1183. 
Jain, B.A. and Kini, O., 2008. The impact of strategic investment choices on Post‐
issue operating performance and survival of US IPO firms. Journal of Business 
Finance & Accounting, 35(3‐4), pp. 459-490. 
Jennings, J.N., Seo, H. and Tanlu, L., 2013. The effect of organizational complexity 
on earnings forecasting behavior. Working papers, Washington University in 
St.Louis. 
Jensen, M.C. and Meckling, W.H., 1976. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, 




Jiang, G., Lee, C.M. and Zhang, Y., 2005. Information uncertainty and expected 
returns. Review of Accounting Studies, 10(2-3), pp. 185-221. 
John, K., Knyazeva, A. and Knyazeva, D., 2011. Does geography matter? Firm 
location and corporate payout policy. Journal of Financial Economics, 101(3), pp. 
533-551. 
Khanna, T. and Palepu, K., 2000. Is group affiliation profitable in emerging 
markets? An analysis of diversified Indian business groups. The Journal of 
Finance, 55(2), pp. 867-891. 
Krishnan, C., Ivanov, V.I., Masulis, R.W. and Singh, A.K., 2011. Venture capital 
reputation, post-IPO performance, and corporate governance. Journal of 
Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 46(5), pp. 1295-1333. 
Landier, A., Nair, V.B. and Wulf, J., 2009. Trade-offs in staying close: Corporate 
decision making and geographic dispersion. The Review of Financial Studies, 
22(3), pp. 1119-1148. 
Lee, P.M. and Wahal, S., 2004. Grandstanding, certification and the underpricing 
of venture capital backed IPOs. Journal of Financial Economics, 73(2), pp. 375-
407. 
Leff, N.H., 1964. Economic development through bureaucratic corruption. 
American Behavioral Scientist, 8(3), pp. 8-14. 
Leone, A.J., Rock, S. and Willenborg, M., 2007. Disclosure of intended use of 
proceeds and underpricing in initial public offerings. Journal of Accounting 
Research, 45(1), pp. 111-153. 
Lerner, J., 1995. Venture capitalists and the oversight of private firms. Journal of 
Finance, 50(1), pp. 301-318. 
Levis, M., 1990. The winner's curse problem, interest costs and the underpricing 
of initial public offerings. The Economic Journal, 100(399), pp. 76-89. 
Li, X., Wang, S.S. and Wang, X., 2019. Trust and IPO underpricing. Journal of 
Corporate Finance, 56, pp. 224-248. 
Lin, C. and Su, D., 2008. Industrial diversification, partial privatization and firm 
valuation: Evidence from publicly listed firms in China. Journal of Corporate 
Finance, 14(4), pp. 405-417. 
Litov, L.P., Moreton, P. and Zenger, T.R., 2012. Corporate strategy, analyst 
coverage, and the uniqueness paradox. Management Science, 58(10), pp. 1797-
1815. 
Liu, X., 2016. Corruption culture and corporate misconduct. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 122(2), pp. 307-327. 
Liu, X. and Ritter, J.R., 2011. Local underwriter oligopolies and IPO underpricing. 
Journal of Financial Economics, 102(3), pp. 579-601. 
Ljungqvist, A., Nanda, V. and Singh, R., 2006. Hot markets, investor sentiment, 
and IPO pricing. The Journal of Business, 79(4), pp. 1667-1702. 
Ljungqvist, A. and Wilhelm, W.J., 2003. IPO pricing in the dot‐com bubble. The 
Journal of Finance, 58(2), pp. 723-752. 
172 
 
Ljungqvist, A.P. and Wilhelm, W.J., 2002. IPO allocations: discriminatory or 
discretionary? Journal of Financial Economics, 65(2), pp. 167-201. 
Lochner, L., 2007. Education and crime. University of Western Ontario, 5(8), pp. 
1-14. 
Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Phalippou, L. and Gottschalg, O., 2015. Giants at the gate: 
Investment returns and diseconomies of scale in private equity. Journal of 
Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 50(3), pp. 377-411. 
Loughran, T. and McDonald, B., 2013. IPO first-day returns, offer price revisions, 
volatility, and form S-1 language. Journal of Financial Economics, 109(2), pp. 307-
326. 
Loughran, T. and Ritter, J.R., 1995. The new issues puzzle. The Journal of finance, 
50(1), pp. 23-51. 
Loughran, T. and Ritter, J.R., 2002. Why don’t issuers get upset about leaving 
money on the table in IPOs? Review of Financial Studies, 15(2), pp. 413-444. 
Loughran, T. and Ritter, J.R., 2004. Why has IPO underpricing changed over time? 
Financial Management, 33, pp. 5-37. 
Loughran, T. and Schultz, P., 2005. Liquidity: Urban versus rural firms. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 78(2), pp. 341-374. 
Lowry, M. and Shu, S., 2002. Litigation risk and IPO underpricing. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 65(3), pp. 309-335. 
Lui, F.T., 1985. An equilibrium queuing model of bribery. Journal of Political 
Economy, 93(4), pp. 760-781. 
Marcato, G., Milcheva, S. and Zheng, C., 2018. Market integration, country 
institutions and IPO underpricing. Journal of Corporate Finance, 53, pp. 87-105. 
Marciukaityte, D., Szewczyk, S.H., Uzun, H. and Varma, R., 2006. Governance and 
performance changes after accusations of corporate fraud. Financial Analysts 
Journal, 62(3), pp. 32-41. 
Mauer, D.C., Wang, S., Wang, X. and Zhang, Y., 2015. Global diversification and 
IPO returns. Journal of Banking & Finance, 58, pp. 436-456. 
Mauro, P., 1995. Corruption and growth. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, pp. 
681-712. 
Megginson, W.L. and Weiss, K.A., 1991. Venture capitalist certification in initial 
public offerings. The Journal of Finance, 46(3), pp. 879-903. 
Merton, R.C., 1987. A simple model of capital market equilibrium with 
incomplete information. The journal of finance, 42(3), pp. 483-510. 
Meyer, K.E., 2006. Globalfocusing: From domestic conglomerates to global 
specialists. Journal of management studies, 43(5), pp. 1109-1144. 
Mironov, M., 2015. Should one hire a corrupt CEO in a corrupt country? Journal 
of Financial Economics, 117(1), pp. 29-42. 
Mo, P.H., 2001. Corruption and economic growth. Journal of Comparative 
Economics, 29(1), pp. 66-79. 
Murphy, K.M., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R.W., 1993. Why is rent-seeking so costly 
to growth? The American Economic Review, 83(2), pp. 409-414. 
173 
 
Nahata, R., 2008. Venture capital reputation and investment performance. 
Journal of Financial Economics, 90(2), pp. 127-151. 
Neupane, S., Paudyal, K. and Thapa, C., 2014. Firm quality or market sentiment: 
What matters more for IPO investors? Journal of Banking & Finance, 44, pp. 207-
218. 
Neus, W. and Walz, U., 2005. Exit timing of venture capitalists in the course of an 
initial public offering. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 14(2), pp. 253-277. 
Nguyen, T.T. and Van Dijk, M.A., 2012. Corruption, growth, and governance: 
Private vs. state-owned firms in Vietnam. Journal of Banking & Finance, 36(11), 
pp. 2935-2948. 
Nielsson, U. and Wójcik, D., 2016. Proximity and IPO underpricing. Journal of 
Corporate Finance, 38, pp. 92-105. 
North, D.C., 1990. Institutions, institutional change and economic performance. 
Cambridge University Press,Cambridge. 
Paunov, C., 2016. Corruption's asymmetric impacts on firm innovation. Journal of 
Development Economics, 118, pp. 216-231. 
Petersen, M.A., 2004. Information: Hard and soft. Working Paper, Northwestern 
University. 
Petersen, M.A. and Rajan, R.G., 2002. Does distance still matter? The information 
revolution in small business lending. The Journal of Finance, 57(6), pp. 2533-
2570. 
Pevzner, M., Xie, F. and Xin, X.J.J.o.F.E., 2015. When firms talk, do investors 
listen? The role of trust in stock market reactions to corporate earnings 
announcements. 117(1), pp. 190-223. 
Pirinsky, C. and Wang, Q., 2006. Does corporate headquarters location matter for 
stock returns? The Journal of Finance, 61(4), pp. 1991-2015. 
Platikanova, P. and Mattei, M.M., 2016. Firm geographic dispersion and financial 
analysts’ forecasts. Journal of Banking & Finance, 64, pp. 71-89. 
Purnanandam, A.K. and Swaminathan, B., 2004. Are IPOs really underpriced? The 
Review of Financial Studies, 17(3), pp. 811-848. 
Ritter, J.R., 1984. The" hot issue" market of 1980. Journal of Business, pp. 215-
240. 
Ritter, J.R., 2011. Equilibrium in the initial public offerings market. Annu. Rev. 
Financ. Econ., 3(1), pp. 347-374. 
Rock, K., 1986. Why new issues are underpriced. Journal of Financial Economics, 
15(1), pp. 187-212. 
Rock, M.T. and Bonnett, H., 2004. The comparative politics of corruption: 
accounting for the East Asian paradox in empirical studies of corruption, growth 
and investment. World Development, 32(6), pp. 999-1017. 
Sahlman, W.A., 1990. The structure and governance of venture-capital 
organizations. Journal of financial Economics, 27(2), pp. 473-521. 
Schultz, P., 1993. Unit initial public offerings: A form of staged financing. Journal 
of Financial Economics, 34(2), pp. 199-229. 
174 
 
Sherman, A.E. and Titman, S., 2002. Building the IPO order book: underpricing 
and participation limits with costly information. Journal of Financial Economics, 
65(1), pp. 3-29. 
Slangen, A.H. and Van Tulder, R.J., 2009. Cultural distance, political risk, or 
governance quality? Towards a more accurate conceptualization and 
measurement of external uncertainty in foreign entry mode research. 
International Business Review, 18(3), pp. 276-291. 
Smajlbegovic, E., 2018. Regional economic activity and stock returns. Journal of 
Financial and Quantitative Analysis, pp. 1-32. 
Smith, C.W. and Watts, R.L., 1992. The investment opportunity set and corporate 
financing, dividend, and compensation policies. Journal of Financial Economics 
32(3), pp. 263-292. 
Smith, J.D., 2016. US political corruption and firm financial policies. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 121(2), pp. 350-367. 
Somers, M.J., 1996. Modelling employee withdrawal behaviour over time: A 
study of turnover using survival analysis. Journal of Occupational and 
Organizational Psychology, 69(4), pp. 315-326. 
Stulz, R.M., 2005. The limits of financial globalization. The Journal of Finance, 
60(4), pp. 1595-1638. 
Svensson, J., 2003. Who Must Pay Bribes and How Much? Evidence from a Cross-
Section of Firms. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1(118), pp. 207-230. 
Tian, X., Udell, G.F. and Yu, X., 2016. Disciplining delegated monitors: When 
venture capitalists fail to prevent fraud by their IPO firms. Journal of Accounting 
and Economics, 61(2), pp. 526-544. 
Titman, S. and Trueman, B., 1986. Information quality and the valuation of new 
issues. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 8(2), pp. 159-172. 
Vial, V. and Hanoteau, J., 2010. Corruption, manufacturing plant growth, and the 
Asian paradox: Indonesian evidence. World Development, 38(5), pp. 693-705. 
Walker, T., Turtle, H.J., Pukthuanthong, K. and Thiengtham, D., 2015. Legal 
opportunism, litigation risk, and IPO underpricing. Journal of Business Research, 
68(2), pp. 326-340. 
Wang, T.Y., 2011. Corporate securities fraud: Insights from a new empirical 
framework. The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, 29(3), pp. 535-568. 
Wang, W. and Yung, C., 2011. IPO information aggregation and underwriter 
quality. Review of Finance, 15(2), pp. 301-325. 
Weber, J. and Willenborg, M., 2003. Do expert informational intermediaries add 
value? Evidence from auditors in microcap initial public offerings. Journal of 
Accounting Research, 41(4), pp. 681-720. 
Welbourne, T.M. and Andrews, A.O., 1996. Predicting the performance of initial 
public offerings: Should human resource management be in the equation? 
Academy of Management Journal, 39(4), pp. 891-919. 
Welch, I., 1989. Seasoned offerings, imitation costs, and the underpricing of 
initial public offerings. The Journal of Finance, 44(2), pp. 421-449. 
175 
 
Welch, I., 1992. Sequential sales, learning, and cascades. The Journal of finance, 
47(2), pp. 695-732. 
Wooldridge, J., 2015. Introductory econometrics: A modern approach. Nelson 
Education. 
Zhang, X.F., 2006. Information uncertainty and stock returns. The Journal of 
Finance, 61(1), pp. 105-137. 
Zhu, Y., 2009. The relation between IPO underpricing and litigation risk revisited: 
Changes between 1990 and 2002. Financial Management, 38(2), pp. 323-355. 
 
